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Abstract

Fair exchange protocols aim to allow two parties to exchange digital items in a fair
manner. Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a kind of protocols that solves the fair
exchange problem with the help of a trusted third party (TTP), usually referred to
as an ‘arbitrator’. The participation of the arbitrator is only required when there
is a dispute between the exchanging parties. In the literature, the highest level of
security of optimistic fair exchange is the multi-user security in the chosen-key model,
proposed by Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo in CT-RSA 2008. They showed that
an efficient optimistic fair exchange scheme, secure in this sense, can be constructed
generically from a conventional signature and a ring signature. In particular, the
underlying ring signature is required to be unforgeable under an adaptive attack,
against a static adversary in the 2-user setting.
Concurrent signatures, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson in Eurocrypt
2004, allow two parties to produce two ambiguous signatures until an extra piece
of information, the keystone, is released by one of the parties. Upon the release of
the keystone, the ambiguity will be revoked and the signatures bind to their true
signers concurrently. Concurrent signatures, however, are known to fall just short
of fully solving the long standing fair exchange of signatures problem. The price
for not requiring any TTP is that the party who holds the keystone always has
an advantage over the other party in controlling when and whether the protocol
completes or not.
In this thesis, the fair exchange of digital signatures problem is studied. In the
first part of this thesis, the OFE security is strengthened and a more practical model
which is called enhanced chosen-key model is proposed. Unlike the existing multiuser setting and chosen-key model, an adversary in the enhanced chosen-key model
is further provided with the signing oracle that outputs full signatures generated by
the signer, and may even be allowed to have access to the arbitrator’s secret key.
The necessity for the new model is demonstrated. It is shown that two existing
v

methodologies for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes remain valid in the
enhanced chosen-key model.
Next, the efficiency of OFE constructions is improved. A model for 2-user ring
signatures called ‘unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks’ is proposed and
it is shown that the new ring model is strictly weaker than the model of unforgeability
under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting. Based
on the finding that 2-user ring signatures secure in this weaker model will suffice
to guarantee the security of the resulting OFE schemes in the enhanced chosenkey model, the most efficient OFE scheme whose security does not rely on random
oracles is proposed.
New situations in OFE are also investigated, and the applications of OFE are
extended. The scenarios where the digital items to be exchanged are threshold signatures are considered, and the notion of threshold-oriented OFE (TOFE) together
with a security model and an efficient concrete scheme is proposed. It is identified
that in some scenarios, it is required that prior to the completion of the protocol, no
information about the actual exchange should be revealed to an outsider. To achieve
this purpose, the notion of perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (PAOFE)
is introduced, the security model for PAOFE is proposed and a generic construction based on existing primitives is offered. OFE in the attribute-based setting is
considered and the notion of attribute-based optimistic fair exchange (ABOFE) is
proposed. The security model and a construction for ABOFE are presented as well.
Finally, concurrent signatures is revisited. It is showed that theoretically the
party who controls the keystone in a concurrent signature scheme has more advantages than previously thought. In particular, the notion is examined and the
advantages are classified into three levels.It is demonstrated that concurrent signatures may be abused in practical applications if one fails to take these advantages
into account.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the wide use of open networks such as Internet, electronic commerce (ecommerce), the exchange of digital items, becomes more and more important. A
fundamental requirement for electronic commerce is the establishment of mechanisms allowing exchanges of digital items between two parties in a fair way.
In traditional commerce, fairness is easy to achieve as the physical items can
be exchanged simultaneously over a counter. Such a simultaneous exchange is not
feasible over networks as no physical counter exists. One party involved in an electronic commercial exchange may refuse to offer its item after having received the
other party’s.
One kind of solution was provided by gradual exchange protocols [Gol84, EGL85,
BCDvdG87, Cle89, Dam94, BN00, GP03] where two parties exchange their digital
items in turns “little-by-little” over many rounds. The basic idea of these kinds of
protocols is that if each party alternately releases a small portion of the digital item,
one bit or several bits for example, then both parties have comparable knowledge
whenever the protocol is terminated prematurely, and thus neither party has a
considerable advantage over the other. However, these solutions may not provide
true fairness, because one party owing a considerably stronger computational power
may abort at some stage and compute the remaining parts of the other party’s item
while the other party fails to do so. Even if both parties have equal computational
power, such protocols are normally too interactive and cumbersome.
Another solution is to resort to a trusted third party (TTP) to ensure fairness. A
straightforward way to achieve this is to have an on-line trusted third party involved
as mediator. In such a case, each party sends its digital item and expectation to
the trusted third party, who first checks the validity of the items to be exchanged
and the expectations of the parties, and then forwards each item to the other party.
Some variations are discussed in [CTS95, DGLW96, FR97]. However, in practical
1
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applications, the on-line trusted third party is a single point of failure. Once it is
down, no transaction can be conducted. Another drawback is that the trusted third
party becomes a bottleneck due to the involvement in every single exchange. Also,
this type of trusted third party is required to be fully trusted by both parties, which,
in practice, is a very strong assumption.
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE), introduced by Asokan, Schunter and Waidner
[ASW97], is another kind of protocol that uses a third party as arbitrator, but only
in some limited circumstances. The third party only gets involved when one party
cheats or some network failure occurs. In the vast majority of transactions where
the parties follow the protocol honestly, the third party will not be involved at all.
An optimistic fair exchange protocol comprises signers, verifiers, and a trusted third
party, called the ‘arbitrator’. In such a protocol, Alice the signer first delivers a
partial signature to Bob the verifier. A valid partial signature serves as a partial
commitment from Alice about the exchange to take place and assures Bob that he
will receive Alice’s full signature at the end of the protocol. The assurance follows
from the fact that the arbitrator is capable of converting the partial signature into
a full one. After verifying the validity of the partial signature, Bob fulfills his
obligation by delivering his digital item to Alice, after which Alice should send her
full signature to complete the exchange. In the case where Alice refuses to send
her full signature or there is a network failure, Bob asks the arbitrator to make a
resolution, in which the arbitrator converts the partial signature into a full one and
sends it back to Bob.
Due to the optimistic usage of the trusted third party, OFE has attracted much
research [GJM99, Mic03, Wan05, ES05, OMO08, HV11, HWS11a] since its introduction. The highest level of security of optimistic fair exchange in the literature
is the multi-user security in the chosen-key model, proposed by Huang et al. in
CT-RSA 2008. The security comprises three aspects: security against signers, security against verifiers and security against the arbitrator. Scenarios cover instances
when any of the three parties is dishonest. There exist two generic constructions
of optimistic fair exchange schemes which are secure in this model, one based on
verifiably encrypted signatures, and the other based on conventional signatures and
ring signatures [HYWS08b].
Most existing optimistic fair exchange schemes share the property that Bob could
use Alice’s partial signature as a means to convince others that Alice has agreed to
commit to something, but this may not be desirable in some applications such as

1.1. Summary of this Thesis

3

fair negotiation. To address this problem, Boyd and Foo [BF98] and Chen [Che98]
independently proposed OFE schemes in which a partial signature is not publicly
verifiable and an interactive protocol between the signer and the verifier must be
executed to convince the verifier of the validity of a partial signature. In [GJM99],
Garay, Jakobsson and MacKenzie proposed a new notion called ‘abuse-free’, which
requires that no party can ever prove to a third party that he is capable of choosing whether to validate or invalidate a contract. They introduced a new technique
named ‘private contract signature’, from which an abuse-free contract signing protocol was constructed. In 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [HYWS08a] studied a
variant of optimistic fair exchange, in which a new security notion called ‘signer ambiguity’ was introduced, which requires that Bob be able to forge a partial signature
that is indistinguishable from a real one generated by Alice. With this property,
Bob will not be able to convince any outsiders that a partial signature was indeed
generated by Alice. They named OFE with this new security property ‘ambiguous optimistic fair exchange’ (AOFE). In addition, they proposed a formal security
model for AOFE.
In 2004, Chen et al. [CKP04] introduced a new cryptographic primitive called
‘concurrent signatures’, which is reviewed as a new and different approach to solve
the fair exchange problem. Such schemes allow two parties to produce two ambiguous signatures in the sense that both signatures do not bind to their true signers.
This is due to the fact that either party alone is able to forge two ambiguous signatures. Upon the release of an extra piece of information called the keystone, however,
both signatures will bind to their signers concurrently. Concurrent signatures enable fair exchange protocols to be built without the involvement of a trusted third
party, but it is at the sacrifice that the initial signer (one of the two parties who
control the keystone) always has the extra power of deciding when or even whether
the keystone is released. The initial signer might privately show the other party’s
signature together with the unreleased keystone to outsiders.

1.1

Summary of this Thesis

In this thesis, the issues of fair exchange of digital signatures are investigated. The
attention is mainly focused on optimistic fair exchange, as it is the most-widely used
approach for solving the fair exchange problem. In this chapter, the significance and
overview of fair exchange of digital items have been introduced. In particular, the
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three existing approaches for solving the fair exchange problem was reviewed.
In Chapter 2, the notations is introduced and background knowledge required
to understand this thesis is reviewed. An introduction to bilinear pairing and some
complexity assumptions are firstly given. Then definitions of several cryptographic
tools are recalled such as secret sharing, hash functions, zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge, digital signature and encryption schemes. Finally the important primitives for fair exchange, including optimistic fair exchange (OFE), ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (AOFE) and concurrent signature are reviewed.
Next, the enhanced chosen-key model is proposed to strengthen the existing
OFE security in Chapter 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, it is identified how existing OFE
models fail to capture the scenario that an adversary may have access to the full
signatures generated by the signer. It is claimed that in the security against verifiers
(the arbitrator, resp.), the dishonest verifier (arbitrator, resp.) must be explicitly
provided the signing oracle which outputs the signer’s full signature. The necessity of
doing this is demonstrated through two counterexamples. In Chapter 4, the security
against signers is further strengthened by allowing the dishonest signer to have the
arbitrator’s secret key, which captures a possible collusion between the dishonest
signer and the potentially dishonest arbitrator. This new model is distinguished
from existing models. At the end of Chapter 4, an affirmative answer is provided
to the basic and natural question of whether or not there exists schemes in the
enhanced chosen-key model.
In Chapter 5, the efficiency of existing OFE constructions is improved. Specifically, the popular paradigm of constructing OFE schemes from conventional signatures and ring signatures are revisited. A model for 2-user ring signatures called
unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks is proposed and then it is shown
that 2-user ring signatures secure in this model will suffice to guarantee the security
of the resulting OFE schemes, rather than the previous understanding that the ring
signature scheme should satisfy a stronger model unforgeable under an adaptive
attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting. By adopting a 2-user ring
signatures secure only in the weaker model, the most efficient OFE instantiation in
the standard model is gained.
Furthermore, new situations about OFE are investigated. In Chapter 6, optimistic fair exchange of threshold signatures is considered. Specifically, the signatures
are created by a subset of legitimate signers of a party instead of a single signer.
In Chapter 7, the notion of perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (PAOFE) is
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proposed, which in essence is AOFE but with a new property, ‘perfect ambiguity’,
which intuitively guarantees that no outsider, not even the arbitrator, is able to
infer any useful information (the identities of the two involving parties, for example) from the partial signature. In Chapter 8, OFE in the attribute-based setting is
considered, which for the first time takes into account the cases that in an exchange
the user’s attributes such as nationality and age may be involved.
Finally, in Chapter 9, the fairness in concurrent signatures is revisited. It is
shown that theoretically the initial signer in a concurrent signature scheme can have
two more advantages except the commonly known one. Thus in applications where
concurrent signatures are potentially to be adopted, the users have to pay special
attention to the advantages the initial signer owns and make sure these advantages
are acceptable.
The thesis is concluded in Chapter 10.

Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, the notations, definitions and complexity assumptions that will
be used throughout this thesis are intorduced. Cryptographical tools that will be
adopted in this thesis and fair exchange primitives including optimistic fair exchange
(OFE), ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (AOFE) and concurrent signatures are
briefly reviewed. For more information about cryptography theory, refer to the
books [MVO96, Mao03].

2.1
2.1.1

Preliminaries
Notations

Throughout the thesis, the following notations are used. If n is a positive integer,
[n] is used to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. If p is a prime, ZZp and ZZ∗p is used to denote
the sets {0, . . . , p − 1} and {a|a ∈ ZZp ∧ gcd(a, p) = 1}, respectively. k ∈ N denotes a
security parameter. For a finite set S, |S| denotes its cardinality and s ← S denotes
that an element s is chosen uniformly at random from S. For a bit string m, |m|
denotes the bit length of m. For any bit strings m1 and m2 , m1 ||m2 denotes the
concatenation of m1 and m2 . By x := y, it means variable x is assigned with the
value of y. y ← AO (x) means that the algorithm A, on input x and having access
P

to oracle O, outputs y. [A1 (in1 ) → out1 ] ⇐⇒ [A2 (in2 ) → out2 ] is used to denote
that two PPT algorithms A1 and A2 outputs out1 and out2 respectively upon the
completion of the protocol P in which A1 takes as input in1 and A2 takes as input
in2 .

6
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Bilinear Pairing

Let G, GT be two cyclic groups of the same order p for some large prime p. It is said
that e is a bilinear map [BF01] if e : G × G → GT satisfies the following properties.
• (Bilinearity) For all elements of g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ ZZp , it holds that
e(g a , hb ) = e(g, h)ab .
• (Non-degeneracy) There exists g, h ∈ G such that e(g, h) is not the identity
element of GT .
• (Efficiency) The group operation in G and the map e can be computed efficiently.

2.1.3

Complexity Notion and Assumptions

A basic notion in complexity theory is negligible function [Bel02]. Specifically, it is
required that the probability of an adversary successfully attacking a cryptography
system be negligible in terms of a security parameter k.
Definition 2.1 (Negligible function). A function µ : N → R is negligible if for any
positive integer c there exists an integer Nc such that for all k > Nc ,
µ(k) <

1
.
kc

Another fundamental notion in complexity theory is the computational indistinguishability [Gol90] of two distributions.
Definition 2.2 (Computational Indistinguishability). Two distribution families
{Xk }k∈N and {Yk }k∈N are computationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm A, the following quantity
µ(k) =

Pr [A(x) = 1] − Pr [A[x] = 1]

x∈Xk

x∈Yk

is a negligible function in k.
The security of many cryptosystems relies on well-established assumptions. An
assumption normally assumes some problem is intractable and no algorithm can
solve it in polynomial time. More specifically, there is no proof that no such efficient
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algorithm exists, but it is widely believed that this is the case. The complexity
assumptions that has been proposed in the literature and will be used in this thesis
will be reviewed.
The discrete logarithm (DL) assumption [Odl85] is one of the fundamental assumptions in public-key cryptography.
Definition 2.3 (Discrete Logarithm Assumption). Let G be a cyclic group with
generator g of prime order p ≥ 2k , where k is a security parameter. Given (g, u)
where u = g a is a random element of G, the discrete logarithm assumption holds
for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the advantage of A in
computing the discrete logarithm of u to the base g
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(g, u) = a]
is negligible in k.
Diffie-Hellman proposed the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
[DH76] in their seminal paper “New Directions in Cryptography”.
Definition 2.4 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Let G be a cyclic
group with generator g of prime order p ≥ 2k , where k is a security parameter. Given
(g, g a , g b ) where a, b are uniformly at random chosen from ZZp , the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time
adversary A, the advantage of A in computing g ab
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(g, g a , g b ) = g ab ]
is negligible in k.
It is clear that if there is an algorithm which can breaks the DL assumption,
then this algorithm can also be used to break the CDH assumption.
The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption is the decisional version of
the CDH assumption. It was firstly introduced in [Bra93] and further surveyed in
[Bon98].
Definition 2.5 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Let G be a cyclic group
with generator g of prime order p ≥ 2k , where k is a security parameter. Let a, b, c
be uniformly and independently chosen from ZZp . The decisional Diffie-Hellman
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assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the
advantage of A in distinguishing (g, g a , g b , g ab ) from (g, g a , g b , g c )
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g ab ) = 1] − Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g c ) = 1]
is negligible in k.
Note that the DDH assumption will not hold in the bilinear pairing setting, however
it is believed that the CDH assumption still holds in the pairing setting.
Let G be of prime order p ≥ 2k , where k is a security parameter. Let g be
a generator of G, and u be a random element of G. Let further x be a random
element in ZZp and Q =< g, g x , u, {(g 1/(x+si ) , g si , usi )}qi=1 >. Below three dynamic
computational assumptions are reviewed.
Definition 2.6 (q-SDH Assumption [BB08]). The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH)
assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A with
2

1

q

input (g, g x , g x , · · · , g x ), the advantage of A in computing a tuple (s, g x+s )
2

q

1

AdvA (k) = Pr[A(g, g x , g x , · · · , g x ) = (s, g x+s )]
is negligible in k.
Definition 2.7 (q-HSDH Assumption [BW07]). The q-Hidden Strong Diffie-Hellman
(q-HSDH) assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A with input Q, the advantage of A in computing another triple (g 1/(x+s) , g s , us )
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(Q) = (g 1/(x+s) , g s , us )]
is negligible in k, where s ∈ ZZp and s 6∈ {s1 , · · · , sq }.
Definition 2.8 (q-DHSDH Assumption [HW11]). The q-Decisional Hidden Strong
Diffie-Hellman (q-DHSDH) assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the advantage of A in distinguishing (Q, us , g 1/(x+s) ) from
(Q, us , Z)
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(Q, us , g 1/(x+s) ) = 1] − Pr[A(Q, us , Z) = 1]
is negligible in k, where s is a random element in ZZp and Z is a random element of
G.
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The above three assumptions are dynamic in the sense that the value q can change for
different polynomial time adversaries. They are variants of the CDH assumption and
being used to construct cryptosystems for various functionalities without random
oracles. The security analysis of them are proposed by Cheon [Che06]. Note that
the three assumptions are stronger than the CDH assumption in the sense that if
the CDH assumption does not hold, then the three assumptions will be broken.

2.2

Cryptographic Tools

2.2.1

Secret Sharing

The principle of the well-known Shamir secret sharing scheme [Sha79] is reviewed
here. Roughly speaking, a secret sharing scheme allows a user to divide a secret into
n pieces, called shares, so that any t share holders together can recover the secret.
The major idea is that it takes t points to define a polynomial, say, f (x) of degree
t − 1. One could generate f in such a way that f (0) is the secret to be shared. Each
share is then a point (i, f (i)). Now with t points, one could recover the polynomial
and thus the value f (0). On the other hand, with only t − 1 points, nothing about
f (0) would be revealed since there are exponentially many curves that pass through
those t − 1 points.
Preparation Let x be the secret to be shared. Randomly pick a polynomial f of
degree t − 1 such that f (0) = x. Each share is defined as (i, f (i)) for i = 1 to
n.
Reconstruction One could make use of Lagrange interpolation to recover the value
f (0) when t points are given.
• Let I be a set such that |I| = t and that for all i ∈ I, f (i) is known.
• The Lagrange polynomial interpolation technique states that
f (x) :=

X

f (i)λi (x),

i∈I

where λi (x), called the Lagrange basis polynomials, is defined as
λi (x) :=

Y x−j
.
i−j

j∈I\{i}
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Since people are interested in f (0) in the secret sharing scheme, λi is used
to denote the value of λi (0) and referred to as the Lagrange coefficient.
• Thus, to recover the secret, one first computes the Lagrange coefficient
λi as
Y

λi :=

j∈I\{i}

−j
.
i−j

• Then, f (0) can be recovered as
f (0) :=

X

f (i)λi .

i∈I

2.2.2

Hash Function

A hash function, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n , is an efficient algorithm that maps a bit
string of variable length to a bit string of fixed length n [CW79]. The outputs of a
hash function are called hash values. Hash functions are primarily used to generate
a shortened reference of an original bit string. In this thesis, it is required that the
hash function should be collision resistant [Dam88]. That is, it is computationally
infeasible to find two bit strings m0 and m1 with m0 6= m1 such that H(m0 ) =
H(m1 ).
The random oracle model (ROM), first introduced by Fiat and Shamir [FS87]
and formalized by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], may be adopted in the security
proof of many cryptosystems in which hash functions are involved. In the random
oracle model, a hash function is treated as a random oracle that responds to each
query with a truly random value chosen uniformly from the hash value space, except
that it always responds the same value for the same query. That is, to gain a hash
value of an input, one has to query the random oracle, and through this means a
strong randomness of the hash function’s output is guaranteed.
Since the output of real hash functions, for example SHA and MD5, does not
follow the uniform distribution over the hash value space, some believe that a proof in
the random oracle model is heuristic and such a proof may not guarantee the security
when the random oracle is replaced by a concrete hash function. For instance, the
research by Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi [CGH98, CGH04] demonstrated that
cryptographic schemes secure in the random oracle model may not be secure when
the random oracle is replaced by a real hash function. However, others argue that the
counterexamples are totally artificial and practical system will not be designed that
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way. In a word, the random oracle model is still widely accepted in cryptography
security proof as it may lead to better reduction, even though designing schemes
whose security does not rely on the random oracle is, without any doubt, more
desirable.

2.2.3

General Forking Lemma

The General Forking Lemma [BN06], proposed by Bellare and Neven, is a general
version of the Forking Lemma in [PS96] and has been used to prove the security of
a variety of digital signature schemes and other random-oracle based cryptographic
constructions. It is recalled here to better understand the thesis.
Lemma 2.1 (General Forking Lemma). Fix an integer Q ≥ 1 and a set H of
size |H| ≥ 2. Let A be a randomized algorithm that on input x, h1 , · · · , hQ returns
a pair (J, σ) where J ∈ {0, · · · , Q} and σ is referred as side output. Let IG be
a randomized algorithm called the input generator. Let accA = Pr[J ≥ 1 : x ←
IG; h1 , · · · , hQ ← H; (J, σ) ← A(x, h1 , · · · , hQ )] be the accepting probability of A.
The forking algorithm FA associated to A is the randomized algorithm that takes as
input x and proceeds as follows:
Algorithm FA (x)
pick coins ρ f or A at random
h1 , · · · , hQ ← H
(J, σ) ← A(x, h1 , · · · , hQ ; ρ)
If J = 0 then return (0, ⊥, ⊥)
h0J , · · · , h0Q ← H
(J 0 , σ 0 ) ← A(x, h1 , · · · , hJ−1 , h0J , · · · , HQ0 ; ρ)
If (J = J 0 and hJ 6= h0J ) then return (1, σ, σ 0 )
Else return(0, ⊥, ⊥).
A
Let f rk = Pr[b = 1 : x ← IG; (b, σ, σ 0 ) ← FA (x)]. Then f rk ≥ accA ( acc
−
Q

1
).
|H|

Roughly speaking the lemma says that if an algorithm A runs two times in related executions and the process forks at a certain point, then with non-negligible
probability (with overwhelming probability if |H| is large) A can generate two different outputs with the same property. In this thesis the General Forking Lemma is
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used to prove the security of the concrete OFE schemes in Section 3.3 and Section
4.3.

2.2.4

Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Knowledge

In cryptography, a zero-knowledge proof, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and
Rackoff in [GMR85], is a protocol by which a prover convinces a verifier of the truth
of a given statement, without leaking any additional information except the fact
that the statement is true. A proof of knowledge [BG93], is a protocol by which the
prover convinces a verifier that it knows some secret. Specifically, the prover proves
it knows some value w such that (x, w) ∈ R where R is a relation and x is publicly
known to both the prover and the verifier. Putting the two notions together, a zeroknowledge proof-of-knowledge is a protocol by which a prover convinces a verifier
that it knows some secret while not revealing any information about the secret.
Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation. For a pair (x, w) ∈ R x
is called the statement and w the witness. Let L be the language consisting of
statements in R. Let negl(·) be a negligible function in the security parameter k.
A non-interactive proof system Π for a language L (a relation R) consists of a
key generation algorithm K, a prover algorithm P and a verifier algorithm V . The
key generation algorithm takes 1k as input and outputs a common reference string
σ. The prover algorithm takes as input (σ, x, w) and outputs a proof π. The verifier
algorithm takes as input (σ, x, π) and outputs > if the proof is acceptable and ⊥
otherwise.
Definition 2.9 Π a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for a language L
(a relation R) if it satisfies the following three properties.
• Completeness. For any adversary A,


σ ← K(1k );


 ≤ negl(k).
Pr 
:
V
(σ,
x,
π)
=
⊥
if
x
∈
L
(x,
w)
←
A(σ);


π ← P (σ, x, w)
• Soundness. For any adversary A,
"
#
σ ← K(1k );
Pr
: V (σ, x, π) = > if x 6∈ L ≤ negl(k).
(x, π) ← A(σ)
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• Zero-knowledge. There exists a PPT simulator S = (S1 , S2 ) such that for any
adversary A,




Pr σ ← K(1k ) : AP (σ,·,·) (σ) = 1 − Pr (σ, τ ) ← S1 (1k ) : AS(σ,τ,·,·) (σ) = 1
≤ negl(k), where S(σ, τ, x, w) = S2 (σ, τ, x) for (x, w) ∈ R.
Definition 2.10 Π a proof of knowledge system for a language L (a relation R) if
it satisfies the following two properties.
• Completeness. This is the same as in Definition 2.9.
• Knowledge Extraction. There exists a knowledge extractor E = (E1 , E2 ) such
that for any adversary A,




Pr σ ← K(1k ) : A(σ) = 1 − Pr (σ, ξ) ← E1 (1k ) : A(σ) = 1 ≤ negl(k),
and for any adversary A we have


k
(σ, ξ) ← E1 (1 );



Pr  (x, π) ← A(σ); : V (σ, x, π) = > but (x, w) 6∈ R
 ≤ negl(k).
w ← E2 (σ, ξ, x, π)
Note that the knowledge extraction property implies soundness property, because if
one can extract a witness from a proof, then the corresponding statement obviously
belongs to the language. A proof of knowledge system is zero-knowledge if it further
satisfies the zero-knowledge property defined above.

2.2.5

Digital Signature

Digital signature, first proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76], is the electronic
counterpart of the traditional handwriting signature. A valid digital signature can
authenticate the identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a document. It
can also ensure that the message or document is not altered in transfer.
SYNTAX. The syntax of a digital signature scheme is formalized in [GMR88] and
consists of the following three algorithms:
KGen(1k ) → (sk, vk). The key generation algorithm takes as input 1k where k is
a security parameter, and outputs a signing key sk and a verification key vk.
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Sig(sk, m) → σ. The signing algorithm algorithm takes as input a signing key sk
and a message m from the associated message space M, and outputs a signature σ.
Ver(m, σ, vk) → >/⊥. The verification algorithm Ver takes a message m, a signature σ and a verification key pk and outputs either a valid symbol > or an invalid
symbol ⊥.
Correctness of a signature scheme requires that Ver(m, Sig(sk, m), vk) = >, for
any m ∈ M and any key pair (sk, vk) outputted by the key generation algorithm
KGen(1k ).
SECURITY. The standard security notion for signatures is existential unforgeability
under adaptive chosen message attacks [GMR88], denoted by UF-CMA. Intuitively,
this notion requires that an adversary is not able to generate a signature on a new
message on behalf of a target signer. Formally, it is defined through the following
experiment conducted between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup : The challenger C runs KGen(1k ) to generate a signing/verification key pair
(sk, vk), gives the verification key vk to the adversary A, and keeps sk as private.
Queries : A can adaptively and sequentially make q signing queries to C where
q is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter k. For the i-th query, A
submits a message mi to C, who returns a signature generated by Sig(sk, m).
Output : A outputs a message signature pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ). A wins the experiment if
m∗ has not been previously queried by A and Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , vk) = >.
Definition 2.11 A digital signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (UF-CMA-secure) if no PPT adversary wins the above
experiment with non-negligible probability.
In this thesis, the terminology used in [HYWS08b] is sometimes followed and the
signature schemes reviewed above are refered to as conventional signature schemes
to distinguish them from ring signature schemes that will be reviewed below. In
addition, the signatures generated by a conventional signature scheme are sometimes
referred as conventional signatures.

2.2.6

Ring Signatures

Ring signature, introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in Asiacrypt 2001 [RST01],
is a kind of digital signature that can be generated by any member of a number of
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users that form a ring. A ring signature convinces people that the signer is in the
ring, but the exact identity of the signer will be hidden. Due to its importance in
the applications where user’s privacy is of concern, ring signatures have been widely
researched.
SYNTAX. A ring signature scheme RS = (KGen, Sig, Ver) is formalized by the
following three efficient algorithms:
KGen(1k ) → (rsk, rpk). The key generation algorithm takes as input 1k and
outputs a secret key rsk and a public key rpk.
Sig(rsk, m, R) → σ. The signing algorithm takes as input a secret key rsk, a
message m from the associated message space M and a set of public keys R :=
{rpki }li=1 such that rpk ∈ R where (rsk, rpk) is a key pair outputted by KGen(1k ),
and outputs a ring signature σ.
Ver(m, σ, R) → >/⊥. The verification algorithm takes as input a message m, a
ring signature σ and a list of public keys R := {rpki }li=1 , and outputs > or ⊥ for
accept or reject.
Correctness of a ring signature scheme requires that Ver(m, Sig(rsk, m, R), R) =
>, for any m ∈ M and any key pair (rsk, rpk) outputted by the key generation
algorithm KGen(1k ) such that rpk ∈ R.
A 2-user ring signature scheme is a specific case of the above that only supports
rings R for which |R| = 2.
SECURITY. Two security properties that a ring signature scheme should satisfy are
anonymity and unforgeability. Intuitively, anonymity requires that no one should
be able to determine which number of a ring has actually generated the signature,
and unforgeability requires that no one should be able to generate a ring signature
if none of the ring members’ private keys is known.
A fundamental requirement for anonymity will be reviewed, named basic anonymity
considered in [BKM06]. It is defined through the following experiment conducted
between a challenger C and an the adversary A.
Setup : The challenger C runs KGen(1k ) to generate a number of key pairs
n(k)

n(k)

{rski , rpki }i=1 and gives the set of public keys R := {rpki }i=1 to the adversary
A.
Queries : A chooses an index s, a message m and a set S such that rpks ∈ S and
S ⊂ R, and submits (s, m, S) to C for a signing query, who returns the output of
Sig(rsks , m, S) to A. A can adaptively make a polynomial number of such queries.
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Challenge : A submits (m∗ , i0 , i1 , R∗ ) where R∗ ⊂ R, rpki0 , rpki1 ∈ R∗ . C
randomly flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and gives A the challenge ring signature σ ∗ ←
Sig(rskib , m∗ , R∗ ).
Guess : A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}. A wins the experiment if b0 = b.
Definition 2.12 A ring signature scheme satisfies basic anonymity if no PPT adversary wins the above experiment with probability non-negligibly greater than 1/2.
For the security of unforgeability, the model unforgeability under an adaptive
attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting [Boy07] is considered. It is
defined through the following experiment conducted between a challenger C and an
the adversary A.
Setup : The challenger C runs KGen(1k ) twice to generate two key pairs (rsk0 , rpk0 )
and (rsk1 , rpk1 ), respectively, and gives the two public keys R := {rpk0 , rpk1 } to
the adversary A.
Queries : A chooses an index i ∈ {0, 1}, a message m and a set S where |S| = 2,
S ∩ R 6= ∅ and rpki ∈ S, and submits (i, m, S) to C for a signing query. C returns
the output of Sig(rski , m, S) to A. A can adaptively make a polynomial number of
such queries.
Output : A outputs a message signature pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ). A wins the experiment if
Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , R) = > and (·, m∗ , R) has not been previously queried by A.
Definition 2.13 A ring signature scheme is (existentially) unforgeable under an
adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting if there is no adversary wins the experiment with non-negligible probability.

2.2.7

Public-key Encryption

In traditional private-key (symmetric) encryption scheme, the encryption and decryption processes uses the same secret key. Thus two involving parties must somehow share the secret key before communication. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [DH76]
introduced the concept of public-key (asymmetric) encryption, in which data can be
encrypted under a public key and only the user with the corresponding secret key
can decrypt the ciphertext. Compared with private-key encryption, one prominent
advantage of public-key encryption is that two communicating parties do not require
a initial procedure to share a key.
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SYNTAX. The syntax of a public-key encryption scheme is formalized in [GM84]
and consists of the following three algorithms:
KGen(1k ) → (dk, ek). The key generation algorithm takes as input 1k , and outputs a decryption key dk and an encryption key ek.
Enc(ek, m) → c. The encryption algorithm takes as input an encryption key ek
and a message m from the associated message space M, and outputs a ciphertext
c.
Dec(dk, c) → m. The decryption algorithm takes as input a decryption key dk
and a ciphertext c and returns a corresponding message m.
Correctness of a public-key encryption scheme requires that Dec(dk, Enc(ek, m)) =
m, for any m ∈ M and any key pair (dk, ek) outputted by the key generation algorithm KGen(1k ).
SECURITY. The primary goal of a public-key encryption scheme is to guarantee
the privacy of data. The standard security notion for public-key encryption schemes
is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks [RS92], denoted by
IND-CCA2. Intuitively, IND-CCA2 means that given a properly generated encryption
key, no adversary A can distinguish encryptions of any two-equal length messages
m0 , m1 under this key. IND-CCA2 security captures strong message (data)-privacy
property and guarantees that, given a challenge ciphertext, no valid information
about the underlying message (plaintext, or data) will be leaked. Formally, it is
defined through the following experiment conducted between a challenger C and an
the adversary A.
Setup : The challenger C runs KGen(1k ) to generate a decryption/encryption
key pair (dk, ek), gives the encryption key ek to the adversary A, and keeps dk as
private.
Phase 1 Queries : A can adaptively make a polynomial number of decryption
queries to C . For each query, A submits a ciphertext c to A, who returns a message
m outputted by Dec(dk, c).
Challenge phase : A submits two messages m0 and m1 with equal bit length. C
randomly flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes cb = Enc(ek, mb ). C returns cb to A.
Phase 2 Queries : A can further adaptively make a polynomial number of decryption queries to C with the only limitation that the challenge ciphertext cb should
not be queried. For each query, A submits a ciphertext c to A, who returns a message m outputted by Dec(dk, c).
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Guess : A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}. A wins the game if b0 = b.
Definition 2.14 A public-key encryption scheme is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2-secure) if no PPT adversary wins the
above experiment with non-negligible probability.
Another security notion for public-key encryption is named indistinguishability
of keys against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks [BBDP01], denoted by IK-CCA2.
IK-CCA2 captures strong key-privacy property. It means that given two randomly
selected encryption keys ek0 and ek1 , no adversary A can distinguish encryptions
of the same message m under the two different keys. Given a challenge ciphertext,
no valid information about the underlying key will be leaked in an IK-CCA2-secure
encryption scheme. Formally, this security notion is defined through the following
experiment conducted between a challenger C and an the adversary A.
Setup : The challenger C runs KGen(1k ) to generate two decryption/encryption
key pair (dk0 , ek0 ) and (dk1 , ek1 ), separately. C gives the encryption keys ek0 and
ek1 to the adversary A, and keeps dk0 and dk1 as private.
Phase 1 Queries : A can adaptively make a polynomial number of decryption
queries to C with respect to the two keys ek0 and ek1 . When A submits a ciphertext
c to C to ask for a decryption with respect to ek0 , C returns a message m outputted
by Dec(dk0 , c). When A submits a ciphertext c to C to ask for a decryption with
respect to ek1 , C returns a message m outputted by Dec(dk1 , c).
Challenge phase : A submits a challenge message m∗ to C. C randomly flips a
coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes cb = Enc(ekb , m∗ ). C returns cb to A.
Phase 2 Queries : A can further adaptively make a polynomial number of decryption queries to C with the only limitation that the challenge ciphertext cb should
not be queried. For each query, C answer as in Phase 1 queries.
Guess : A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}. A wins the game if b0 = b.
Definition 2.15 A public-key encryption scheme is indistinguishable of keys against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IK-CCA2-secure) if no PPT adversary wins the
above experiment with non-negligible probability.

2.2.8

Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption

Before reviewing the notion of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CPABE), the definition of an access structure is reviewed.
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Definition 2.16 (Access structure [Bei96]) Let {P1 , · · · , Pn } be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1 ,··· ,Pn } is monotone if for any B, C: if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C
then C ⊆ A. An access structure (respectively, monotonic access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of {P1 , · · · , Pn },
i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1 ,··· ,Pn } \ {∅}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets
not in A are called unauthorized sets.
The notion and security model of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption introduced in [LW12] is reviewed here. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme E comprises four efficient algorithms: E := (Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt).
Setup(1k , U ). The setup algorithm takes as input 1k and attribute universe description U , and outputs the public parameters PM and a master key MK.
Encrypt(PM, M, A). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PM, a message M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes,
and outputs a ciphertext CT such that only a user that possesses a set of attributes
that satisfies the access structure A will be able to decrypt the ciphertext. It is
assumed that the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
KeyGen(MK, S). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master key
MK and a set of attributes S, and outputs a private key SK.
Decrypt(PM, CT, SK). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PM, a ciphertext CT, which contains an access policy A, and a private
key SK, which is a private key for a set of attributes S. If the set of attributes S
satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and
returns a message M .
Correctness for a CP-ABE scheme E states that Decrypt(PM, Encrypt(PM, M, A),
KeyGen(MK, S)) = M , for any set of attributes S that satisfies the access structure
A.

2.3. Optimistic Fair Exchange

21

Security Model.
The full security for CP-ABE [LW12] is described by a security game between a
challenger and an adversary. The game proceeds as follows.
Setup : The challenger runs Setup algorithm and sends the public parameters
PM to the adversary.
Phase 1 : The adversary adaptively queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets of attributes S1 , · · · , Sq1 . For the query with respect to Sk , the
challenger responds with a secret key outputted by KeyGen(MK, Sk ).
Challenge : The adversary submits two equal length messages M0 and M1 , and
an access structure A such that none of the previous sets S1 , · · · , Sq1 satisfies the
access structure. The challenger flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mb
under A, producing CT. It sends CT to the attacker.
Phase 2 : The adversary adaptively queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets of attributes Sq1 +1 , · · · , Sq , with the restriction that none of these
satisfies A. For the query with respect to Sk , the challenger responds with a secret
key outputted by KeyGen(MK, Sk ).
Guess : The adversary outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as Pr[b0 = b] − 12 .
Definition 2.17 A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is fully secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the
above security game.

2.3

Optimistic Fair Exchange

The notion of Optimistic Fair Exchange (OFE) was introduced by Asokan, Schunter
and Waidner [ASW97] in 1997 to solve the fair exchange problem over open networks. An optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures protocol comprises three
kinds of participants: a signer, a verifier and a semi-trusted third party called an
“arbitrator”. Typically such a protocol is conducted in three message flows. First,
Alice the signer initiates the protocol by delivering a partial signature to Bob the
verifier. A valid partial signature not only serves as evidence to Bob that Alice has
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Alice’s partial signature:
Normally assumed useless

Fulfils his obligation:
Bob’s full signature

Alice

Alice’s full signature

Bob

Figure 2.1: A typical execution of OFE without disputes.
committed to endorse a certain message, but also assures Bob that he will receive
Alice’s full signature at the end of the protocol. The assurance follows the fact that
the arbitrator is capable of converting the partial signature into a full one. In the
second step, Bob delivers his full signature to Alice. Later, if Alice is honest, she
will send her full signature to Bob in the third step, and this completes the exchange
process (see Figure 2.1). In case Alice refuses to do so or there is a network failure,
Bob can ask the arbitrator to make a resolution, who will convert Alice’s partial
signature into a full one and send it back to Bob (see Figure 2.2). Note that under
the normal situation, participation of the arbitrator is not required and thus, the
term “optimistic”.
Below the definition for non-interactive optimistic fair exchange (OFE) in the
multi-user setting and chosen-key model [HYWS08b] is reviewed.

2.3.1

Definition

Definition 2.18 (Optimistic Fair Exchange) A non-interactive optimistic fair
exchange scheme involves the users (signers and verifiers) and the arbitrator, and
consists of the following (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms:
• SetupTTP : On input 1k , this algorithm generates a secret key ASK, and a public
key APK of the arbitrator.
• SetupUser : On input 1k and (optionally) APK, this algorithm outputs a secret/public key pair (SK, PK). For a user Ui , (SKi , PKi ) is used to denote the
user’s key pair.
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Alice’s partial signature:
Normally assumed useless

Fulfils his obligation:
Bob’s full signature

Bob

Alice

Arbitrator

Figure 2.2: An execution of OFE when disputes occur.
• Sig and Ver: These are similar to conventional signing and verification algorithms of a conventional signature scheme. Sig(m, SKi , APK), outputs a (full)
signature σ of Ui ’s on message m, while Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK) outputs > or ⊥,
indicating σ is a valid full signature of Ui ’s on m or not.
• PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and verification algorithms respectively. PSig(m, SKi , APK) outputs a partial signature σP , while PVer(m, σP ,
PKi , APK) outputs > for acceptance or ⊥ for rejection.
• Res: This is the resolution algorithm run by the arbitrator. Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi )
outputs a full signature σ, or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving a partial signature.
Correctness property means the output is what one wants if everybody follows the
algorithms. More specifically, it states that
• Ver(m, Sig(m, SKi , APK), PKi , APK) = >,
PVer(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), PKi , APK) = >, and
Ver(m, Res(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), ASK, PKi ), PKi , APK) = >.
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Resolution ambiguity property states that any “resolved signature” Res(m, PSig(m,
SKi , APK), ASK, PKi ) is computationally indistinguishable from the “actual signature” Sig(m, SKi , APK).
In a concrete OFE protocol, the signer Ui first runs PSig to generates a partial
signature σP and sends it to the verifier. The verifier runs PVer to check the validity
of the partial signature and fulfills its obligation if the output is >. After that,
the signer Ui runs Sig to generate a full signature σ and sends it to the verifier.
In this normal case, the arbitrator does not need to be involved. However, in the
cases there is a network failure or the signer Ui refuses to send its full signature σ,
the verifier can approach the arbitrator with the partial signature σP and a proof
that it has fulfilled its obligation. If the partial signature σP and the proof are both
valid, the arbitrator runs Res to convert the partial signature σP into a full one and
sends it to the verifier. As in the previous definitions such as [DR03, DLY07], the
definition does not address the subtle issue of how to prove to the arbitrator that
one has fulfilled its obligation in an specific exchange.
It should be emphasised that in the existing definition of resolution ambiguity,
the distinguisher does not have any adaptive adversarial capability. Specifically, the
distinguisher is neither given any oracle access nor the arbitrator’s secret key.

2.3.2

Security in Multi-User setting and Chosen-key Model

The security of an optimistic fair exchange scheme consists of three aspects: security
against signers, security against verifiers, and security against the arbitrator. The
security in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model [HYWS08b] guarantees the
highest level of security for optimistic fair exchange in literatures. This security
model is reviewed below.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. Intuitively, it is required that no signer should
be able to produce a partial signature that is accepted by the verifier but cannot
be converted into a full signature by the honest arbitrator. This ensures fairness for
verifiers, that is, after the verifier fulfills its obligation, it can always get the signer’s
full signature. Formally, consider the following experiment.
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SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK)
(m, σP , PK∗ ) ← AORes (APK)
σ ← Res(m, σP , ASK, PK∗ )
"
#
PVer(m, σP , PK∗ , APK) = >
success of A :=
Ver(m, σ, PK∗ , APK) = ⊥
where the resolution oracle ORes takes as input a valid partial signature σP on message m under the public key PKi (i.e. (m, σP , PKi ) such that PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK) =
>), and outputs a full signature σ on m under PKi . In the resolution oracle queries,
the adversary can make queries with respect to adversarially chosen public keys,
without requiring to know the corresponding secret keys. The advantage of A in
this experiment is defined as the probability of success of A.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. This aspect of security guarantees that no
verifier should be able to generate a full signature or convert any partial signature
σP into a full one by himself. This is to ensure fairness for the signer, that is, to
gain the signer’s full signature, the verifier has to fulfill its obligation first. Formally,
consider the following experiment.
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig ,ORes (PK, APK)
"
#
Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
success of A :=
(m, ·) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )
where oracle ORes is described in the experiment of security against signers, Query(A,
ORes ) is the set of queries made by A to oracle ORes , and oracle OPSig takes as input a message m and outputs a partial signature σP on m under PK. It is widely
believed1 that there is no need to provide A with access to the signing oracle OSig ,
which takes as input a message m and outputs a full signature σ on m under the
challenge signer’s public PK, as OSig could be simulated by OPSig and ORes . The
advantage of A in this experiment is defined as the probability of success of A.
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. This aspect of security guarantees
that the arbitrator should not be able to produce a full signature on behalf of
1
In Chapter 3 it will be shown that the signing oracle is in fact needed and it will be one
contribution of this thesis.
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the signer on any message, unless the arbitrator has seen a partial signature on
that message. This is to ensure fairness for the signer, that is, the arbitrator can
only generate signatures on messages that the signer herself will potentially sign.
Formally, consider the following experiment.
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(ASK∗ , APK) ← A(PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig (ASK∗ , APK, PK)
"
#
Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
success of A :=
m 6∈ Query(A, OPSig )
where ASK∗ is A’s state information, which might not be the corresponding private
key of APK2 , oracle OPSig is described in the previous experiment, and Query(A, OPSig )
is the set of queries made by A to oracle OPSig . As in the experiment of security
against verifiers, the adversary is not given the signing oracle access, as it is believed
that the adversary can gain a full signature by firstly receiving a partial signature
from the partial signing oracle and then converting it into a full one by using the
secret arbitrator key. The advantage of A in this experiment is defined as the probability of success of A.
Definition 2.19 A non-interactive optimistic fair exchange scheme is said to be
secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if no PPT adversary wins any
of the above experiments with non-negligible advantage.

2.4

Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange

Most existing optimistic fair exchange schemes share the property that Bob could
use Alice’s partial signature as a mean to convince others that Alice has agreed to
commit in something, which may not be desirable in some applications such as fair
negotiation. In 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [HYWS08a] studied a variant
of optimistic fair exchange, in which a new security notion called signer ambiguity
was introduced, which requires that Bob is able to forge a partial signature that
is indistinguishable from a real partial signature generated by Alice. With this
2

The adversary is allowed to adversarially choose the arbitrator’s public key and may even not
know the corresponding secret key. In the process, the adversary is allowed to keep the useful
information as its state information.
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property, Bob will not be able to convince any outsiders that a partial signature
was indeed generated by Alice. They named OFE with this new security property
Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange (AOFE). Besides, they proposed a formal
security model for AOFE in the multi-user setting and chosen key model.
Recall that in OFE, given a partial signature, outsiders can be convinced that it
is generated by the signer Alice. However, in AOFE, outsiders can only be convinced
that a partial signature is generated by either the signer Alice or the verifier Bob.
The main difference between OFE and AOFE is that in AOFE the verifier Bob
cannot convince outsiders of the authorship of the partial signature generated by the
signer Alice. To achieve the signer ambiguity in AOFE, it requires to include both
Alice and Bob’s public keys into the (partial) signing and verification algorithms.
That is to say, the syntax for OFE will not be suitable for AOFE. The notion
and security model of the ambiguous optimistic fair exchange protocol introduced
in [HYWS08a] is reviewed here.
Definition 2.20 An ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme involves the users
(signers and verifiers) and the arbitrator, and consists of the following (probabilistic)
polynomial-time algorithms:
• PMGen: On input 1κ where κ is a security parameter, it outputs a system
parameter P M .
• SetupTTP : On input P M , the algorithm generates a secret key ASK, and a
public key AP K of the arbitrator.
• SetupUser : On input P M and (optionally) AP K, it outputs a secret/public key
pair (SK, P K). For a user Ui , (SKi , P Ki ) is used to denote the user’s key
pair.
• Sig and Ver: Sig(M, SKi , P Ki , P Kj , AP K), outputs a (full) signature σ on
M of user Ui with the designated verifier Uj , while Ver(M , σ, P Ki , P Kj ,
AP K) outputs > or ⊥, indicating σ is Ui ’s valid full signature on M with the
designated verifier Uj or not.
• PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and verification algorithms respectively. PSig(M, SKi , P Ki , P Kj , AP K) outputs a partial signature σP , while
PVer(M, σP , PK, AP K) outputs > or ⊥, where PK = {P Ki , P Kj }.

2.4. Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange

28

• Res: This is the resolution algorithm. Res(M, σP , ASK, PK), where PK =
{P Ki , P Kj }, outputs a full signature σ, or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving
a partial signature.
Resolution ambiguity property states that
• any “resolved signature” Res(M , PSig(M , SKi , P Ki , P Kj , AP K), ASK,
{P Ki , P Kj }) is computationally indistinguishable from the “actual signature”
Sig(M , SKi , P Ki , P Kj , AP K).
The security of an ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme consists of four aspects: signer ambiguity, security against signers, security against verifiers, and security against the arbitrator. The security models of them in the multi-user setting
and chosen-key model are reviewed below.
SIGNER AMBIGUITY. Intuitively, this security notion requires that, given a partial signature σP from a signer A, a verifier B should not be able to convince others
that A was indeed the signer of σP , as B can generate partial signatures that look
indistinguishable from those generated by A. Formally, consider the following experiment.
P M ← PMGen(1k )
(ASK, AP K) ← SetupTTP (P M )
(M, (SK0 , P K0 ), (SK1 , P K1 ), δ) ← DORes (AP K)
b ← {0, 1}
σP ← PSig(M, SKb , P Kb , P K1−b , AP K)
b0 ← DORes (σP , δ)
"
success of A :=

b0 = b

#

(M, σP , {P K0 , P K1 }) 6∈ Query(D, ORes )

where δ is D’s state information, oracle ORes takes as input a valid partial signature
σP of user Ui on message M with respect to verifier Uj (i.e. (M , σP , P Ki , P Kj )
such that PVer(M , σP , {P Ki , P Kj }, AP K) = >), and outputs a full signature
σ on M under P Ki , P Kj , and Query(D, ORes ) is the set of valid queries D issued
to the resolution oracle. The advantage of A in this experiment is defined as the
probability of success of A.
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SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. This security notion requires no signer should
be able to produce a partial signature that looks good to a verifier but cannot be
resolved to a full signature by the honest arbitrator. Formally, consider the following
experiment.
P M ← PMGen(1k )
(ASK, AP K) ← SetupTTP (P M )
(SKB , P KB ) ← SetupUser (P M , AP K)
B

(M, σP , P KA ) ← AOPSig ,ORes (AP K, P KB )
σ ← Res(M, σP , ASK, {P KA , P KB })
PVer(M, σP , {P KA , P KB }, AP K) = >
success of A := [

Ver(M, σ, P KA , P KB , AP K) = ⊥

]

B
)
(M, P KA ) 6∈ Query(A, OPSig
B
where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiment, oracle OPSig
takes as input

(M, P Ki ) and outputs a signature on M with respect to P Ki and P KB generated
B
B
using SKB , and Query(A, OPSig
) is the set of queries made by A to oracle OPSig
.

The advantage of A in this experiment is defined as the probability of success of A.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. This security notion requires no verifier should
be able to complete any partial signature σP into a full signature, without explicitly
asking the arbitrator to do so. Formally, consider the following experiment.
P M ← PMGen(1k )
(ASK, AP K) ← SetupTTP (P M )
(SKA , P KA ) ← SetupUser (P M , AP K)
(M, σ, P KB ) ← AOPSig ,ORes (AP K, P KA )
"
#
Ver(M, σ, P KA , P KB , AP K) = >
success of A :=
(M, ·, {P KA , P KB }) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )
where oracle ORes is described in the experiment of signer ambiguity, Query(A,
ORes ) is the set of queries made by A to oracle ORes , and oracle OPSig takes as input
(M, P Kj ) and outputs a signature on M with respect to P KA and P Kj generated
using SKA . The advantage of A in this experiment is defined as the probability of
success of A.
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. This security notion requires that
the arbitrator should not be able to produce a full signature without explicitly asking
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the signer to generate a partial one. Formally, consider the following experiment.
P M ← PMGen(1k )
(AP K, ASK ∗ ) ← A(P M )
(SKA , P KA ) ← SetupUser (P M , AP K)
(M, σ, P KB ) ← AOPSig (ASK ∗ , AP K, P KA )
"
#
Ver(M, σ, P KA , P KB , AP K) = >
success of A :=
(M, P KB ) 6∈ Query(A, OPSig )
where ASK ∗ is A’s state information, which might not be the corresponding private
key of AP K, oracle OPSig is described in the previous experiment, and Query(A, OPSig )
is the set of queries made by A to oracle OPSig . The advantage of A in this experiment is defined as the probability of success of A.
Definition 2.21 An ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme is said to be secure
in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if no PPT adversary wins any of the
above experiments with non-negligible advantage.

2.5

Concurrent Signatures

Concurrent Signatures, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson in [CKP04], is
viewed as a new primitive for solving fair exchange of digital signatures problem
without the help of a third trusted party. In a concurrent signature scheme, two
parties exchange their signatures in such a way that the signatures will concurrently
bind to their respective signers upon the release of some important information
named keystone. Before the release of the keystone, the signatures are ambiguous
and no outsiders can distinguish the real signers, as either party may have generated
both signatures. An overview of concurrent signatures is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Compared with optimistic fair exchange, concurrent signature schemes do not
require any trusted third party (TTP). However, it is at the sacrifice that the party
who controls the keystone always has an advantage over the other party that it can
freely choose when to release the keystone or whether to release the keystone or not.
Concurrent signatures are believed to be useful in the applications where the above
concern is not a problem for the involving parties.
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Ambiguous Signatures:
No one can tell if they are
generated by Alice or Bob

keystone

Bob

Alice

Valid Signatures

Figure 2.3: An overview of Concurrent Signatures.

2.5.1

Definition of Concurrent Signatures

The definition of concurrent signatures from [CKP04] is reviewed. A concurrent
signature comprises four algorithms (SETUP, ASIGN, AVERIFY, VERIFY). Their
formal definitions are given below.
SETUP. On input security parameter 1λ , this probabilistic algorithm outputs the
description of the set of participants U, the message space M, the signature
space S, the keystone space K, the keystone fix space F, and a function KGEN :
K → F. It is also assumed the public keys {Xi } and their respective secret
keys {xi } are also generated by this algorithm. π is used to denote additional
system parameters. It is assumed that (π, U, M, S, K, F, KGEN, {Xi }) are
available to all participants while each user retains his/her own secret key xi .
ASIGN. On input (Xi , Xj , xi , h2 , M ) where Xi , Xj ∈ {Xi } such that Xi 6= Xj ,
xi being the secret key corresponds to the public key Xi , h2 ∈ F, M ∈ M,
this algorithm outputs an ambiguous signature σ = (s, h1 , h2 ) on message M ,
where s ∈ S, h1 , h2 ∈ F.
AVERIFY. On input (σ, Xi , Xj , M ), where σ = (s, h1 , h2 ), s ∈ S, h1 , h2 ∈ F,
Xi , Xj are distinct public keys and M ∈ M, outputs 0/1. It is required that
AVERIFY((s, h1 , h2 ), Xi , Xj , M ) = AVERIFY((s, h2 , h1 ), Xj , Xi , M ).
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VERIFY. On input (k, (σ, Xi , Xj , M )) such that k ∈ K and σ = (s, h1 , h2 ), it
outputs 0 if h2 6= KGEN(k). Otherwise, it outputs AVERIFY(σ, Xi , Xj , M ).
Below is a recap of the interactive protocol in which the above algorithms are
used in the exchange of signatures in a concurrent manner amongst two participants.
1. Suppose SETUP has been executed and all participants have their own key
pair already. Below how Alice with key pair (XA , xA ) exchanges signatures
with Bob with key pair (XB , xB ) is described.
2. Alice picks a random k ∈ K, computes f = KGEN(k) and obtains σA :=
(sA , hA , f ) from ASIGN(XA , XB , xA , f, MA ). Alice sends σA , MA to Bob.
3. Bob verifies Alice’s ambiguous signature by invoking AVERIFY(σA , XA , XB ,
MA ). If σA is valid, Bob obtains σB := (sB , hB , f ) from ASIGN(XB , XA , xB , f,
MB ). Bob sends (σB , MB ) to Alice.
4. Alice verifies Bob’s ambiguous signature by invoking AVERIFY(σB , XB , XA ,
MB ). If σB is valid, Alice releases the keystone k. Parse SA as (k, σA , XA ,
XB , MA ) and SB as (k, σB , XB , XA , MB ).
5. Everybody can now verify both signatures SA and SB using VERIFY.
The correctness is defined in the usual manner. Specifically, if σ = ASIGN(Xi ,
Xj , xi , f , M ) and S = (k, σ, Xi , Xj , M ), then AVERIFY(σ, Xi , Xj , M ) = 1. In
addition, if f = KGEN(k) for some k ∈ K, then VERIFY(S) = 1.

2.5.2

Security Model

As discussed in [CKP04], a concurrent signature should satisfy three security requirements, namely, unforgeability, ambiguity and fairness. For completeness, these
security requirements we reviewed as follows.
Unforgeability
The following game is used to capture the existential unforgeability of a concurrent
signature.
Definition 2.22 (Unforgeability) A concurrent signature is unforgeable if no PPT
adversary A can win the following game with a challenger C.
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Setup. C invokes SETUP(1λ ) for a security parameter 1λ and obtains a set of
parameters (π, U, M, S, K, F, KGEN, {Xi }) and the corresponding set of secret
keys {xi }. C gives the set of parameters to A while retaining the set of secret
keys {xi }.
Queries. A is allowed to issue to following queries in an adaptive manner.
1. KGEN: C randomly generates k ∈R K and returns f = KGEN(k) to A.
2. Keystone Reveal: On input f such that f is an output of the KGEN query,
C returns k such that f = KGEN(k). Otherwise C returns ⊥.
3. ASIGN: On input (Xi , Xj , h2 , M ) such that Xi , Xj ∈ {Xi }, h2 ∈ F,
M ∈ M, C replies with ASIGN(Xi , Xj , xi , h2 , M ).
4. Secret Key Reveal: On input Xi ∈ {Xi }, C returns xi .
Output. Finally A outputs a signature σ ∗ = (s∗ , h∗ , f ∗ ), a message M ∗ and two
public keys Xc∗ , Xd∗ . A wins the game if AVERIFY(σ ∗ , Xc∗ , Xd∗ , M ∗ = 1) and
either one of the following is true:
• (Xc∗ , Xd∗ , f ∗ , M ∗ ) is not an input to the ASIGN query and Xc∗ , Xd∗ is not
an input to the secret key reveal query.
• A has not made any ASIGN query of the form (Xc∗ , X, f ∗ , M ∗ ) for all
X ∈ {Xi } \ {Xc∗ }, no secret key reveal query was made with input Xc∗
and f ∗ is the output of KGEN query or A also outputs k ∗ such that f ∗ =
KGEN(k ∗ ).
Ambiguity
The following game is used to capture ambiguity of a concurrent signature.
Definition 2.23 (Ambiguity) A concurrent signature is ambiguous if no PPT
adversary A can win the following game with a challenger C.
Setup. Same as Setup in Definition 2.22.
Phase 1. A is allowed to made a sequence of KGEN, Keystone Reveal, ASIGN and
Secret Key Reveal query, which are answered as in Definition 2.22.
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Challenge. A outputs two public keys Xi , Xj and a message M as challenge. C
randomly picks k ∈R K and computes f = KGEN(k). C then flips a fair coin
b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 0, C computes σ0 = ASIGN(Xi , Xj , xi , f, M ). Otherwise,
C computes (s, h, f ) = ASIGN(Xj , Xi , xj , f, M ) and parse σ1 as (s, f, h). C
returns σb to A.
Phase 2. A can make another sequence of queries as in phase 1.
Output. Finally A outputs a guess bit b0 . A wins the game if b = b0 and A did not
make any Keystone Reveal query on input f or h.
Fairness
The following game is used to capture fairness of a concurrent signature.
Definition 2.24 (Fairness) A concurrent signature is fair if no PPT adversary A
can win the following game with a challenger C.
Setup. Same as Setup in Definition 2.22.
Queries. A is allowed to made a sequence of KGEN, Keystone Reveal, ASIGN and
Secret Key Reveal query, which are answered as in Definition 2.22.
Challenge. A outputs two public keys Xi , Xj and two messages Mi , Mj , together
with σi = (si , h1 , h2 ) such that AVERIFY((si , h1 , h2 ), Xi , Xj , Mi ) = 1. C
returns σj = (sj , h3 , h2 ) = ASIGN(Xj , Xi , xj , h2 , Mj ).
Output. Finally A either outputs a value k. A wins the game if f = KGEN(k) such
that f was a previous output from KGEN query and no Keystone Reveal query
on f was made.

Part I
OFE with Stronger Security
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Chapter 3
Optimistic Fair Exchange in the
Enhanced Chosen-key Model
The security for OFE in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model consists of three
aspects: security against signers, security against verifiers and security against the
arbitrator. In this chapter, the security against verifiers and the security against
the arbitrator are strengthened by allowing the adversary to have an extra oracle
access.

3.1

Introduction

Due to its fundamental role in electronic commerce, optimistic fair exchange has been
extensively studied [MS01, Mic03, DR03, Wan05, ES05, LOS+ 06, ZM07, OMO08,
RS09, HV11, HWS11a]. It has been shown that optimistic fair exchange schemes
can be constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures [ASW98, CD00, BGLS03,
LOS+ 06, ZM07, RS09] and sequential two-party multisignatures [DR03], respectively. It is widely accepted that optimistic fair exchange schemes should have
the property ‘resolution ambiguity’ [DR03, DLY07, HYWS08b], namely the actual
signatures generated by the signer should be at least computationally indistinguishable from the resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator. As the intervention
of an arbitrator could be due to a network failure, rather than the signer cheats, an
optimistic fair exchange scheme with resolution ambiguity property can avoid bad
publicity for the signer.
One main goal of modern cryptography is to define security models capturing
possible practical attacks for cryptographic schemes. Defining a suitable security
model for OFE protocols turns out to be an iterative process.
Early optimistic fair exchange protocols was studied in the single-user setting
and the security model assumed only one signer and one verifier. The first formal
37
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security model was proposed in [ASW97, ASW98] but fails to consider the case that
the arbitrator itself may be dishonest. A more generalized model in the single-user
setting was suggested by Dodis and Reyzin [DR03] to take into account a dishonest
arbitrator.
Since many users may share the same arbitrator in the real world, the security
model in the single-user setting does not capture the possible attacks by colluding
dishonest users. In 2007, Dodis, Lee and Yum [DLY07] considered the multi-user
security of optimistic fair exchange which allows dishonest users collude to cheat
another user. They separated the security of optimistic fair exchange between singleuser setting and multi-user setting by showing that an optimistic fair exchange
instance provably secure in the single-user setting is not necessarily secure in the
multi-user setting. Independently, this was also studied by Zhu, Susilo and Mu in
2007 [ZSM07].
Since then, the security of optimistic fair exchange intuitively covers the following
three aspects.
• Security against signers: the signer should not be able to generate a partial
signature that can not be converted into a full one by the honest arbitrator.
• Security against verifiers: the verifier should not be able to generate a full
signature of the signer’s by himself.
• Security against the arbitrator: the arbitrator should not be able to generate
a full signature on behalf of the signer while not seeing a corresponding partial
one.
In an orthogonal dimension, most optimistic fair exchange protocols are studied
in the certified-key model (also known as the registered-key model [BCNP04]). In
this model, it is assumed that the authenticity of public keys are verifiable and
each user in the system should show its knowledge of the corresponding secret key
in the public key registration stage to resist key substitution attacks. That is to
say, in this model, the dishonest signer and the dishonest arbitrator has to show
their knowledge of their corresponding secret keys, and the dishonest verifier can
only make resolution queries with respect to the target signer and other public keys
whose secret keys are known.
However, in the public key infrastructure, when a certification authority issues
a certificate of a user’s public key, the user is not required to show its knowledge
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of the secret key. Thus the certified-key model is not practical enough, as it relies
on a stronger assumption than the normal authenticity assumption placed on the
certification authority.
In 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [HYWS08b] studied the security of
optimistic fair exchange in the chosen-key model, in which the adversary can adversarially choose public keys without knowing the corresponding secret key. This
model provides more realistic power to the adversary in attacking the honest users.
On the one hand, the adversary can choose its own public key without knowing
the corresponding secret key. Specifically, in the security against the arbitrator, the
dishonest arbitrator is even allowed to set its own public key after having seen the
target signer’s public key. In the certified-key model, however, the dishonest arbitrator has to set its key pair before seeing the target signer’s public key. On the other
hand, for a dishonest signer or verifier, the adversary is allowed to make resolution
queries with respect to arbitrary public keys, without knowing the corresponding
private keys. They demonstrated, through an example, that a provably secure fair
exchange in the certified-key model may not be secure in the chosen-key model. Furthermore, a generic optimistic fair exchange construction secure in the chosen-key
model based on conventional signatures and ring signatures was proposed.

3.1.1

Motivation

The most fundamental work of OFE is to define security models, that capture realistic attacks. Based on these models, secure schemes will be designed. These security
models are very essential to ensure that they capture practical situation, which will
ensure that the protocols can be adopted in practice. In this chapter it is observed
that the existing OFE models in fact do not capture realistic situation, where the
adversary (i.e. the dishonest verifiers or the dishonest arbitrator) can actually observe the full signatures generated by the signer before launching the actual attack.
This realistic situation implies that in the security model, the adversary should have
been provided with the signing oracle, which will produce full signatures generated
by the signer.
In all the proposed optimistic fair exchange models, in the security against the
arbitrator, the dishonest arbitrator is only given a partial signing oracle, which takes
as input a message and outputs the target signer’s partial signature on this message.
Furthermore, in the security against the verifier, the dishonest verifier is given the
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partial signing oracle and a resolution oracle, which takes as input a partial signature
and outputs a resolved signature. It should be noted that the two aspects of the
OFE security have the common feature that the adversary (the dishonest verifiers
or the dishonest arbitrator) is not provided the access to the actual signatures. This
situation in fact separates the security models of OFE schemes from the realistic
situation, which may result in the insecurity of the scheme in practice, which will
hinder the adoption of OFE in practice.
To date, it is commonly believed that it is not required to provide the dishonest
arbitrator with the signing oracle, as the dishonest arbitrator can generate a full
signature by first gaining a partial signature from the partial signing oracle and
then converting it into a full one using its own secret key. Similarly, in the models
of security against the verifier, the dishonest verifier is given the partial signing
oracle and a resolution oracle, which takes as input a partial signature and outputs
a full signature, as it is commonly acknowledged that the signer can gain a full
signature by first requesting a partial signature from the partial signing oracle and
then asking the resolution oracle to convert it into a full one. Unfortunately, by
carefully analyzing the existing models, it should be noticed that the above models
at most allow the adversary (the dishonest arbitrator or the dishonest verifier) to
gain the partial signatures and the resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator.
For a malicious arbitrator who generates its public key based on a target signer and
has no knowledge of its own secret key, it may not even be able to get a resolved
signature. Hence, the real scenario that an adversary may also have access to the
actual signatures generated by the signer is not captured. The crux of the issue in
the security models is the lack of signing oracle access, which has been believed to
be unnecessary since the partial signing oracle and the resolution oracle have been
provided.
Furthermore, it is also identified that the notion of resolution ambiguity does not
imply signing oracle is not of help to the adversary. The distinguisher in the definition of resolution ambiguity is not equipped with any power, i.e. it is not offered
with any oracle access, not to mention the arbitrator’s secret key, the resolution
ambiguity property only guarantees a preliminary level of computational indistinguishability between the actual signature and the resolved signature. There is no
guarantee that the actual signature is still computationally indistinguishable from
the resolved signature in the view of the dishonest verifier, who can have partial
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signing oracle access and resolution oracle access, let alone the dishonest arbitrator, who can have partial signing oracle access and choose the arbitration key pair
himself.

3.1.2

The Contributions

In this chapter the security of OFE when an adversary is given an signing oracle is
studied. The contribution comprises three aspects.
First, the enhanced chosen-key model for optimistic fair exchange that explicitly
captures the real scenario that an adversary may have access to the actual signatures
is proposed in Section 3.2. That is, besides the partial signing oracle and resolution
oracle, the adversary is also provided with the signing oracle.
Next, to show the necessity of the enhanced model, in Section 3.3, it is shown
that, even for a honest but curious arbitrator (the arbitrator correctly generates its
key pair and knows its own secret arbitration key), the security in the multi-user
setting and chosen-key model does not imply that in the enhanced model with a
concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme that serves as a counterexample. In other
works, the current definition of resolution ambiguity (the actual signatures generated by the signer should be computationally indistinguishable from the resolved
signatures generated by the arbitrator) fails to guarantee that depriving the signing
oracle is reasonable.
Since the current definition of resolution ambiguity fails to justify the absence of
the signing oracle, a natural and straightforward question would be “if the definition
of resolution ambiguity is further strengthened, would it be possible to fill the gap
between the enhanced model and existing model?” Unfortunately, the answer is no.
Specifically, in Section 3.4, it is demonstrated that, for a malicious arbitrator (the
arbitrator adversarially chooses its arbitration public key and without knowing the
corresponding secret key), a provably secure fair exchange in the existing model may
not be secure in the enhanced model, even if the definition of resolution ambiguity
is strengthened to the highest level, i.e., the actual signatures generated by the
signer and the resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator have the identical
distribution. This answer about the question firmly certifies the significance of the
proposal of the enhanced chosen-key model.

3.2. The Enhanced Chosen-key Model
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The Enhanced Chosen-key Model

As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the actual signature generated by
the signer may be different from the resolved signature generated by the arbitrator
based on a corresponding partial one. Thus it seems natural and straightforward
that a security model should capture the real scenario that an adversary may see the
actual signatures generated by the signer. To explicitly take this case into account,
the following enhanced chosen-key model is proposed, i.e., in the experiments of
security against verifiers and security against the arbitrator, the adversary we offered
with the signing oracle access.
The syntax for non-interactive optimistic fair exchange (OFE) follows the one in
the multi-user setting and chosen-key model proposed in [HYWS08b] and reviewed
in Chapter 2. The security against signers is the same as that in the existing model,
as the dishonest signer itself does not need to be provided a signing oracle. In the
enhanced chosen-key model, the security against verifiers and the security against
the arbitrator are defined as follows.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. It is required that the probability that any
PPT adversary A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig ,OSig ,ORes (PK, APK)

Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >

success of A := 
 (m, ·) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )
m 6∈ Query(A, OSig )






where OPSig , ORes and Query(A, ORes ) are the same as reviewed in the existing
model reviewed in Section 2.3.2, oracle OSig takes as input a message m and outputs
a full signature σ on m generated using the challenge signer’s secret key SK, and
Query(A, OSig ) is the set of queries made by A to oracle OSig .
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. It is required that the probability
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that any PPT adversary A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(ASK∗ , APK) ← A(PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig ,OSig (ASK∗ , APK, PK)

Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >

success of A := 
 m 6∈ Query(A, OPSig )
m 6∈ Query(A, OSig )






where ASK∗ , OPSig and Query(A, OPSig ) are the same as reviewed in the existing
model reviewed in Section 2.3.2, and OSig and Query(A, OSig ) are the same as
described in the above experiment.
Note that the models here are defined for OFE, rather than AOFE reviewed in
Section 2.4. Therefore the PMGen algorithm in AOFE will not be involved here.
Besides, in AOFE, the verifier’s public key will be needed when a signer generates
a partial or full signature. Thus the adversary in the security against verifiers in
AOFE will need to output its own public key, but the adversary in the security
against verifiers in OFE does not need to do so.

3.3

Separation of the Proposed Model and the
Existing Model

In this section, a concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme that is secure in the multiuser setting and chosen key model reviewed in Section 2.3.2 but not secure against
the arbitrator in the enhanced chosen-key model is presented. This demonstrates
that the previous understanding that there is no need to provide the adversary with
the signing oracle for the security against the arbitrator is wrong. That is to say, this
counterexample clearly shows that the existing models fail to capture the the real
scenario that an adversary may have access to the signer’s actual signatures, and
the enhanced chosen-key model is more complete and practical as it clearly captures
this scenario. For the security against verifiers, a counterexample is not given to
show that it makes a difference whether the signing oracle is given or not. However,
since offering the signing oracle can capture the the real scenario that the verifier
can have access to the signer’s actual signatures, it is better to use the enhanced
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model. Besides, even for the security against verifiers, the enhanced model is at
least as strong as the existing one.
Prior to proposing the concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme that will serve as
a counterexample, the high level description will be firstly provided. The concrete
optimistic fair exchange scheme is constructed in the bilinear pairing setting. let
e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where g is a generator of G. The signer’s
public key is X = g x and a random u ∈ G. The arbitrator’s public key is Y = g y .
The signer and the arbitrator keep their secret keys x and y as private, respectively.
Let further H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZZp be two hash functions that
will be viewed as random functions. The partial signature on a message m is a
conventional signature (H0 (m)1/(x+s) , g s , us ) ∈ G3 , which can be seen as a variation
of the signatures from [HK12, HWS11a] in which they employ a programmable hash
function [HK12] to guarantee the security without random oracles.
To fully sign a message, the signer does as follow.
1. The signer firstly generates a partial signature (H0 (m)1/(x+s) , g s , us ) on message m.
2. Let m̄ be the complementary message of m, i.e. m̄ and m are of the same
bit-length but each i-th bits of them are different.
3. The signer then generates a designated confirmer signature [Cha94, HWS11a]
0

0

0

(δ 0 , v 0 , θ0 ) = (H0 (m̄)1/(x+s ) , Y s , us ) with the arbitrator being the confirmer on
message m̄ where s0 is a random. This confirmer signature can be seen as a
variation of the confirmer signature from [HWS11a] in which the hash function
H0 is replaced with a programmable hash function.
4. Note that e(δ 0 , u)x = e(H0 (m̄), u)/e(δ 0 , θ0 ) := W . The signer finally makes a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with respect to the message
m and the signer’s public key (X, u) that it knows the value x such that g x = X
and e(δ 0 , u)x = W or it knows the arbitrator’s secret key y. The signer can
always make such a proof by using its secret key x.
5. The full signature comprises the partial signature, the designated confirmer
signature and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
To convert a partial signature into a full one, the arbitrator uniformly samples a
0

0

designated confirmer signature (δ 0 , v 0 , θ0 ) = (Z, Y s , us ) from the signer’s designated
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signature space where Z ∈ G and an exponent s0 are randomly chosen. Let W =
e(H0 (m̄), u)/e(δ 0 , θ0 ). The arbitrator then makes a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge with respect to the message m and the signer’s public key (X, u)
that it knows the value x such that g x = X and e(δ 0 , u)x = W or it knows the
arbitrator’s secret key y. The arbitrator can always make the non-interactive zeroknowledge proof of knowledge using its secret key y.
Note that due to the invisibility property of a confirmer signature, the designated
confirmer signature sampled by the arbitrator is indistinguishable from the one that
is generated by the signer. Besides, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge guarantees the proof made by the signer is indistinguishable from the
proof made by the arbitrator. Thus the resolution ambiguity property of the concrete
optimistic fair exchange scheme holds.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, g be a generator of G,
and e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative group of
order p. Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZZp be two hash functions. It
is assumed that the public parameter (G, p, e, H1 , H2 ) is shared by all users. The
concrete OFE scheme is as follows.
• SetupTTP (1k ): The arbitrator chooses at random y ∈ ZZp and computes Y = g y .
The public key is set as APK = Y , and the arbitrator keeps ASK = y as private.
• SetupUser (1k ): Each user Ui chooses at random two secret values xi ∈ ZZp and
ui ∈ G, and calculates Xi = g xi . The user sets (SKi , PKi ) = (xi , (Xi , ui )).
• PSig(m, SKi , APK): To partially sign a message m, the user Ui chooses a random s ∈ ZZp and returns σP := (H0 (m)1/(xi +s) , g s , usi ).
• PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK): Given a partial signature σP from user Ui , the verifier
parses σP as (δ, v, θ), and returns > if both e(v, ui ) = e(g, θ) and e(δ, Xi v) =
e(H0 (m), g) hold. Otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
• Sig(m, SKi , APK): To fully sign a message m, the user Ui
1. chooses a random s ∈ ZZp and computes σP := (H0 (m)1/(xi +s) , g s , usi ).
0

0

0

2. chooses a random s0 ∈ ZZp and computes (δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) := (H0 (m̄)1/(xi +s ) , Y s , usi )
where m̄ is the complementary message of m.
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3. Denote W := e(H0 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ). Note that W = e(δ 0 , ui )xi . The
user Ui chooses uniformly at random r, c1 , t1 ∈ ZZp , and computes c =
H1 (m||PKi ||g r ||e(δ 0 , ui )r ||g t1 Y c1 ), c0 = c − c1 (mod p) and t0 = r − c0 xi
(mod p).
4. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ).
• Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK): Given a full signature σ from user Ui , a verifier does as
follows.
1. Check whether c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ∈ ZZp and PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK) = >.
2. Check whether e(γ 0 , ui ) = e(Y, θ0 ).
3. Compute W = e(H0 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ) and
c = H1 (m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g t1 Y c1 ).
4. Verify whether c0 + c1 = c (mod p).
5. If all the above hold, > is returned and otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
• Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ): For the user Ui ’s partial signature σP on message m,
the arbitrator
1. first checks whether PVer(m, σP , PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise,
returns ⊥.
0

0

2. chooses at random s0 ∈ ZZp , Z ∈ G and computes (δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) := (Z, Y s , usi ).
3. computes W = e(H0 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ) where m̄ is the complementary message of m.
4. chooses uniformly at random r, c0 , t0 ∈ ZZp , and computes
c = H1 (m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g r ),
c1 = c − c0 (mod p) and t1 = r − c1 y (mod p).
5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ).
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Security Analysis.

It is not hard to verify that, in the above construction, any (partial) signature
created by Sig (PSig) will be valid under Ver (PVer), and that any signature created
by the arbitrator using Res based on a partial signature generated by PSig will be
valid under Ver. Thus the correctness property of the above construction holds.
Based on the q-DHSDH Assumption, the resolution ambiguity property also
holds.
Next the specific construction is secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key
model reviewed in Section 2.3.2 will be shown. Intuitively, the security against signers holds unconditionally as the arbitrator is always able to convert a signer’s partial
signature into a full one. Note that the full signature consists of two, essentially independent, parts. The first part is exactly the partial signature and the second part
can be generated by the arbitrator independent of the partial signature. Therefore
if the partial signature is correct then the second part can always be generated and
the full signature will be correct. The security against verifiers holds due to the fact
that one cannot make the proof of knowledge without knowing the signer’s secret
key or the arbitrator’s secret key. The security against the arbitrator holds due to
the unforgeability of the conventional signature scheme that generates the partial
signature.
Theorem 3.1 The above concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is unconditionally secure against signers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model.
Proof. For any message m and any valid signature σP on m under the verification
key PKi , the arbitrator can always convert it into a full signature by using its own
secret key ASK. Therefore, the security against signers always hold.



Theorem 3.2 The above concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure against
verifiers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if the q-HSDH Assumption
holds.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A makes q queries to the partial signing oracle and
breaks the security against verifiers with non-negligible probability. It will be shown
how to construct an algorithm R that breaks the q-HSDH Assumption.
Note that algorithm R is given Q =< g, g x , u, {(g 1/(x+si ) , g si , usi )}qi=1 >. Its
goal is to output another distinct triple (g 1/(x+s) , g s , us ). Algorithm R simulates the
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challenger and interacts with adversary A. Algorithm R chooses a random integer
0

x0 ∈ ZZp , sets X 0 = g x , flips a coin and gets a random bit b. According to the
random bit b, R performs one of the following two games.
• Game 0 (b = 0): R forwards PK := (g x , u) and APK = Y := X 0 to A and
simulates the oracles for A.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . To
respond to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hmi , ai i as explained
below. This list is referred to as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When
A queries the oracle H0 on a message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as
follows:
1. If the query mi already appears on the H0 -list in some tuple hmi , ai i,
then algorithm R responds with H(mi ) = g ai .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hmi , ai i to the
H0 -list and responds to A as H(mi ) = g ai .
H1 Queries. A can also query the random oracle H1 . To respond to these
queries, R maintains a list of tuples hstring (i) , c(i) i as explained below. This
list is referred to as H1 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the
oracle H1 at a point string ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query string already appears on the H-list in some tuple hstring, ci,
then algorithm R responds with H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hstring, ci to
the H1 -list and responds to A as H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
PSig Queries. For the i-th partial signing query on message mi , R checks
whether there is a tuple hmi , ai i in the H0 -list. If not, R generates a random
ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hmi , ai i to the H0 -list. R returns ((g 1/(x+si ) )ai , g si , usi )
to A as the reply for the partial signing query.
Res Queries. Given a resolution query (m, σP , PKi ) where PKi = (Xi , ui ) is the
signer’s public key, algorithm R responds to this query as follows:
1. checks whether PVer(σP , m, PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise, R
responds to A with a special symbol ⊥.
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0

0

2. chooses at random s0 ∈ ZZp , Z ∈ G and computes (δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) := (Z, Y s , usi )
where m̄ is the complementary message of m.
3. computes W = e(H1 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ).
4. chooses uniformly at random c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ∈ ZZp , and adds
< m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g t1 Y c1 , c0 + c1 >
to the H1 -list. Since c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 are all randomly chosen, the probability
that A has previously asked a H1 query on the string
m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g t1 Y c1
is negligible.
5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ) and returned to
A as the reply of the resolution query.
• Game 1 (b = 1): R forwards PK := (X 0 , u) and APK = Y := g x to A and
simulates the oracles for A.
The H0 , H1 and resolution queries are simulated the same as in Game 0. For
the i-th partial signing query on message mi , R checks whether there is a
tuple hmi , ai i in the H0 -list. If not, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds
the tuple hmi , ai i to the H0 -list. R chooses at random s0i ∈ ZZp and returns
0

0

0

0

(g ai /(x +si ) , g si , usi ) to A as the reply for the partial signing query.
It is easy to see that the above Hash queries, partial signing queries and resolution
queries are indistinguishably simulated. Finally, A halts. It either admits failure, in
which case so does R, or it returns a full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ without asking
the resolution oracle with respect to the message m∗ and the challenge signer’s public
key PK.
By the General Forking Lemma [BN06] (a standard rewinding technique in random oracle model), with non-negligible probability algorithm R is able to extract the
value x or x0 . The algorithm R wins if it extracts the value x. Note that the adversary A can not distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1, because the distributions
of the simulation in the two games are the same. Therefore, if A succeeds with a
non-negligible probability , the algorithm R wins with a non-negligible probability.
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Theorem 3.3 The above concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure against
the arbitrator in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if the q-SDH Assumption and q-HSDH assumption hold.
Proof. Suppose A makes q partial signing queries. Let mi be the i-th query sub(i)

mitted by A, σP = (δi , vi , θi ) be the reply of the partial signing oracle for the i-th
query, and si be the exponent such that vi = g si . Finally the adversary A outputs a
full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ without asking the partial signing query on message
∗

∗

m∗ . Let σP∗ = (δ ∗ , v ∗ , θ∗ ) = (δ ∗ , g s , us ) be the partial signature contained in the
full signature σ ∗ . Below two situations are distinguished.
Type I: There exists 1 ≤ i ≤ q such that v ∗ = vi , which implies that s∗ = si .
Type II: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ q, v ∗ 6= vi , which implies that s∗ 6∈ {s1 , · · · , sq }.
Type I adversary
Suppose the Type I adversary A breaks the security against the arbitrator in the
multi-user setting and chosen-key model. It will be shown how to construct an algo2

q

rithm R to break the q-SDH Assumption. Recall that R is given (g, g x , g x , · · · , g x )
as input, its goal is to output (g 1/(x+s) , s). R selects uniformly at random si ∈ ZZp
used for answering the partial signing queries. Let S = {s1 , · · · , sq } be the set of
all si , and let S i = S \ {si }. R also uniformly chooses i∗ ∈ [q]. Let S ∗ = S \ {si∗ }.
Define
p∗ (η) =

Y

(η + t), and p(η) =

t∈S ∗

Y
(η + t).
t∈S

∗

Note that deg(p ) = q − 1 and deg(p) = q. Define
g0 = gp

∗ (x)

, h = g p(x) , X = g x .

R randomly chooses u ∈ G and sets PK := (X, u). R simulates the challenger
and answers the queries from A.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . Suppose
A makes in total q0 distinct queries to the random oracle H0 . To respond to these
queries, R independently and uniformly chooses j ∗ ∈ [q0 ] and maintains a list of
tuples hm0i , a0i i as explained below. This list is referred to as H0 -list. The list
is initially empty. When A queries the oracle H0 for the j-th distinct message
m0j ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
0

1. If the tuple hm0j , a0j i is on the H0 -list, algorithm R responds with H(m0j ) = haj
0

for j 6= j ∗ and H(mj 0 ) = g 0 haj for j = j ∗ .
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2. Otherwise, if j 6= j ∗ , R generates a random a0j ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hm0j , a0j i
0

to the H0 -list and responds to A as H(mj ) = haj . If i = j ∗ , R generates a
random a0j ∗ ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hm0j ∗ , a0j ∗ i to the H0 -list and responds to A
0

as H(mj ∗ ) = g 0 haj∗ .
H1 Queries. A can also query the random oracle H1 . To respond to these queries,
R maintains a list of tuples hstring (i) , c(i) i as explained below. This list is referred
to as H1 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the oracle H1 at a point
string ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query string already appears on the H-list in some tuple hstring, ci,
then algorithm R responds with H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hstring, ci to the
H1 -list and responds to A as H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
PSig Queries. Without loss of generality, assume that for each partial signing
query on a message mi , the adversary has previously asked a H0 query on mi . Then
for the i-th partial signing query, R finds the tuple hm0j , a0j i in the H0 -list such
that mi = m0j . If mi = m0j ∗ , R aborts and returns failure. Otherwise R computes
vi = g si , θi = usi and
0

0

δi = haj /(x+si ) = g aj
2

Q

t∈S i (x+t)

.

(3.1)
(i)

q

Since g x , g x , · · · , g x are known, R can generate the partial signature σP = (δi , vi , θi )
without explicitly knowing the secret key x, but instead using the right-hand side
of (3.1) for computing δi .
Finally, the adversary A outputs a full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ without
asking the partial signing query on message m∗ . From the full signature query, R
∗

∗

can gain a valid partial signature σP∗ = (δ ∗ , v ∗ , θ∗ ) = (δ ∗ , g s , us ) on message m∗ .
If s∗ 6= si∗ or m∗ 6= m0j ∗ , R returns failure. Otherwise, R can computes a tuple
∗

(g 1/(x+s ) , s∗ ).
Note that
0

δ ∗ = (g 0 haj∗ )1/(x+si∗ ) = g p
0

From δ ∗ and the knowledge of g aj∗ p

∗ (x)

0

δ 0 = (δ ∗ /g aj∗ p

∗ (x)/(x+s ∗ )
i

0

g aj∗ p

, R can derive
∗ (x)

) = gp

∗ (x)/(x+s ∗ )
i

.

∗ (x)

.
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Let p∗ (η)/(η + si∗ ) = p0 (η) + γ−1 /(η + si∗ ) for some polynomial p0 (η) of q − 2 and
some γ−1 ∈ ZZ∗p . Thus R can further derive
0

∗

δ 00 = (δ 0 /g p (x) )1/γ−1 = (g γ−1 /(x+si∗ ) )1/γ−1 = g 1/(x+s ) .
Note that i∗ and j ∗ are uniformly chosen and independent of the adversary A’s
view, thus the case s∗ = si∗ or m∗ = m0j ∗ happens with a non-negligible probability
at least 1/qq0 , which means R can breaks the q-SDH assumption.
Type II adversary
Suppose the Type I adversary A breaks the security against the arbitrator in
the multi-user setting and chosen-key model. It will be shown how to construct an
algorithm R to break the q-HSDH Assumption.
Note that algorithm R is given Q =< g, g x , u, {(g 1/(x+si ) , g si , usi )}qi=1 >. Its goal
is to output another distinct triple (g 1/(x+s) , g s , us ). R forwards PK := (g x , u) to A
and simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary A as follows.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . To respond
to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hmi , ai i as explained below. This list
is referred to as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the oracle H0
on a message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query mi already appears on the H0 -list in some tuple hmi , ai i, then
algorithm R responds with H0 (mi ) = g ai ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hmi , ai i to the
H0 -list and responds to A as H0 (mi ) = g ai ∈ ZZp .
H1 Queries. A can also query the random oracle H1 . To respond to these queries,
R maintains a list of tuples hstring (i) , c(i) i as explained below. This list is referred
to as H1 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the oracle H1 at a point
string ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query string already appears on the H-list in some tuple hstring, ci,
then algorithm R responds with H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hstring, ci to the
H1 -list and responds to A as H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
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PSig Queries. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that for each partial signing
query on a message mi , the adversary has previously asked a H0 query on mi . For
the i-th partial signing query on message mi , R seek out the tuple hm0j , a0j i in the
0

H0 -list such that m0j = mi . R returns ((g 1/(x+si ) )aj , g si , usi ) to A as the reply for
the partial signing query.
It is easy to see that the Hash queries and partial signing queries are perfectly
simulated. Finally, A halts. It either admits failure, in which case so does R,
or it returns a full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ without asking the partial signing
query on message m∗ . From the full signature query, R can gain a valid partial
∗

∗

signature σP∗ = (δ ∗ , v ∗ , θ∗ ) = (δ ∗ , g s , us ) on message m∗ . Due to the randomness
of the outputs of H0 oracle, with overwhelming probability A have submitted the
message m∗ to the H0 oracle. Let H0 (m∗ ) = g a where hm∗ , ai is stored in the H0 list. Since s∗ 6∈ {s1 , · · · , sq }, R can simply outputs ((δ ∗ )1/a , v ∗ , θ∗ ) and break the
q-HSDH assumption.
The theorem follows from the two cases discussed above.

3.3.2



An attack in the Enhanced Model

It will be shown that the above concrete construction is insecure in the enhanced
model. More specifically, it will be shown that if a dishonest arbitrator can have
access to the signer’s signing oracle, he is able to generate a full signature on a new
message without explicitly observing a corresponding partial signature.
Recall that a full signature on message m comprises a partial signature on message m, a designated confirmer signature on message m̄ with the arbitrator being
the designated confirmer where m̄ is the complementary message of m, and a zeroknowledge proof of knowledge. If the arbitrator sees a full signature generated by
the signer on message m, then the arbitrator has a designated confirmer signature
on m̄. Being the designated confirmer, the arbitrator is able to convert the designated confirmer signature into a conventional signature, which is exactly a partial
signature of the optimistic fair exchange scheme on message m̄. Thus the arbitrator
will be able to generate a full signature on message m̄ without asking the signer to
generate a corresponding partial one.
Indeed, the arbitrator can ask the signer to generate a full signature on a message
m. Denote the full signature on m is (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ), which is generated
by the signer using algorithm Sig. Then the arbitrator can generate a full signature
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on message m̄ where m̄ is the complementary message of m as follows.
1. Compute σP = (δ 0 , (γ 0 )1/y , θ0 ).
2. Choose at random s ∈ ZZp , Z ∈ G and computes (δ, γ, θ) := (Z, Y s , usi ).
3. Compute W = e(H0 (m), ui )/e(δ, θ).
4. Choose uniformly at random r, c00 , t00 ∈ ZZp , and computes
0

0

0

0

c0 = H1 (m̄||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ, ui )t0 W c0 ||g r ),
c01 = c0 − c00 (mod p) and t01 = r − c01 y (mod p).
5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ, γ, θ, c00 , t00 , c01 , t01 ).
It is not hard to check that σ is a valid signature on message m̄ under the target
signer’s public key PKi = (Xi , ui ).

3.4

Identical Distribution not Sufficient

In this section it will be shown that even the resolved signature generated by the
arbitrator has the same distribution with the actual signatures generated by the
signer, it still makes a difference whether an malicious arbitrator is allowed to have
access to the signing oracle or not. This is showed by a concrete counterexample.
The intuitions of the concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme are as follows.
The partial signature is the BLS signature [BLS04], and the full signature will be
the partial signature plus the modified Bender-Katz-Morselli 2-user ring signature
between the signer and the arbitrator [BKM06] (also can be viewed as Waters’s
signature [Wat05]). Note that in Waters’s signature scheme, each user’s public
key includes g1 , g2 and a set of Waters hash generators u0 , u1 , · · · , un . In the OFE
instantiation, all the users share the same Waters hash generators. Besides, it is
required that all users use the arbitrator’s public key as g2 so that each user can
use a single key to generate both the BLS signature and the modified Bender-KatzMorselli 2-user ring signature.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, g be a generator of G,
and e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative group of
order p. Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be two collision-resistant
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hash functions. It is assumed that the public parameter (G, p, e, H1 , H2 ) is shared
by all users. The concrete OFE scheme is as follows.
SetupTTP : The arbitrator chooses uniformly at random Waters hash generators
u0 , u1 , · · · , un ← G and exponents y ← ZZp and sets Y = g y . APK is set as
(Y, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ). ASK is set as y.
SetupUser : User Ui chooses uniformly at random an exponent xi ← ZZp and sets
SKi = xi and PKi = g xi .
PSig(m, SKi , APK): To partial sign a message, the user Ui computes and sets the
partial signature as σP = H0 (m)xi .
PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK): Given a partial signature σP from user Ui , a verifier verifies
whether e(σP , g) = e(H0 (m), PKi ) holds. If so, it returns >; otherwise it returns ⊥.
Sig(m, SKi , APK): To partial sign a message, the user Ui computes σP ← PSig(m, SKi ,
APK) and (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H1 (m||PKi ). It then chooses r ← ZZp and compute
S1 = Y

xi

0

· (u

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r .

j=1

The full signature is set as σ = (σP , S1 , S2 ).
Ver(m, σP , PKi , AP K): Given a full signature σ from user Ui , a verifier verifiers
whether PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK) = > and whether
e(Y, PKi ) = e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , u0

n
Y

m

uj j ).

j=1

If both hold, it returns >; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ): It first verifies whether σP is a valid partial signature by
running PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK). If σP is invalid, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it computes
(m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H1 (m||PKi ), chooses r ← ZZp , computes
S1 =

PKyi

0

· (u

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r ,

j=1

and returns σ = (σP , S1 , S2 ).
It is not hard to verify that, in the above construction, any (partial) signature
created by Sig (PSig) will be valid under Ver (PVer), and that any signature created
by the arbitrator using Res based on a partial signature generated by PSig will be
valid under Ver. Thus the correctness property of the above construction holds.
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It is easy to see the actual signatures generated by the signer and the resolved
signatures generated by the arbitrator have the identical distribution, thus the resolution ambiguity also holds.

3.4.1

Security Analysis.

It will be shown that the specific construction is secure in the multi-user setting and
chosen-key model reviewed in Section 2.3.2. Intuitively, the security against signers
holds unconditionally as the arbitrator is always able to convert a signer’s partial
signature into a full one. The security against verifiers holds due to unforgeability of
the BLS signature and the modified Bender-Katz-Morselli 2-user ring signature. The
security against the arbitrator holds due to the unforgeability of the BLS signature.
Theorem 3.4 The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme above is unconditionally secure against signers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model.
Proof. Obviously, for any message m and any valid signature σP on m under the
verification key PKi , the arbitrator can always convert it into a full signature by
using its own secret key ASK. Therefore, the security against signers always hold.

Theorem 3.5 The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme above is secure against
verifiers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if CDH assumption holds in
G.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against verifiers with nonnegligible probability. it will be shown how to construct an algorithm R that breaks
the CDH assumption in G.
Note that algorithm R is given an CDH instance (G, p, g, A = g a , B = g b ). Its
goal is to output g ab . Algorithm R simulates the challenger and interacts with
adversary A. Let q be the number of different messages contained in the queries A
has made to the resolution oracle.
At the start, the algorithm R sets an integer, l = 4q, and chooses uniformly
at random an integer, k ∗ between 0 and n. It then chooses an n-length vector,
~x = (xi ), where the elements of ~x are chosen uniformly at random between 0 and
l − 1 and a value, x0 , chosen uniformly at random between 0 and l − 1. Besides,
algorithm R chooses a random y 0 ∈ ZZp and an n-length vector, ~y = (yi ), where the
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elements of ~y are chosen at random in ZZp . Algorithm R keeps these values private.
let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative group of order
p and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function. Algorithm R sets
PK := A and APK = Y := B and assigns the Waters hash generators parameters
u0 = B p−k

∗ m+x0

0

g y and ui = B xi g yi . Algorithm R forwards PK, APK and the public

parameters (G, p, e, H0 , H1 , u0 , u1 , · · · , un ) to the adversary. From the view of the
adversary, the distribution of the simulated public parameters is identical to the real
construction. The hash function H0 is viewed as a random oracle.
For ease of analysis the following functions are defined where m̃ is the set of
indices i such that mi = 1 while H1 (m) = (m1 , · · · , mn ) :
F (m) = (p − mk ∗ ) + x0 +

X

xi , and J(m) = y 0 +

X

yi .

i∈m̃

i∈m̃

A binary function K(m) is defined as
(
K(m) =

0, if x0 +

P

i∈m̃

xi ≡ 0

(mod l)

1, otherwise.

H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . To respond
to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hMi , ai i as explained below. This list
is referred to as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the oracle H0
on a message Mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query Mi already appears on the H0 -list in some tuple hMi , ai i, then
algorithm R responds with H(Mi ) = g ai .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hMi , ai i to the
H0 -list and responds to A as H(Mi ) = g ai .
PSig Queries. For the i-th partial signing query on message Mi , R checks whether
there is a tuple hMi , ai i in the H0 -list. If not, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds
the tuple hMi , ai i to the H0 -list. R returns Aai to A as the reply for the partial
signing query.
Res Queries. Given a resolution query (m, σP , PKi ) where PKi could be PK or
could be adversarially-generated by the adversary, algorithm R responds to this
query as follows:
1. checks whether PVer(σP , m, PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise, R responds
to A with a special symbol ⊥.
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2. chooses a random r ∈ ZZp , and computes the signature as
−J(m||PKi )
F (m||PKi )

S 1 = g1

(u0

−1
F (m||PKi )

Y

ui )r , S2 = g1

gr .

˜ i
i∈m||PK

3. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , S1 , S2 ) and returned to A as the reply of
the resolution query.
Let r̃ = r −

α
F (m||PKi )

and PKi = g α . Then

−J(m||PKi )
F (m||PKi )

S1 = PKi

−J(m||PKi )
F (m||PKi )

= PKi

(u0

Y
˜ i
i∈m||PK

ui )r

(B F (m||PKi ) g J(m||PKi ) )r
α

−

= B α (B F (m||PKi ) g J(m||PKi ) ) F (m||PKi ) (B F (m||PKi ) g J(m||PKi ) )r
Y
α
r−
= B α (u0
ui ) F (m||PKi )
˜
i∈m||PKi
Y
α 0
= B (u
ui )r̃
˜
i∈m||PKi

Additionally,
−1
F (m||PKi )

S2 = g1

gr = g

α
r− F (m||PK

= g r̃ .

i)

Algorithm R will be able to perform this computation if and only if F (m||PKi ) 6=
0 mod p.
Finally the adversary A halts. It either admits failure, in which case so does R,
or it returns a full signature σ ∗ = (σP∗ , S1∗ , S2∗ ) on message m∗ without asking the
resolution oracle with respect to the message m∗ and the challenge signer’s public
key PK. Due to the collision-resistant property of the hash function, H1 (m∗ ||PK) 6=
H(m||PKi ) for any message m and PKi that had been submitted to the resolu˜
tion query before. Let m∗ ||PK
be the set of indices i such that m∗i = 1 where
P
H(m∗ ||PK) = (m∗1 , · · · , m∗n ). If x0 + i∈m∗ ˜||PK xi = k ∗ m, then
e(

S1∗
y+

(S2∗ )

P

i∈m∗˜||PK

yi

, g) =

e(A, B)e(S2∗ , u0
e((S2∗ )

y+

P

m∗

Qn

j
j=1 uj )

i∈m∗˜||PK

yi

= e(A, B).

, g)

Therefore algorithm R can solve the CDH problem by computing g ab as
g

ab

=

y+

(S2∗ )

S∗
P1

i∈m∗˜||PK

yi

.
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Similar to [Wat05], the probability that the simulator does not abort during
P
simulating the signing oracle and the equation x0 + i∈m∗ ˜||PK xi = k ∗ m holds is at
least λ =

1
,
8(n+1)q

which is non-negligible. This completes the proof.



Theorem 3.6 The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme above is secure against
the arbitrator in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if the CDH assumption
holds in G.
Proof. Suppose an adversary breaks the security against verifiers with non-negligible
probability. It will be shown how to construct an algorithm R that breaks the CDH
assumption in G.
Note that algorithm R is given an CDH instance (G, p, g, A = g a , B = g b ). Its
goal is to output g ab . The algorithm R chooses uniformly at random u0 , u1 , · · · , un ∈
G.

let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative

group of order p and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function. Algorithm R sets PK := A and forwards PK and the public parameters
(G, p, e, H0 , H1 , u0 , u1 , · · · , un ) to the adversary A. From the view of the adversary,
the distribution of the simulated public parameters is identical to the real construction. The hash function H0 is viewed as a random oracle. Suppose the adversary A
makes in total q different queries to the random oracle. At the start, the algorithm
R chooses uniformly at random an integer k ∗ such that 1 ≤ k ∗ ≤ q.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . To respond
to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hMi , ai i as explained below. This list
is referred to as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When A makes the i different
queries the oracle H0 on a message Mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. R checks whether i = k ∗ . If so, R returns B to A as the reply and adds the
tuple hMi , Bi to the H0 -list.
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hMi , ai i to the
H0 -list and responds to A as H(Mi ) = g ai .
PSig Queries. Without loss of generality, assume that for each partial signing
query, the adversary A has previously submitted the corresponding message to the
H0 query. For a partial signing query on message M , R checks the H0 -list. Suppose
M = Mi where Mi is i-th different query A has made to the H0 oracle. If i = k ∗ ,
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R aborts and returns failure. Otherwise, R returns Aai to A as the reply for the
partial signing query.
Finally A outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that m∗ is not queried to the partial signing
oracle. Since k ∗ is chosen uniformly at random and independent of the adversary A’s
behavior, thus with non-negligible probability at least 1/q it should be m∗ = Mk∗ ,
in which case σ ∗ = g ab . Thus algorithm R can outputs σ ∗ and breaks the CDH
assumption with non-negligible probability.

3.4.2



An attack in the Enhanced Model

The malicious arbitrator can always sign on behalf the signer as follows when it
is provided the signing oracle. The reason that an adversary can succeed in the
enhanced model is that the signing oracle can provide useful information to the
adversary. Specifically, the adversary can forge a new signature as follows.
1. The arbitrator computes Y = H0 (m∗ ) where m∗ is the message the arbitrator
tries to forge a signature on. Besides, the arbitrator chooses uniformly at ran0

dom x0 , x1 , · · · , xn ∈ ZZp and sets u0 = g x , u1 = g x1 , · · · , un = g xn . The public
key APK is set as (Y, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ). Note that APK is malicious generated in
the sense that the arbitrator does not know the corresponding secret key of Y .
2. Let the challenger’s public key is X = g x . The arbitrator asks a signing query
on a message m 6= m∗ , and gains a ring signature
S1 = Y x · (u0

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r ,

j=1

where (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H1 (m||X).
3. With the knowledge of x0 , x1 , · · · , xn , the arbitrator computes
A = (S2 )

x0

n
Y

0

(S2 )xj mj

j=1

and therefore Y x = S1 /A.
4. The arbitrator sets σP := Y x , chooses at random r0 ∈ ZZp , and computes
S10

x

= Y · (u

0

n
Y
j=1

where (m01 , · · · , m0n ) ← H1 (m∗ ||X).

m0

0

0

uj j )r , and S20 = g r ,
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5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , S10 , S20 ).
It is not hard to check that σ is a valid signature on message m∗ under the target
signer’s public key X and the arbitrator has not made a partial signing query on
the message m∗ .

3.5

Chapter Summary

Defining proper security models capturing possible realistic powers of an adversary
is of significant importance in the study of optimistic fair exchange. In this chapter
it is identified that existing models failed to capture the reality that an adversary
can have access to full signatures generated by the signer. An observation was made
that the previous perception that a signing oracle can be simulated by the partial
signing oracle and resolution oracle was wrong. That is to say, existing models
are not complete as they deprived dishonest users of the chance of observing the
challenge signer’s actual signatures. To make existing models more practical and
complete, an enhanced model for optimistic fair exchange that explicitly provides
the adversary with the signing oracle was proposed. Separations between existing
chosen-key model and the enhanced model are demonstrated.

Chapter 4
Collusion-Resistance in Optimistic Fair
Exchange
In this chapter, the OFE security model about security against signers is strengthened by allowing the dishonest signer having access to the arbitrator’s secret key.
To some extent, this captures the scenario that the signer and the arbitrator may
collude to disadvantage a verifier.

4.1

Introduction

An optimistic fair exchange protocol comprises three kinds of participants, namely
a signer, a verifier, and a semi-trusted third party named an “arbitrator”. Typically
such a protocol is conducted in three message flows. Firstly, Alice the signer initiates
the protocol by delivering a partial signature to Bob the verifier. A valid partial
signature not only serves as an evidence to Bob that Alice has committed to endorse
a certain message, but also assures Bob that he will receive Alice’s full signature at
the end of the protocol. The assurance follows the fact that the arbitrator is capable
of converting the partial signature into a full one. In the second step, Bob delivers
his full signature to Alice. Later, if Alice is honest, she will send her full signature
to Bob in the third step, and this completes the exchange process. Note that under
the normal situation, participation of the arbitrator is not required and thus, the
term ‘optimistic’. Meanwhile, the arbitrator is trusted in two senses. Alice trusts
the arbitrator would not convert her partial signature into a full signature unless
Bob submits his full signature. At the same time, Bob trusts the arbitrator that if
he submits his full signature, the arbitrator would convert Alice’s partial signature
into a full one, should Alice fails to do so.
Note that the arbitrator in OFE should correctly make a resolution. If the
arbitrator converts the signer’s partial signature into a full one without a verifier
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having submitted his own full signature, the signer will be disadvantaged. On the
other hand, if the arbitrator refuses to convert the signer’s partial signature into a
full one even if a verifier has submitted his own full signature, the verifier will be
disadvantaged. Without this basic assumption that the arbitrator correctly make a
resolution, the fairness of OFE will not be guaranteed.
However, since the third party could be a random member of the network, it is
realistic that it may potentially help one party like its business partner. Thus the
collusion of the arbitrator with the signer or the verifier should be taken into account,
as long as the arbitrator correctly makes the required resolution request whenever
needed. In this chapter the scenario is considered that the arbitrator may implicitly
collude with the signer in the sense of sharing its secret arbitrator key with the signer.
If the fairness for the verifier can still be achieved when this collusion is considered,
the trust for the arbitrator will be reduced for the verifier side. This is meaningful
in practice, as it is easier for the signer to choose an arbitrator unilaterally than
both mutually distrusted parties to choose a common trusted third party as an
arbitrator. Furthermore, allowing the signer having access to the arbitrator’s secret
key also captures the real scenario of leakage of the arbitrator’s secret key.

4.1.1

The Contributions

In this chapter, the following contributions are made.
1. The definition of security against signers in the enhanced chosen-key model
proposed in Chapter 3 is updated, such that it now captures the previously
overlooked case in optimistic fair exchange schemes, in which the potentially
dishonest arbitrator may implicitly collude with a signer by offering its secret arbitration key. The enhanced chosen-key model now assures collusionresistance in OFE. It is also showed that the security against signers in the
enhanced model guarantees stronger security than that in existing multi-user
setting and chosen-key model with a concrete example that shows the separation.
2. After updating the enhanced chosen-key model, the security of the existing
schemes in the enhanced model is investigated. Two well known methodologies for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes are revisited, namely
one based on verifiably encrypted signatures, and the other one based on the
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combination of conventional signatures and ring signatures. The result shows
that these paradigms will remain secure in the enhanced model.

4.1.2

Organization

In the next section, the current definition for security against signers is modified to
allow a dishonest signer having access to the arbitrator’s secret key, and explanations
about the updated model is made. In Section 4.3, the multi-user setting and chosenkey model and the enhanced chosen-key model are separated by offering a concrete
OFE scheme that serves as a counterexample. In Section 4.4, two popular generic
constructions of OFE protocols are revisited, namely, schemes based on verifiably
encrypted signature and those based on conventional signature plus ring signature
and it is shown that they yield schemes which remain secure in the enhanced model
with slight modifications.

4.2

The Enhanced Chosen-key Model

It is easy to see that the existing models do not capture the possible collusion
amongst the arbitrator and signer. That is, when a dishonest signer has access
to the arbitrator’s secret key, security of the schemes proven in this model will be
unclear. To capture this case and make the security model more practical, the
following model about security against signers is proposed.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. It is required that the probability that any PPT
adversary A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK)
(m, σP , PK∗ ) ← A(ASK, APK)
σ ← Res(m, σP , ASK, PK∗ )
"
#
PVer(m, σP , PK∗ , APK) = >
success of A := ∧
Ver(m, σ, PK∗ , APK) = ⊥
In other words, no signer, even with the knowledge of the arbitrator’s secret key,
should be able to produce a partial signature that looks good to a verifier but
cannot be resolved to a full signature. The case that the arbitrator and a dishonest
signer may implicitly collude is captured by allowing the adversary A having the
arbitrator’s secret key as an input.
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Implications and Limitations of The Enhanced Model

The model captures the case when the arbitrator’s key is leaked to the attacker, or
that someone having access to the arbitration key is colluding with the attacker. One
limitation of the model is that it only captures the behavior of a malicious arbitrator
whose nature is honest-but-curious. Specifically, it is assumed that the arbitration
key is generated in complete accordance with the setup algorithm. This includes
deleting all randomness used during key generation but not explicitly contained
within the arbitration key. This is analogous to the situation for certificateless
cryptosystems in which the attacker could be the key generation centre (KGC) itself.
The nature of the KGC is modelled in two ways, namely, honest-but-curious and
fully malicious. The former assumes the attacker has access to the KGC’s master
key which is generated honestly while the latter assumes that the KGC’s master key
is created by the attacker. Readers are referred to [Den08] for the discussion of the
various models of certificateless cryptosystem.
There are two reasons for modeling an honest-but-curious arbitrator. Firstly,
the observation is made that existing models already fall short in capturing attacks
from such an honest-but-curious arbitrator. Secondly, existing schemes following a
certain design approach are immune against this kind of attack. The formalization
of a model that captures the behavior of a malicious arbitrator and the construction
of schemes secure in this sense is left as an open problem.
In an orthogonal direction, it should be remarked that a similar extension could
not be applied to the security against verifiers. In other words, the arbitrator must
be completely honest to the signer. Otherwise, the verifier could just convert the
partial signature from the signer with the help of the arbitrator without the need
to fulfill the obligation.

4.3

Separation of the Proposed Model and the
Existing Model

In this section, a separation of the security against signers in the enhanced model
and that in the existing model [HYWS08b], which was reviewed in Section 2.3.2,
is demonstrated. In order to do this, a concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme,

4.3. Separation of the Proposed Model and the Existing Model

66

called A*-OFE1 , that is secure in the multi-user setting and chosen key model reviewed in Section 2.3.2 is presented. Then, a concrete attack against this scheme in
the enhanced model is shown. This shows that the security against signers in the
enhanced model captures strictly stronger security than that in the existing model,
as it is trivial to show that the security in the enhanced model implies that in the
multi-user setting and chosen key model.

4.3.1

High Level Description

Prior to proposing the concrete construction that will serve as a counterexample, the
high level description will be firstly provided. In this example, the full signature is a
Schnorr signature [Sch91] (c, s) on a message m under the signer’s public key X such
that c = H(X||g||g s X c ||m), where g is a generator of the group G in the Schnorr
signature setting and H is a hash function. Suppose the order of g is of `-bit and
in the following γ is used to denote the value ` − 1. The partial signature comprises
c, S = g s , an encryption of the exponent s and a proof that the encryption is done
correctly. That is, to generate a partial signature, the signer does the following.
1. The signer releases c and S = g s .
2. Let bj for j = 0 to γ be the binary representation of s. That is, s =

Pγ

j=0

2j bj ,

where bj ∈ {0, 1}.
3. Since no efficient encryption of exponents in the Schnorr signature setting is
known, the signer encrypts the individual bits bj of s.
• The signer encodes bit 0 as the identity element in group G while bit 1 is
encoded as the generator g. Thus to encrypt the j-th binary bit bj , the
signer equivalently encrypts the group element g bj .
• For j = 0 to γ, the signer independently and randomly chooses rj and
computes
Aj = g rj , Bj = hrj , Cj = g bj Y rj .
Note that (Aj , Bj , Cj ) is in fact the encryption of the bit bj under the
arbitrator’s public key (h, Y ).
1

The name A*-OFE represents that the arbitrator may implicitly collude with the signer in the
enhanced model.
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• The set of tuples (Aj , Bj , Cj ) for j = 0 to γ constitute the encryption of
the exponent s.
4. The signer then makes a proof of knowledge that the ciphertexts have been
generated correctly. Naturally the proof of knowledge consists of two parts.
• The first part ensures that the discrete logarithm of the value encrypted
in (Aj , Bj , Cj ), when added together after applying the proper weights, is
the exponent s. More specifically, the first part itself is a zero knowledge
proof of knowledge of a set of values {sj , rj }γj=0 such that Aj = g rj , Bj =
hrj , Cj = g sj Y rj and S = g

Pγ

j=0

2j sj

.

• The second part guarantees that the discrete logarithm of the value encrypted in (Aj , Bj , Cj ) can only be 0 or 1. It can be viewed as a zero
knowledge proof of knowledge of values Rj such that either Cj = Y Rj or
Cj = gY Rj holds.
To convert a partial signature into a full one, the arbitrator decrypts the ciphertexts and gains a sequence of plaintexts. If all the plaintexts are either the identity
element in group G or the generator g, the arbitrator decodes the identity element
and g as bit 0 and 1, respectively, and outputs the value whose binary representation
is exactly the sequence of these bits. Otherwise the arbitrator returns ⊥ to indicate
failure in making a resolution.
Since the signer has no access to the arbitrator’s secret key, the proof of knowledge of a set of values {sj , rj }γj=0 such that Cj = g sj Y rj , S = g
of knowledge of values Rj such that Cj = Y

Rj

or Cj = gY

Rj

Pγ

j=0

2 j sj

and the proof

together would imply

that sj ∈ {0, 1} and rj = Rj . Thus the above proof of the set of relationships achieve
what the signer would like to convince the verifier. That is, the sum of sj after applying the appropriate weights would be the component s of the Schnorr signature
and that sj can only be 0 or 1. Thus the arbitrator can decrypt the ciphertexts and
output the exponent s such that S = g s .

4.3.2

Construction of A*-OFE

Formally it is assumed that a public group G with a generator g of prime order p
of ` bits has been generated. Denote by γ the value ` − 1. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → ZZp be
a cryptographic hash function.
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The construction of A*-OFE is as follows.
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator chooses random elements h ∈ G and y ∈ ZZp , and
computes Y = g y . The public key is set as APK = (h, Y ), and the arbitrator
keeps ASK = y as private.
• SetupUser : Each user Ui chooses a secret value xi ∈ ZZp , and calculates Xi = g xi .
The user sets (SKi , PKi ) = (xi , Xi ).
• PSig: To partially sign a message m, a user Ui does as follows:
1. chooses a random t ∈ ZZp and then computes c ∈ ZZp and s ∈ ZZp such
that
c = H(PKi ||g||g t ||m) and s = t − cxi (in ZZp ).
2. let s =

Pγ

j=0

2j bj , where for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, bj ∈ {0, 1}. Note that

this binary representation always exists and is unique in ZZp 2 . Let further
j

S = g s and Ej = g 2 for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ. Thus
S=

γ
Y

(Ej )bj .

j=0

3. Ui chooses uniformly at random 0 ≤ rj ≤ ZZp for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, and
computes
Aj = g rj , Bj = hrj , Cj = g bj Y rj .
4. For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, if bj = 0, Ui chooses uniformly at random elements
tj0 , cj1 , sj1 ∈ ZZp and sets
Tj0 = Y tj0 , Tj1 = (

Cj cj1 sj1
) Y .
g

Otherwise, Ui chooses uniformly at random cj0 , sj0 , tj1 ∈ ZZp , and sets
Tj0 = (Cj )cj0 Y sj0 , Tj1 = (

Cj tj1
) .
g

Besides, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, Ui chooses uniformly at random tj , t˜j ∈ ZZp , and
sets

γ
Y
˜
˜
S̃ =
(Ej )tj , Ãj = g tj , B̃j = htj , C̃j = g tj Y tj .
j=0
Pγ

j

s
j=0 2 bj may not be unique.
While the value s is unique in ZZp , the set {bj }l−1
j=0 such thta g = g
γ
For example, suppose s = 1 ∈ ZZp and that p < 2l − 1, two sets of {bj }j=0 exist. They corresponds
to the binary representation of 1 and p + 1. However, later it will be shown that this will not affect
the security of the scheme.
2
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0
5. For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote T˜j = Ãj ||B̃j ||C̃j and T˜j = Tj0 ||Tj1 . Let A =
0
0
T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ , and B = T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ . The user Ui computes


c̃ = H PKi ||c||S||m|| S̃ || A || B .
For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, if bj = 0, Ui computes
cj0 = c̃ − cj1 (in ZZp ), sj0 = tj0 − cj0 rj (in ZZp ).
Otherwise, Ui computes
cj1 = c̃ − cj0 (in ZZp ), sj1 = tj1 − cj1 rj (in ZZp ).
Furthermore, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, Ui computes
s˜j = t˜j − c̃bj (in ZZp ), sj = tj − c̃rj (in ZZp ).
6. For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote Tj = Aj ||Bj ||Cj . The partial signature is set as
σP := (c, S, T0 , · · · , Tγ , c00 , c01 , s00 , s01 , · · · , cγ0 , cγ1 , sγ0 , sγ1 , c̃, s˜0 , s0 ,
· · · , s˜γ , sγ ).
• PVer: Given a partial signature σP from user Ui , a verifier does as follows.
1. The verifier checks whether c, c̃ ∈ ZZp , and for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ,
cj0 , cj1 , sj0 , sj1 , s˜j , sj ∈ ZZp , cj0 + cj1 = c̃ (in ZZp ).
2. The verifier checks whether
c = H(PKi ||g||S(Xi )c ||m).
3. The verifier computes S̃ = S c̃ ·

Qγ

j=0 (Ej )

s˜j

and for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ,

Tj0 = (Cj )cj0 Y sj0 , Tj1 = (

Cj cj1 sj1
) Y .
g

4. Besides, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, the verifier decomposes Tj as Aj ||Bj ||Cj and
computes
Ãj = g sj (Aj )c̃ , B̃j = hsj (Bj )c̃ , C̃j = g s˜j Y sj (Cj )c̃ .
0
5. Denote T˜j = Ãj ||B̃j ||C̃j and T˜j = Tj0 ||Tj1 . Let A = T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ , and
0
0
B = T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ . The verifier checks whether


c̃ = H PKi ||c||S||m|| S̃ || A || B .
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6. If all the above equations hold, then the verifier returns >, otherwise ⊥
is returned.
• Sig: To fully sign a message m, a user Ui chooses a random t ∈ ZZp and then
computes c ∈ ZZp and s ∈ ZZp such that
c = H(PKi ||g||g t ||m) and s = t − cxi (in ZZp ).
The full signature is set as σ := (c, s).
• Ver: Given a full signature σ := (c, s) from user Ui , a verifier verifies whether
c ∈ ZZp , s ∈ ZZp and
c = H(PKi ||g||g s (Xi )c ||m).
If so, > is returned and otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
• Res: For the user Ui ’s partial signature σP , the arbitrator
1. first checks whether PVer(m, σP , PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise,
returns ⊥.
2. for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, compute Dj = Cj /(Aj )y . If Dj = g, sets bj = 1, and if
Dj = 1, sets bj = 0. Otherwise, it responds to A with ⊥.
P
3. If ⊥ is not returned, returns s = γj=0 2j bj mod p3 .

4.3.3

Security Analysis.

It is not hard to verify that, in the above construction, any (partial) signature
created by Sig (PSig) will be valid under Ver (PVer), and that any signature created
by the arbitrator using Res based on a partial signature generated by PSig will be
valid under Ver. Thus the correctness property of the above construction holds.
Since the signature generated by Sig and that generated by the arbitrator using
Res based on a valid partial signature are both Schnorr signatures, the resolution
ambiguity property also holds.
Next the specific construction is secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key
model reviewed in Section 2.3.2 will be shown.
3

Note that even if the set of binary values {bj }Pis not unique, the value s computed by the
γ
j
arbitrator modulo p will be unique as long as S = g j=0 2 bj and that bj ∈ {0, 1}.
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Theorem 4.1 The A*-OFE scheme is secure against signers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against signers. It will be shown
how to construct an algorithm R that solves the discrete logarithm problem. This
will contradict with the discrete logarithm assumption.
Note that algorithm R is given random elements u ∈ G. Its goal is to output
an integer α ∈ ZZp such that u = g α . Algorithm R simulates the challenger and
interacts with adversary A as follows.
Setup. Algorithm R chooses a random integer y ∈ ZZp and sets h = u, Y = hy .
Note that the distributions of h, Y are uniform on G. R forwards the values h, Y to
adversary A, who returns its public key PK∗ = XA .
Hash Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H. To
response to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hstring (i) , ci i as explained
below. This list is referred to as H-list. The list is initially empty. When A queries
the oracle H at a point string ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query string already appears on the H-list in some tuple hstring, ci,
then algorithm R responds with H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hstring, ci to the
H-list and responds to A as H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
Note that c is uniform in ZZp and is independent of A’s current view as required.
Res Queries. Given a resolution query (m, σP , PKi ) where PKi = Xi is the signer’s
public key and σP := (c, S, T0 , · · · , Tγ , · · · ), algorithm R responds to this query as
follows:
1. checks whether PVer(σP , m, PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise, R responds
to A with a special symbol ⊥.
2. for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, decompose Tj as Aj ||Bj ||Cj , and compute Dj = Cj /(Bj )y . If
Dj = g, sets bj = 1, and if Dj = 1, sets bj = 0. Otherwise, R responds to A
with ⊥.
3. If ⊥ is not returned, R forwards s =

Pγ

j=0

2j bj to A as the response.
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Output. It is easy to see that the above hash queries and resolution queries
are perfectly simulated. Finally, A halts. It either admits failure, in which case
so does R, or it returns a partial signature σP∗ on message m∗ , where σP∗ :=
(c∗ , S ∗ , T0∗ , · · · , Tγ∗ , c∗00 , c∗01 , s∗00 , s∗01 , · · · , c∗γ0 , c∗γ1 , s∗γ0 , s∗γ1 , c̃∗ , s˜0 ∗ , s∗0 , · · · , s˜γ ∗ , s∗γ )
and Tj∗ = A∗j ||Bj∗ ||Cj∗ for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, such that PVer(σP∗ , m∗ , PK∗ ) = >, but it can
not be resolved to a valid full signature by the resolution algorithm Res.
By the General Forking Lemma [BN06] (a standard rewinding technique in random oracle model), with non-negligible probability algorithm R is able to gain
another partial signature σP0 on the same message m∗ , where σP0 := (c∗ , S ∗ , T0∗ ,
· · · , Tγ∗ , c000 , c001 , s000 , s001 , · · · , c0γ0 , c0γ1 , s0γ0 , s0γ1 , c̃0 , s˜0 0 , s00 , · · · , s˜γ 0 , s0γ ) and c̃∗ 6= c̃, such
that PVer(σP 0 , m∗ , PK∗ ) = >, but it can not be resolved to a valid full signature by
the resolution algorithm Res.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that c̃0 > c̃∗ . For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, it
∗

∗

∗

0

0

0

0

∗

has (Cj∗ )c̃ g s˜j Y sj = (Cj∗ )c̃ g s˜j Y sj . It follows that (Cj∗ )c̃ −c̃ = g s˜j

∗ −s˜ 0
j

∗

0

Y sj −sj . Let

τj = (s˜j ∗ − s˜j 0 )(c̃0 − c̃∗ )−1 , υi = (s∗j − s0j )(c̃0 − c̃∗ )−1 . Hence Cj∗ = g τj Y υj .
∗

∗

0

0

∗

∗

0

0

For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, because (A∗j )c̃ g sj = (A∗j )c̃ g sj , (Bj∗ )c̃ hsj = (Bj∗ )c̃ hsj , it follows
A∗j = g υi , Bj∗ = hυi .
∗

0

∗

0

Moreover, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, because (Cj∗ )cj0 Y sj0 = (Cj∗ )cj0 Y sj0 , (

0
C∗ 0
( gj )cj1 Y sj1 ,

case1 :
∗

∗
Ci∗ cj1 s∗j1
)
Y
g

=

c∗j0 + c∗j1 = c̃∗ and c0j0 + c0j1 = c̃0 , it has the following three cases:
0
∗
∗
0
∗
C∗ 0
If c∗j0 6= c0j0 and c∗j1 6= c0j1 , then it has (Cj∗ )cj0 −cj0 = Y sj0 −sj0 and ( gj )cj1 −cj1

0

Y sj1 −sj1 . Thus it has Cj∗ = Y

0
s∗
j0 −sj0
∗
0
c −c
j0
j0

= gY

0
s∗
j1 −sj1
∗
0
c −c
j1
j1

s∗ −s0

j1
. Denote β = y( cj1
0 −c∗ −
j1

j1

=

s∗j0 −s0j0
).
c0j0 −c∗j0

It follows 1 = ghβ . Algorithm R can simply output α = −β −1 and breaks the discrete logarithm assumption when this case happens. Thus, this case can be safely
omitted.
case2 : If c∗j0 = c0j0 , and c∗j1 6= c0j1 . It follows that (
0

υj0 = (s∗j1 − s0j1 )(c0j1 − c∗j1 )−1 . Then it has Cj∗ = gY υj .

Cj∗ c0 −c∗
) j1 j1
g
Since Cj∗

∗

0

= Y sj1 −sj1 . Denote
= g τj Y υj , it follows

0

1 ≡ g τj −1 Y υj −υj . Thus it must be the case τj = 1 and υi = υi 0 , as otherwise
algorithm R can simply output α = (1 − τj )(yυj − yυj0 )−1 and breaks the discrete
logarithm problem. Therefore Cj∗ = gY υj when this case happens.
case3 : If c∗j0 6= c0j0 and c∗j1 = c0j1 , then likewise under the discrete logarithm
assumption one can gain that τj = 0 and Cj∗ = Y υj when this case happens.
Qγ
∗ Qγ
s˜j ∗
∗ c̃0
s˜j 0
∗ c̃0 −c̃∗
Furthermore, since (S ∗ )c̃
(E
)
=
(S
)
=
i
i=0
j=0 (Ei ) , it has (S )
Qγ
Qγ
s˜j ∗ −s˜j 0
∗
τj
. It follows that (S ) = j=0 (Ej ) .
j=0 (Ej )
From the above analysis, it is readily to see that the arbitrator always returns a
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Pγ

2j bj mod p where bj = 0 if τj = 0, and bj = 1 if τi = 1. It is easy
Q
Q
j
∗
to verify S ∗ = γj=0 (Ej )τj = γj=0 g 2 bj = g s , which means that under the discrete
j=0

logarithm assumption, the scheme is secure against signers.



Theorem 4.2 The A*-OFE scheme is secure against verifiers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A makes Qh hash queries, Qp partial signing queries
and Qr resolution queries, and then wins by producing a new full signature forgery
σ ∗ := (c∗ , s∗ ) on message m∗ . For 1 ≤ i ≤ Qp , let m(i) be the ith message submitted
(i)

(i)

to the partial signing oracle and σP := (c(i) , S (i) = g s , · · · ) be the reply for this
query. To show the security, a sequence of games are firstly defined, and then the
security is shown via a series of claims that if A is successful against Game x, then
it will also be successful in Game x + 1.
Game 0. This is the real experiment between the challenger and an adversary A
as defined in security against verifiers in Section 2.3.2, in the random oracle model.
This means that the challenger firstly correctly generates the TTP’s and target
signer’s key pairs by running algorithms SetupTTP and SetupUser , respectively. The
challenger forwards the TTP’s public key APK := (h, Y ) and target signer’s public
key PK∗ := X to the adversary A, and then provides accesses to the hash oracle,
partial signing oracle and resolution oracle as well.
Game 1. This is the same as Game 0, with the exception that one makes it a rule
that A fails if there does not exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ Qp such that m(i) = m∗ , c(i) =
∗

c∗ , S (i) = g s .
Game 2. This is the same as Game 1, with the exception that the challenger is
simulated as follows. Choose at random y1 , y2 ∈ ZZp and set Y = g y1 hy2 .
Hash Queries. The simulation of hash queries is exactly the same as in the above
theorem.
PSig Queries. At any time A can request a partial signature under challenge key
∗

PK = X. Responds to the ith partial signing query on message m(i) as follows:
(i)

(i)

1. R chooses c(i) , s(i) ∈ ZZp at random, sets c(i) := H(PK∗ ||g||g s X c ||m(i) ), and
(i)

adds hPK∗ || g|| S (i) X c || m(i) , c(i) i where S (i) = g s

(i)

to the H-list.
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2. Let s(i) =

(i)

Pγ

j=0

(i)

2j bj , where for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, bj

uniformly at random 0 ≤
(i)

(i)

(i)
rj
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∈ {0, 1}. Choose

≤ ZZp for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, and compute
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

Aj = g rj , Bj = hrj , Cj = g bj (Aj )y1 (Bj )y2 .
3. Randomly choose c̃(i) ∈ ZZp . For 0 ≤ j ≤ δ, choose uniformly at random
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

cj0 , sj0 , sj1 ∈ ZZp , and compute cj1 = c̃(i) − cj0 and
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

Tj0 = (Cj )cj0 Y sj0 , Tj1 = (

(i)
Cj c(i)
) j1 Y sj1 .
g

(i)

Besides, for 0 ≤ j ≤ δ, choose uniformly at random 0 ≤ s˜j (i) , sj ≤ ZZp .
(i)
Q
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i) (i)
Compute S̃ (i) = S c̃ · γj=0 (Ej )s˜j , and for 0 ≤ j ≤ δ, Ãj = g sj (Aj )c̃ ,
B̃j

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

= g sj (Bj )c̃ , C̃j

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

= g s˜j Y sj (Cj )c̃ .

0(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
= Tj0 ||Tj1 and
4. For each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote T˜j = Ãj ||B̃j ||C̃j , T˜j
(i)
(i)
0(i)
0(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
Tj = Aj ||Bj ||Cj . Let A(i) = T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ , and B (i) = T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ .

Set
c̃(i) := H PK∗ ||c(i) ||S (i) ||m(i) ||S̃ (i) ||A(i) ||B (i)



and add
PK∗ ||c(i) ||S (i) ||m(i) ||S̃ (i) ||A(i) ||B (i) , c̃(i)
to the H-list.
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

5. The partial signature is returned to A as σP := (c(i) , S (i) , T0 , · · · , Tγ , c00 , c01 ,
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

sj0 , sj1 , · · · , cγ0 , cγ1 , sγ0 , sγ1 , c̃(i) , s˜0 (i) , s0 , · · · , s˜γ (i) , sγ ).
Res Queries. A can request a resolution query (m, σP , PKi ) where PKi = Xi is
a signer’s public key and A may not know its corresponding secret key, and σP :=
(c, S, T0 , · · · , Tγ , c00 , c01 , s00 , s01 , · · · , cγ0 , cγ1 , sγ0 , sγ1 , c̃, s˜0 , s0 , · · · , s˜γ , sγ ). Responds
to this query as follows:
• checks whether PVer(m, σP , PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise, returns ⊥.
1. for 0 ≤ j ≤ δ, decompose Tj as Aj ||Bj ||Cj , and compute Dj = Cj /(Aj )y1 (Bj )y2 .
If Dj = g, sets bj = 1, and if Dj = 1, sets bj = 0. Otherwise, R responds
to A with ⊥.
2. If ⊥ is not returned, R forwards s =
sponse.

Pγ

j=0

2i bi mod p to A as the re-
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• When PVer(σP , m, PKi ) = ⊥, responds to A with ⊥.
Game 3. This is the same as Game 2, with the exception that at the beginning of
∗

∗

the game one guesses an index 1 ≤ i∗ ≤ Qp , and A fails if m(i ) =
6 m∗ , or c(i ) =
6 c∗ ,
∗

∗

or S (i ) =
6 gs .
Game 4. This is the same as Game 3, with the exception that one makes some
changes to the i∗ th partial signing oracle in the above game. Namely, for each
(i∗ )

0 ≤ j ≤ γ, instead of choosing uniformly at random rj
(i∗ )

Aj

(i∗ )

(i∗ )

= g rj , Bj

(i∗ )

(i∗ )

= hrj , Cj

(i∗ )

∈ ZZp , and computing

(i∗ )

(i∗ )

= g bj (Aj )y1 (Bj )y2 ,

Choose independently and uniformly at random αj , βj , δj ∈ ZZp , and compute
(i∗ )

Aj

(i∗ )

= g αj , Bj

∗

(i∗ )

= g βj , Cji = g bj g δj .

Game 5. This is the same as Game 4, with the exception that for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ,
(i∗ )

one randomly and independently chooses µj ∈ ZZp and replaces Cj
(i∗ )

Cj

(i∗ )

= g bj g δj with

= g µj .

Next the probability that A wins in these games is linked via a series of claims.
Let Sx be the event that A wins in Game x.
Claim 1
Pr[S1 ] = Pr[S0 ] − SAA ,

(4.1)

where SAA is the advantage of an adversary A0 in the security against the arbitrator
discussed later.
Suppose A generates a new full signature forgery σ ∗ := (c∗ , s∗ ) on message m∗ ,
but there does not exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ Qp such that m(i) = m∗ , c(i) = c∗ , S (i) =
∗

g s . Then an adversary B in the security against the arbitrator is built. B correctly
generates its key pair (ASK, APK) by running algorithm SetupTTP and then receives
its own target signer’s public key X. B forwards X and APK to A. Whenever A
requests a hash query or a partial signing query, B submits this query to its own hash
oracle or partial signing oracle, respectively, and forwards the reply to A. Whenever
A requests a resolution query, B makes a resolution using its secret key ASK. Note
that the simulation is perfect. Finally B outputs A’s forgery σ ∗ := (c∗ , s∗ ) on
message m∗ and wins in the security against the arbitrator that will be discussed in
the next theorem.
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Claim 2
| Pr[S2 ] − Pr[S1 ]| ≤ negl(k).

(4.2)

Define F to be the event that in a resolution query in Game 2, PVer(σP , m, PKi )
0

= > but there exists some 1 ≤ j ≤ γ such that Aj = g r , Bj = g r but r 6= r0 mod q.
If F does not occur, with Aj = g rj , Bj = hrj , then Y rj = (Aj )y1 Bj y2 ; therefore the
decryption oracle computes Dj = Cj /Y rj , just as it should be. That is to say, the
Game 1 and Game 2 proceed statistically indistinguishably, unless event F occurs.
Thus it has | Pr[S0 ] − Pr[S1 ]| ≤ Pr[F ], and only need to show that Pr[F ] ≤ negl(k).
To prove this inequality, it suffices to notice that in a valid partial signature σP , a
non-interactive proof of knowledge P K{(rj ) : Aj = g rj ∧ Bj = hrj } was essentially
conducted, and the knowledge error is negligible in k even for an adversary with
infinite power.
Claim 3
Pr[S3 ] =

Pr[S2 ]
.
Qp

(4.3)

The only difference between these two games is that one guesses a random index
i∗ . This value is used no where in the game, and independent to the adversary.
Once the adversary makes a forgery, one only declares him successful if the index of
his forgery matches one’s guess, which will occur with 1/Qp probability.
Claim 4
| Pr[S4 ] − Pr[S3 ]| ≤ l · ddh ,

(4.4)

where ddh is the DDH-advantage of some efficient algorithm R (and hence negligible
under the DDH assumption).
To show this, divide the transition from Game 3 to Game 4 into a sequences of
sub-games from Game 00 to Game (γ + 1)0 . Game 00 is exactly the same as Game
3. Game (j + 1)0 is the same as Game j 0 , with the exception that in the i∗ th partial
(i∗ )

signing query instead of choosing uniformly at random rj
(i∗ )

Aj

(i∗ )

(i∗ )

= g rj , Bj

(i∗ )

(i∗ )

= hrj , Cj

(i∗ )

∈ ZZp , and computing

(i∗ )

(i∗ )

= g bj (Aj )y1 (Bj )y2 ,

one chooses uniformly at random αj , βj , δj ∈ ZZp , and computes
(i∗ )

Aj

(i∗ )

= g αj , Bj

∗

(i∗ )

= g βj , Cji = g bj g δj .

Note that Game (γ + 1)0 is exactly the same as Game 4. Let Fj be the event that
A wins in Game j 0 .
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Next it will be shown that any difference between Pr[Fj ] and Pr[Fj+1 ] can be
parlayed into a corresponding DDH-advantage of an algorithm R. Algorithm R
runs as follows. It takes as input (g2 , u1 , u2 ), and interacts with A. R sets h = g2 .
It simulates the oracles as in Game j 0 except that in the i∗ th partial signing query
(i∗ )

it computes Aj

(i∗ )

= u1 , Bj

(i∗ )

= u2 , Cj

(i∗ )

= g bj (u1 )y1 (u2 )y2 . If A outputs a full
∗

∗

∗

∗

signature σ ∗ := (c∗ , s∗ ) on message m∗ such that m∗ = m(i ) , c∗ = c(j ) , g s = S (j ) ,
R output 1, else output a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
When the input to R is of the form (g2 , g r , g2r ) where r is randomly chosen, then
computation proceeds just as in Game j 0 . When the input to R is of the form
0

(g2 , g r , g2r ), where r, r0 ∈ ZZp are independently uniformly chosen, one only needs to
argue that ε = (u1 )y1 (u2 )y2 is random to adversary A’s view. If so, the simulation
of R proceeds just the same as in Game (j + 1)0 .
To see this, consider the point Q = (y1 , y2 ) ∈ (ZZp )2 . Let g2 = g w . At the
beginning of the attack, this is a random point on the line
logg Y = y1 + wy2 ,

(4.5)

determined by the TTP’s public key. Note that the i∗ th partial signing query should
not be submitted to the resolution oracle, otherwise σ ∗ := (c∗ , s∗ ) will not be a new
∗

forgery on message m∗ = m(i ) . Thus, due to the same reason as in Claim 2,
with overwhelming probability the resolution oracle only decrypts with respect to

(Ai , Bi , Ci ) of the form g ri , hri , g bi (Ai )y1 (Bi )y2 , and the adversary A obtains only
linear dependent relations ri logg Y = ri y1 + ri wy2 (since (Ai )y1 (Bi )y2 = g ri y1 hri y1 =
Y ri ). That means, no further information about Q is leaked.
(i∗ )

(i∗ )

(i∗ )

Consider now the output (Aj , Bj , Cj ) of R’s partial signing reply for A’s
i∗ th partial signing query. It has
logg ε = ry1 + r0 y2 .

(4.6)

Clearly, (4.5) and (4.6) are linearly independently when r 6= r0 . ε is a perfect one
time pad, and thus random to the adversary A’s view.
Therefore, for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, it has | Pr[Fj ] − Pr[Fj+1 ]| ≤ ddh , which is followed
by | Pr[S4 ] − Pr[S3 ]| = | Pr[Fγ+1 ] − Pr[F0 ]| ≤ (γ + 1) · ddh . Note that l = γ + 1, the
claim holds.
Claim 5
Pr[S5 ] = Pr[S4 ].

(4.7)
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Note that in game 5, g µj is a randomly chosen element from G, the change from
Game 5 to Game 4 was purely conceptual. Thus it has Pr[S5 ] = Pr[S4 ].
Claim 6
Pr[S5 ] ≤ dl ,

(4.8)

where dl is the discrete logarithm advantage, (and hence negligible under the discrete logarithm assumption).
To show this, an algorithm R that employs the adversary A in Game 5 is built
to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Algorithm R runs as follows. It takes as
input S. Its goal is to output s ∈ ZZp such that g s = S. It interacts with A, playing
the role of the simulator in Game 5. R simulates the environments in the same way
as in Game 5 with the exception that it sets S (i

∗)

= S. The simulation is perfect.
∗

Finally when A wins in Game 5 by outputting (c , s∗ ) on message m∗ , R outputs
s = s∗ and solves the discrete logarithm problem.
Claim 7
AdvA (1k ) ≤ SAA + Qp (l · ddh + dl ) + negl(k),

(4.9)

where AdvA (1k ) is advantage of A in the real experiment defined in the multi-user
setting and chosen key model.
As a sequence of equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.7) and (4.8) gained above,
it has equation (4.9). The whole proof is done.



Theorem 4.3 The A*-OFE scheme is secure against the arbitrator in the multi-user
setting and chosen-key model under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against the arbitrator. It will be
shown how to construct an algorithm R that solves the discrete logarithm problem.
This will contradict with the discrete logarithm assumption. Algorithm R is given a
random element X ∈ G as input, and its goal is to output x ∈ ZZp such that g x = X.
Setup : R sets PK∗ := X and sends it to the arbitrator.
Hash Queries. Hash queries are simulated in the same way as described in the
above theorems.
PSig Queries. Partial signing queries are the same as in Game 2 in the above
theorem.
Output. It is obvious that the above hash queries and resolution queries are
perfectly simulated. Finally, A halts. It either admits failure, in which case so does
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R, or it returns a full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ , where σ ∗ := (c∗ , s∗ ) such that
Ver(σ ∗ , m∗ , PK∗ ) = >.
Suppose adversary A makes Qh hash queries and Qp partial signing queries, and
then produces a new full signature forgery. For 1 ≤ i ≤ Qp , let m(i) be the ith
(i)

(i)

message submitted to the partial signing oracle and σP := (c(i) , S (i) = g s , · · · ) be
the reply for this query. Let σ ∗ := (c∗ , s∗ ) be the forgery on message m∗ . If there does
∗

not exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ Qp such that m(i) = m∗ , c(i) = c∗ , S (i) = g s , then due to
the randomness of the outputs of hash oracle, with overwhelming probability A has
∗

submitted the string X||g||g s X c ||m∗ to the hash query. Therefore by the General
Forking Lemma [BN06] (a rewinding technology in the random oracle model), with
non-negligible probability adversary A is able to produces another full signature
forgery σ 0 on the same message m∗ , where σP := (c0 , s0 ) such that c∗ 6= c0 . R thus
∗

∗

0

0

have g s X c = g s X c . This enable R to output x = (s∗ − s0 )(c0 − c∗ )−1 and break
the discrete logarithm assumption.

4.3.4



A Concrete Attack against A*-OFE in the Enhanced
Model

It will be shown that the above A*-OFE is insecure in the enhanced model. When
the arbitrator reveals its secret key y ∈ ZZp to a signer whose secret/public key pair
is (x, X = g x ), the malicious signer A can create a partial signature that passes the
inspection of partial signature verification algorithm, but it can not be resolved to
a valid full signature.
Taking further investigation into the above concrete construction, one may observe that there is a loophole about the proof made in the conterexample: the
knowledge rj used in the first part of the proof such that Cj = g sj Y rj could be different with the knowledge Rj used in the second part of proof such that Cj = Y Rj
or Cj = gY Rj . If that is true, the value sj would not be 0 or 1. That is, the plaintext
decrypted by the arbitrator in this case would be g sj rather than the identity element or the generator g of group G as it is supposed to be, and thus the arbitrator
will fail to make a resolution.
Note that finding rj , Rj such that Cj = g sj Y rj and that Cj = Y Rj (or Cj = gY Rj )
while rj 6= Rj is hard if the discrete logarithm of Y to the base g is unknown. However, in the enhanced model, this discrete logarithm value is known, and therefore
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finding such values rj , Rj is feasible. This is the rationale of how the counterexample can be attacked when an adversary is allowed to have access to the arbitrator’s
secret key.
The concrete attack by A is as follows.
1. Choose a random t ∈ ZZp and compute c ∈ ZZp and s ∈ ZZp such that
c = H(X||g||g t ||m) and s = t − cx (in ZZp ).
Note that s and y are independent and both random, thus with probability
1/2 it has s ≥ y.
2. Let s =

Pγ

j=0

2j bj and s − y =

Pγ

j=0

2j dj , where for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, bj , dj ∈

{0, 1}. Note that the binary representation always exist and can be uniquely
j

determined. Denote S = g s , γ = ` − 1 and Ej = g 2 for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ. Let further
b0j = dj for 1 ≤ j ≤ γ, and b00 = d0 + y. Thus
γ
Y
0
S=
(Ej )bj .
j=0

3. A chooses uniformly at random 0 ≤ rj ≤ ZZp for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, and computes
0

Aj = g rj , Bj = hrj , Cj = g bj Y rj .
Note that a trick here that will be used by the malicious signers is that
0

C0 = g b0 Y r0 = g d0 Y r0 +1 .
4. If d0 = 0, A chooses uniformly at random elements t00 , c01 , s01 ∈ ZZp and sets
T00 = Y t00 , T01 = (

C0 c01 s01
) Y .
g

Otherwise, A chooses uniformly at random c00 , s00 , t01 ∈ ZZp , and sets
T00 = (Cj )c00 Y s00 , T01 = (

C0 t01
) .
g

5. For 1 ≤ j ≤ γ, if b0j = 0, A chooses uniformly at random elements tj0 , cj1 , sj1 ∈
ZZp and sets
Tj0 = Y tj0 , Tj1 = (

Cj cj1 sj1
) Y .
g
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Otherwise, A chooses uniformly at random cj0 , sj0 , tj1 ∈ ZZp , and sets
Tj0 = (Cj )cj0 Y sj0 , Tj1 = (

Cj tj1
) .
g

Besides, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, A chooses uniformly at random tj , t˜j ∈ ZZp , and sets
γ
Y
˜
˜
(Ej )tj , Ãj = g tj , B̃j = htj , C̃j = g tj Y tj .
S̃ =
j=0
0
6. For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote T˜j = Ãj ||B̃j ||C̃j and T˜j = Tj0 ||Tj1 . Let A = T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ ,
0
0
and B = T˜0 || · · · ||T˜γ . A computes


c̃ = H X||c||S||m|| S̃ || A || B .
If dj = 0, the A computes
c00 = c̃ − c01 (in ZZp ), s00 = t00 − c00 (r0 + 1) (in ZZp ).
Otherwise, A computes
c01 = c̃ − c00 (in ZZp ), s01 = t01 − c01 (r0 + 1) (in ZZp ).
For 1 ≤ j ≤ γ, if b0j = 0, A computes
cj0 = c̃ − cj1 (in ZZp ), sj0 = tj0 − cj0 rj (in ZZp ).
Otherwise, A computes
cj1 = c̃ − cj0 (in ZZp ), sj1 = tj1 − cj1 rj (in ZZp ).
Furthermore, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, A computes
s˜j = t˜j − c̃b0j (in ZZp ), sj = tj − c̃rj (in ZZp ).
7. For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote Tj = Aj ||Bj ||Cj . The partial signature is set as σP :=
(c, S, T0 , · · · , Tγ , c00 , c01 , s00 , s01 , · · · , cγ0 , cγ1 , sγ0 , sγ1 , c̃, s˜0 , s0 , · · · , s˜γ , sγ ).
It is easy to check that PVer(σP , m, PKi ) = >. Now, it needs to show the
resolution about this partial signature will return the symbol ⊥, indicating failure.
Indeed, the arbitrator will compute Dj = Cj /(Aj )y for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ in a resolution
0

process. Since D0 = C0 /(A0 )y = g b0 = g di Y , rather than g or 1 as it should be.
Thus the arbitrator will return ⊥ by following the resolution algorithm. In this
case, without any doubt, verifiers would be disadvantaged with probability 1/2.
The malicious signer can also repeat step 1 several times, for example n times, until
a value s is found such that s ≥ y. In this case, the signer can cheat with probability
as least 1 − 1/2n .
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Previous Paradigms Revisited

From the knowledge in Chapter 3 and the above discussion in this chapter, it is
clear that the enhanced chosen-key model has strengthened all the three aspects of
security in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model. The security against signers
is strengthened by allowing the dishonest signer having access to the arbitrator’s
secret key. The security against verifiers and the security against the arbitrator
are strengthened by allowing the an adversary having access to the target signer’s
signing oracle (this part has been discussed in Chapter 3). In this section, the basic
theoretical question is addressed, namely whether or not a scheme satisfying the
security notions exists. Two previous known paradigms for constructing optimistic
fair exchange schemes are revisited and their security in the enhanced model is
evaluated.

4.4.1

Verifiably Encrypted Signature Paradigm

Dodis et al. [DLY07] showed optimistic fair exchange schemes secure in the multiuser setting can be constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures. Later, Huang et
al. [HYWS08b] showed this generic construction also works in the chosen-key model.
The generic construction of optimistic fair exchange schemes based on verifiably
encrypted signatures [DLY07] is as follows.
Let E = (KGen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme, and S = (KGen, Sig, Ver)
be a signature scheme. Given an encryption/decryption key pair (ek, dk) and a
signature key pair (sk, vk), let Π be a simulation-sound [Sah99] non-interactive zeroknowledge (NIZK) proof system for the NP-language L = {(c, m, ek, vk)|∃σ [c =
E.Enc(σ, ek) ∧ S.Ver(m, σ, vk) = 1]}. Intuitively, the partial signature of the generic
optimistic fair exchange scheme is the encryption of the signer’s signature plus a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof showing that the ciphertext is correctly generated.
The full signature is the signer’s signature. Below is the generic construction of
optimistic fair exchange schemes from verifiably encrypted signatures.
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator runs (dk, ek) ← S.KGen(1k ) and sets ASK = dk and
APK = ek.
• SetupUser : Each user Ui runs (ski , vki ) ← S.KGen(1k ) and sets (SKi , PKi ) =
(ski , vki ).
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• Sig: To sign a message m, the user Ui runs s ← S.Sig(ski , m). The full
signature is set as σ = s.
• Ver: To verify whether a full signature σ is generated by user Ui , a verifier
checks whether the output of S.Ver(m, σ, vki ) is valid or not. If valid, return
>. Otherwise, return ⊥.
• PSig: To partially sign a message m, the user Ui runs s ← S.Sig(ski , m) and
c ← E.Enc(ek, s) and generates a proof π showing (c, m, ek, vki ) ∈ L. The
partial signature is set as σP = (c, π).
• PVer: To verify whether a partial signature σP = (c, π) is generated by user
Ui on message m, the verifier checks whether the proof π for the statement
(c, m, ek, vki ) ∈ L is valid or not. If valid, return >. Otherwise, return ⊥.
• Res: For a partial signature σP = (c, π) generated by the user Ui on message m,
the arbitrator checks whether PVer(m, σP , ASK, PKi ) = >. If so, the arbitrator
runs s ← E.Dec(dk, c) and returns σ = s. Otherwise, the arbitrator returns
⊥.
The correctness property of this construction follows from the correctness of the
signature scheme S, the correctness of the encryption scheme E, and the completeness of the NIZK proof system Π, which states that if the statement is true, the
honest verifier will be convinced of this fact by an honest prover.
The resolution ambiguity property holds due to the fact that a partial signature
is a verifiable encryption of a full signature and the resolution process is just a
decryption of the partial signature.
Typically the security against signers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key
model is due to the soundness of the NIZK proof system Π, which was reviewed
in Section 2.2.4. The soundness property of ordinary proof systems states that
the prover should not be able to convince the verifier of a false statement with
non-negligible probability. Normally the adversary in the soundness model is only
given the public parameters as input. Here, to make the optimistic fair exchange
schemes constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures also secure in the enhanced
model, it is emphasized that the soundness property of Π must hold even when the
adversary is also explicitly given the secret decryption key dk as input, like the
model of verifiable encryption discussed in [CS03].
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For security against verifiers in the multi-user setting and chosen key model,
the simulation-sound property [Sah99] is required. Intuitively, the simulation-sound
property requires that a polynomially bounded party is incapable of convincing
others of a false statement even after having seen a simulated proof of its choice. This
property guarantees that an adversary in the security against verifiers experiment
is not able to submit a resolution query containing an accepting proof of a false
statement even after seeing a simulated proof π generated by the simulator. Note
that the soundness property of Π does not need to hold in a stronger sense that the
adversary is also given the secret decryption key dk as input, as a malicious verifier
in an optimistic fair exchange schemes never should have the arbitrator’s secret key
ASK. Otherwise the verifier will simply use it to decrypt a partial signature. Hence,
it has the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4 If S is UF-CMA-secure signature scheme, E is a IND-CCA2-secure
encryption scheme, and Π is a simulation-sound NIZK proof system, then the above
optimistic fair exchange scheme constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures is
secure in the enhanced model.
Proof. Security against signers. To break the security against signers, an adversary
has to generate a partial signature σP = (c, π) on message m, where π is an accepting
proof but (c, m, ek, vk) 6∈ L. However, this is infeasible even when the adversary has
the secret decryption key ASK = dk as input, because the soundness property of Π
now holds even when a dishonest prover is explicitly given the secret decryption key
dk as input.
Security against verifiers. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against verifiers by outputting (m∗ , σ ∗ ). If A has not made a partial signing query on message
m∗ , the analysis of this type of attack is covered in the security against the arbitrator to be discussed later. Thus without loss of generality, assume that A has made
the query m∗ to the partial signing oracle OPSig .
In this setting, it will be shown how to construct an algorithm B that breaks the
IND-CCA2-security of the encryption scheme E. Recall that B gets ek as input and
has access to the decryption oracle ODec . B runs (sk, vk) ← S.KGen(1k ) and sets
PK = vk, APK = ek. B forwards PK and APK to A and simulates the oracles for A.
Let q be the total number of OPSig queries made by A. To reply to the i-th query
mi to the partial signing oracle OPSig , B uniformly chooses j from {1, 2, · · · , q} and
does as follows.
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• If i = j, B randomly chooses a message m̄0 , and computes s̄0 = S.Sig(sk, m̄0 )
and s̄1 = S.Sig(sk, mj ). B submits (s̄0 , s̄1 ) to its own challenger. Let c̄b
be the challenge ciphertext returned by B’s own challenger, which is either
E.Enc(ek, s̄0 ) or E.Enc(ek, s̄1 ). B further simulates a proof πj showing (c̄b , mj ,
ek, vk) ∈ L. B forwards (c̄b , πj ) to A the reply of this query.
• If i 6= j, B computes si = S.Sig(sk, mi ), ci = E.Enc(ek, si ) and generates a
proof showing that (ci , mi , ek, vk) ∈ L. The reply of this query is (ci , πi ).
To simulate a query m to the signing oracle OSig , B computes s = S.Sig(sk, m)
and returns s as the reply.
To simulate a query (m, (c, π), PKi ) to the resolution oracle ORes , B does as
follows.
• If π is valid and c 6= c̄b , B submits c to its own decryption oracle ODec . Let
the reply be s. B forwards s to A as the reply.
• If π is valid and c = c̄b . B further checks whether m = mj , PKi = PK and π =
πj . If so, B aborts and outputs a random bit to its CCA2 challenger. Otherwise,
by the simulation-sound property of Π, the decryption of c must be a valid
signature on message m under the public key PKi . Suppose S.Ver(m, s̄b , PKi ) =
> where b ∈ {0, 1}. B returns s̄b to A, and at the same time breaks the
IND-CCA2-security by outputting the bit b to its own CCA2 challenger.
• If π is invalid, B returns ⊥.
Note that if the challenge ciphertext c̄b is the encryption of s̄0 (i.e., b=0), cj has
no information on the signature of mj and A’s chance of outputting a signature on
message mj under PK is negligible. If the challenge ciphertext is the encryption of s̄1
(i.e., b=1), then the simulated environment is indistinguishable with that in the real
attack environment. Since j is chosen uniformly at random and independent of the
adversary A’s behavior, A outputs a signature on message mj in this case with nonnegligible probability at least 1/q. Thus if A’s final output (m∗ , σ ∗ ) satisfy m∗ = mj ,
B outputs 1 and otherwise B outputs a random bit to its CCA2 challenger. It is easy
to see that if A can forge a full signature with non-negligible probability, then B can
also break the IND-CCA2-security of the encryption scheme E with non-negligible
probability.
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Security against the arbitrator. To show security against the arbitrator, one converts
any adversary A that breaks the security against the arbitrator into an adversary B
that forges a new signature for the underlying signature scheme S. The adversary B,
on input vk, sets PK = vk, receives APK from A and simulates the environments for
A. To respond to a partial signing query on message m, B asks a signature s from
its own signing oracle on message m, computes c = E.Enc(APK, s) and generates a
proof showing (c, m, APK, vk) ∈ L. To respond to a signing query on message m, B
asks a signature s from its own signing oracle on message m and returns s to A as
the reply. The simulation is perfect and finally A outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that m∗ is
not queried to neither the partial signing oracle nor the signing oracle. Thus B can
simply win by outputting (m∗ , σ ∗ ).

4.4.2



Conventional Signature and Ring signature Paradigm

Since the optimistic fair exchange schemes resulted from verifiably encrypted signatures may not be efficient in the standard model due to the involvement of
a simulation-sound proof, Huang et al.

[HYWS08b] suggested another generic

methodology for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes secure in the multiuser setting and chosen-key model. The generic construction is built on conventional
signatures and ring signature.
Let S = (KGen, Sig, Ver) be a conventional signature scheme, and RS = (KGen, Sig,
Ver) be a ring signature scheme. In Huang et al.’s generic construction, each signer
has two key pairs, one for the conventional signature scheme S and the other for the
ring signature scheme RS. The arbitrator has only a key pair for the ring signature
scheme RS. The partial signature is a conventional signature σ 0 generated by the
signature scheme S. The full signature σ is the partial signature σ 0 plus a 2-user
ring signature σr generated by the ring signature scheme RS with the ring members
consisting of the signer and the arbitrator. To convert a partial signature into a full
one, the arbitrator simply produces a ring signature σr using its secret key with the
ring numbers being the signer and the arbitrator. the construction is reviewed as
follows.
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator runs (ask, apk) ← RS.KGen(1k ) and sets (ASK, APK) :=
(ask, apk).
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• SetupUser : Each user Ui runs (ski , pk i ) ← S.KG(1k ), (rski , rpki ) ← RS.KGen(1k ),
and sets (SKi , PKi ) := ((sk i , rski ), (pk i , rpki )).
• Sig: To sign a full signature on message m, user Ui runs σ 0 ← S.Sig(ski , m)
and σr ← RS.Sig(rski , m||PKi , R)4 where R := {rpki , apk}. The full signature
is then set as σ := (σ 0 , σr ).
• Ver: To verify whether a full signature σ := (σ 0 , σr ) is generated by user Ui
on message m, the verifier checks whether both S.Ver(m, σ 0 , pki ) = > and
RS.Ver(m||PKi , σr , R) = > where R := {rpki , apk}. If so, it returns >; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
• PSig: To partially sign a full signature on message m, user Ui runs σ 0 ←
S.Sig(ski , m), and returns σ 0 as the partial signature.
• PVer: To verify whether a partial signature σP := σ 0 is generated by user Ui
on message m, a verifier returns S.Ver(m, σ 0 , pki ).
• Res: For a partial signature σP := σ 0 generated by the user Ui on message m,
the arbitrator first checks the validity of σ 0 by running S.Ver(m, σ 0 , pki ). If σ 0
is invalid, it returns ⊥; otherwise, it computes σr ← RS.Sig(ask, m||PKi , R),
where R := {rpki , apk}. The arbitrator returns σ := (σ 0 , σr ).
The correctness property of the construction from this paradigm holds due to
correctness of the conventional signature scheme S and the ring signature scheme
RS. The resolution ambiguity property follows the anonymity requirement of the
ring signature scheme RS. For the security analysis, the ring signature is required to
be unforgeable under an adaptive attack against a static adversary, a ring signature
model which was proposed in [Boy07]. The reader is referred to Section 2.2.6 for
the security of ring signatures.
Theorem 4.5 If S is a conventional signature scheme that is UF-CMA-secure, and
RS is a secure ring signature scheme that is with basic anonymity and existential
unforgeability under an adaptive attack against a static adversary, then the above
4

In Huang et al.’s construction, the ring signature is computed as σr
←
RS.Sig(rski , m||σ 0 ||PKi , R). It will be shown later that it would suffice even if signing on a
shorter message string m||PKi rather than m||σ 0 ||PKi .
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optimistic fair exchange scheme constructed from conventional signatures and ring
signatures is secure in the enhanced model.
Proof. Security against signers. To break the security against signers, an adversary
has to generate a partial signature σ 0 on message m, such that the arbitrator is not
able to generate a ring signature with respect to this message m and the partial
signature σ 0 . However, this is infeasible even if the adversary has the arbitrator’s
public key, as the arbitrator can always do so under the ring consisting of the
adversary and itself, which holds unconditionally.
Security against verifiers. Suppose that an adversary A breaks the security against
verifiers. it will be shown how to construct an algorithm B that breaks the unforgeability of RS under an adaptive attack against a static adversary.
Given two public keys rpk0 and rpk1 , which are challenge public keys, B runs
(sk, pk) ← S.KGen(1k ), and sets APK := rpk1 and PK := (pk, rpk0 ). B forwards to
A (PK, APK) and simulates the oracles for A.
When A makes a partial signing query m to oracle OPSig , B computes and returns
S.Sig(sk, m) to A.
When A makes a signing query m to oracle OPSig , B firstly runs σ 0 ← S.Sig(sk, m)
and gains a ring signature σr on message m||PK under the ring {rpk0 , rpk1 } generated using the secret key corresponding to rpk0 from its own ring signing oracle. B
forwards (σ 0 , σr ) to A as the reply.
When A makes a resolution query (m, σ 0 , PK0i ) where PK0i := (pki0 , rpki0 ) to oracle
ORes , B checks whether PVer(m, σ 0 , PK0i , APK) = >. If not, B returns ⊥ to A. Otherwise, B gains a ring signature σr on message m||PK0i under the ring {rpki0 , rpk1 }
generated using the secret key corresponding to rpk1 from its own ring signing oracle.
B forwards (σ 0 , σr ) to A.
The simulation is perfect. Finally, A outputs its forgery (m̃, σ̃), where σ̃ =
0

(σ̃ , σ̃r ). Thus it has RS.Ver(m̃||PK, σ̃r , R) = > where R := {rpk0 , rpk1 }. Since
(m̃, ·, PK) 6∈ Query(A, OSig ) and (m̃, ·, PK) 6∈ Query(A, ORes ), B has never issued
the query on message m̃||PK under the ring {rpk0 , rpk1 } to its own ring signing
oracle. Therefore σ̃r is a valid ring signature on a new message m̃||PK under the
ring {rpk0 , rpk1 }. B can simply output (m̃||PK, σ̃r ) and break the existential unforgeability under an adaptive attack against a static adversary.
Security against the arbitrator. Suppose that an adversary A breaks the security
against the arbitrator. It will be shown how to construct an algorithm B that breaks
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the unforgeability of S. Recall that B gets vk as input and has access to its own
signing oracle Osk . B runs (rsk, rpk) ← RS.KGen(1k ) and forwards PK := (vk, rpk)
to A, who returns to B the public arbitration key APK. To respond to a partial
signing query on message m, B asks a signature s from its own signing oracle Osk
on message m, and returns s to A as the reply. To respond to a signing query on
message m, B asks a signature s from its own signing oracle on message m, runs
σr ← RS.Sig(rsk, m||PK, R) where R = {rpk, APK} and returns (s, σr ) to A as the
reply. The simulation is perfect and finally A outputs (m̃, σ̃), where σ̃ = (σ̃ 0 , σ̃r )
such that m̃ is not queried to neither the partial signing oracle nor the signing oracle.
Thus B can simply break the unforgeability of S by outputting (m̃, σ̃ 0 ).

4.5



Chapter Summary

In this chapter the issue in optimistic fair exchange that a potentially dishonest
arbitrator may implicitly collude with a signer by sharing its secret arbitration key
with the signer was addressed. The security against signers in the enhanced chosenkey model was updated to capture this issue. A separation between the security
against signers in the existing model and that in the new model is showed. Together
with the security against verifiers and security against the arbitrator proposed in
chapter 3, the enhanced chosen-key model have strengthened all the three aspects of
multi-user setting and chosen-key security for OFE. After that, the two well known
paradigm of constructing optimistic fair exchange were revisited, namely verifiably
encrypted signature paradigm and the conventional signature and ring signature
paradigm, and it was shown that constructions based on these two paradigms remain
valid in the enhanced chosen-key model.
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Chapter 5
Optimistic Fair Exchange based on Ring
Signatures
In this chapter a new security model for 2-user ring signatures called unforgeability
against restricted adaptive attacks is proposed. An observation that ring signatures
secure in this model will suffice to construct OFE schemes secure in the enhanced
chosen-key model is made. Based on this observation, more efficient OFE schemes
secure in the standard model can be constructed.

5.1

Introduction

The highest level of security of optimistic fair exchange in the literature is the multiuser security in the chosen-key model, proposed by Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo
in CT-RSA 2008. They showed that an efficient optimistic fair exchange scheme
secure in this sense can be constructed generically from a conventional signature and
a ring signature. In particular, they showed that the ring signature did not need to
satisfy the highest level of existential unforgeability considered in [BKM06], namely
unforgeability with respect to insider corruption. Instead, unforgeability under an
adaptive attack, against a static adversary [Boy07] in the 2-user setting will suffice.
Since there already exist a number of efficient conventional signatures and ring
signatures that are secure without random oracles, efficient OFE schemes whose
security does not rely on random oracles [BR93, PS96] can be built by following
Huang et al.’s generic construction. In fact, they also demonstrated the flexibility of
their generic construction and discussed three efficient OFE instantiations without
random oracles.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Huang et al.’s model was further strengthened to
the enhanced chosen-key model, and in Chapter 4, it was shown that the generic
construction based on conventional signatures and ring signatures still works in the
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enhanced chosen-key model. The security requirement for the ring signature scheme
is the same as that in Huang et al.’s model, i.e., the underlying ring signature
scheme has to be with basic anonymity and existential unforgeability under an
adaptive attack against a static adversary. This chapter will focus on improving the
efficiency of the OFE schemes secure in the enhanced chosen-key model.

5.1.1

The Contributions

In this chapter, Huang et al.’s generic construction of OFE schemes from conventional signatures and ring signatures and the security proof in the enhanced chosenkey model is revisited. The contributions comprise three aspects.
Firstly, a new security model for 2-user ring signatures is propose, which is
named ‘unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks’, and compared with the
existing model unforgeability under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary
in the 2-user setting. These two models are separated by presenting a concrete ring
signature scheme, and it is shown that the new model is strictly weaker. This means
that any ring signature that is unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a static
adversary will also be unforgeable in the new model, but the converse statement does
not hold.
Next, Huang et al.’s generic construction of OFE schemes from conventional
signatures and ring signatures is revisited, and it is proved that a ring signature
secure in the new ring signature model would suffice to guarantee the resulting
OFE scheme’s security in the enhanced chosen-key model, rather than the previous
understanding that the ring signature should be unforgeable under an adaptive
attack, against a static adversary. This observation can provide alternatives for the
ring signatures to be adopted in the OFE construction.
Finally, to demonstrate the impact of the observation, a concrete OFE instantiation is offered based on a ring signature scheme that is only secure in the weaker
model, i.e., unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks. This concrete OFE
instantiation is the most efficient OFE scheme secure in the standard model in terms
of signature size, generation as well as verification. Also, the OFE instantiation relies
on a weak assumption, namely, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
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Chapter Organization

In the next section a new 2-user ring signature model is defined and separated from
existing ring models. Specifically, it is proved that the well-known Bender, Katz
and Morselli’s 2-user ring signature is secure in the weakened model. In Section 5.3,
it is shown that 2-user ring signatures secure in this weaker model will suffice to
guarantee the security of the resulting OFE scheme following the aforementioned
generic construction. By adopting a ring signature scheme only secure in the weaker
model, in Section 5.4, a new instantiation of OFE schemes secure in the enhanced
chosen-key model is proposed, and compared with other efficient OFE instantiations.
Finally, in Section 5.5, this chapter is summarized.

5.2

A New Model for 2-User Ring Signatures

A new security model named ‘unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks’ for
2-user ring signatures is now defined, and then it is shown that it is strictly weaker
than the model Huang et al. considered in [HYWS08b]. Consider the following
experiment.

(rsk0 , rpk0 ) ← RS.KG(1k )
(rsk1 , rpk1 ) ← RS.KG(1k )
R := {rpk0 , rpk1 }
(R, m, σ) ← AORS.Sig (R)
"
success of A :=

∧

RS.Ver(m, σ, R) = >

#

(m, {·, rpk1 }) 6∈ Query(A, ORS.Sig )

where A is a PPT adversary, ORS.Sig is the ring signing oracle which takes as input
a message m, a list of public keys S where |S| = 2 and rpk1 ∈ S, and outputs a
ring signature σ on message m under the ring S using the signing key rsk1 , and
Query(A, ORS.Sig ) is the set of ring signature queries issued by A. By “restricted
adaptive”, it means that the adversary can adaptively choose a public key rpk
where rpk 6= rpk1 and makes a query to the ring signing oracle with respect to a
ring {rpk, rpk1 }, but the adversary is restricted from making queries with respect
to a ring {rpk, rpk0 }. Besides, the adversary is not allowed to make a query on the
challenge message with respect to any ring (however, in the model considered by
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Huang et al., the adversary can make a query on the challenge message with respect
to a 2-user ring S such that S 6= R but S ∩ R 6= ∅). A ring signature scheme is
said to be (existentially) unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks if there is
no adversary wins the experiment with non-negligible probability.

5.2.1

Separating Adaptive Model from Restricted Adaptive
Model

In the following, a concrete example is given for showing that a 2-user ring signature
scheme secure in the restricted adaptive model may not be secure in the adaptive
model considered by Huang et al. The instantiation is a simple modification of Bender, Katz and Morselli’s 2-user ring signature scheme [BKM06]. More specifically,
in Bender, Katz and Morselli’s 2-user ring signature scheme, each user chooses his
own Waters hash generators [Wat05]. In the instantiation, all users share the same
Waters hash generators to make things simpler to understand. The modified 2-user
ring signature scheme RS = (KGen, Sig, Ver) is as follows.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, g be a generator of G,
and e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative group of
order p. Let further u0 , u1 , u2 , · · · , un ← G be the Waters hash generators that are
uniformly and independently chosen at random from G. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
be a collision-resistant hash function. It is assumed that the public parameter
(G, p, e, H, g, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ) is shared by all users.
RS.KGen : Choose a random exponent α ∈ ZZp ; set rpk = g α and rsk = α.
RS.Sig(rsk, M, R) : To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ with respect to the ring R =
{rpk, rpk 0 } where rsk = α is the corresponding secret key of rpk, proceed as follows:
compute (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H(M ), where mi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1 to n, and choose
random r ← ZZp . The ring signature σ is set as
0 α

S1 = (rpk ) · (u

0

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r .

j=1

RS.Ver(M, σ, R) : To verify the signature (S1 , S2 ) on message M with respect to the
ring R = {rpk, rpk 0 }, compute (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H(M ) and check whether
0

e(rpk, rpk ) = e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , u0

n
Y
j=1

m

uj j ).
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Bender, Katz and Morselli [BKM06] proved that their ring signature scheme is
unconditionally anonymous against full key exposure, the highest level of anonymity
considered in [BKM06]. They also showed that their ring signature scheme is unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks, in which the adversary is not allowed to
making signing queries with respect to a ring containing adversarially-generated
public keys.
On the other hand, the same scheme is known to be insecure in the adaptive
model as shown in [SW07]. The adaptive attack described in [SW07] is also applicable to the modified version presented above. Indeed, to generate a signature on
message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ with respect to the ring R = {rpk, rpk 0 } where rsk = α is
the corresponding secret key of rpk, an adversary randomly chooses s ∈ ZZp , sets
¯ = (rpk 0 )s , and asks the signing oracle to generate a signature on
a public key rpk
¯
message M with respect to the ring R0 = {rpk, rpk}.
Let (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H(M ),
the signature with respect to the ring R0 will be
¯ α · (u0
S1 = rpk

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r .

j=1
1/s

1/s

Therefore (S1 , S2 ) will be a ring signature with respect to the ring R on message
M.
It is easy to see that the above instantiation of ring signature scheme is unconditionally anonymous against full key exposure, as the only value (rpk 0 )α (where
rpk = g α ) is needed to sign, and either of the two users can compute this value.
Next, it is shown that the above instantiation of ring signature scheme is in fact
secure in the new unforgeability model, i.e., unforgeable under a restricted adaptive
attack.
Theorem 5.1 The 2-user ring signature scheme above is unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks if the CDH assumption holds in G.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the unforgeability under a restricted adaptive
attack. It will be shown how to construct an algorithm B that produces a solution
for a CDH instance. This will contradict with the CDH assumption. Let the CDH
instance be (G, p, g, A = g a , B = g b ). Let q be the number of different messages
contained in the queries A has made to the ring signing oracles.
At the start, the simulator sets an integer, m = 4q, and chooses uniformly at
random an integer, k ∗ between 0 and n. It then chooses an n-length vector, ~x = (xi ),
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where the elements of ~x are chosen uniformly at random between 0 and m − 1 and a
value, x0 , chosen uniformly at random between 0 and m − 1. Besides, the simulator
chooses a random y 0 ∈ ZZp and an n-length vector, ~y = (yi ), where the elements
of ~y are chosen at random in ZZp . The simulator keep these values private. let
e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative group of order
p and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function. The simulator
sets rpk0 = A and rpk1 = B and assigns the Waters hash generators parameters
u0 = B p−k

∗ m+x0

0

g y and ui = B xi g yi . The simulator forwards rpk0 , rpk1 and the

public parameters (G, p, e, H, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ) to the adversary. From the view of the
adversary, the distribution of the simulated public parameters is identical to the real
construction.
For ease of analysis the following functions are defined where M̃ is the set of
indices i such that mi = 1 while H(M ) = (m1 , · · · , mn ) :
F (M ) = (p − mk ∗ ) + x0 +

X

xi , and J(M ) = y 0 +

i∈M̃

X

yi .

i∈M̃

A binary function K(M ) is defined as
(
K(M ) =

0, if x0 +

P

i∈M̃

xi ≡ 0

(mod m)

1, otherwise.

When the adversary issues a signing query on message M with respect to a
ring {g1 , rpk1 } where g1 could be rpk0 or could be adversarially-generated by the
adversary, the simulator checks whether K(M ) = 0. If so, the simulator aborts.
Otherwise, the simulator chooses a random r ∈ ZZp , and computes the signature as
−J(M )

S1 = g1F (M ) (u0

Y

−1

ui )r , S2 = g1F (M ) g r .

i∈M̃

Let r̃ = r −

α
F (M )

and g1 = g α . Then it has
−J(M )

S1 = g1F (M ) (u0

Y
i∈M̃

ui )r

−J(M )

= g1F (M ) (B F (M ) g J(M ) )r
α

= B α (B F (M ) g J(M ) )− F (M ) (B F (M ) g J(M ) )r
Y
α
= B α (u0
ui )r− F (M )
Yi∈M̃
α 0
= B (u
ui )r̃
i∈M̃
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Additionally, it has
−1

α

S2 = g1F (M ) g r = g r− F (M ) = g r̃ .
The simulator will be able to perform this computation if and only if F (M ) 6= 0
mod p. Finally the adversary outputs a signature (S1∗ , S2∗ ) on a message M ∗ with
respect to the target ring {rpk0 , rpk1 }. Due to the collision-resistant property of
the hash function, H(M ∗ ) 6= H(M ) for any message M that had been submitted to
the signing query before. Let M̃ ∗ be the set of indices i such that m∗i = 1 where
P
H(M ∗ ) = (m∗1 , · · · , m∗n ). If x0 + i∈M˜∗ xi = k ∗ m, then it has
e(

S1∗
(S2∗ )y+

P

i∈M˜∗

yi

, g) =

m∗j
j=1 uj )
P
e((S2∗ )y+ i∈M˜∗ yi , g)

e(A, B)e(S2∗ , u0

Qn

= e(A, B).

Therefore the simulator can solve the CDH problem by computing g ab as
g ab =

S1∗
(S2∗ )y+

P

i∈M˜∗

yi

.

Similar to [Wat05], the probability that the simulator does not abort during
P
simulating the signing oracle and the equation x0 + i∈M˜∗ xi = k ∗ m holds is at least
λ=

1
,
8(n+1)q

which is non-negligible. This completes the proof.



For completeness, the relations between the restricted adaptive model and existing ring signature models are also studied. Specifically, it is further shown that, for
2-user ring signatures satisfying basic anonymity, the model is strictly stronger than
the existing model unforgeability against chosen-subring attacks [BKM06] reviewed
below.
Let RS = (KGen, Sig, Ver) be a ring signature scheme. The model unforgeability
against chosen-subring attackes in 2-user setting is defined by the following experiment:
n(k)

1. Key pairs {rpki , rski }i=1 are generated by RS.KGen(1k ), and the set of public
n(k)

keys R := {rpki }i=1 is given to an adversary A.
2. A is provided with a ring signing oracle OSign(·, ·, ·), where OSign(s, m, S)
outputs RS.Sig(rsks , m, S), and it requires that |S| = 2, S ⊂ R and rpks ∈ S.
3. A outputs (m∗ , R∗ , σ ∗ ) where |R∗ | = 2, and succeeds if R∗ ⊂ R, RS.Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ ,
R∗ ) = >, and A had not queried (·, m∗ , R∗ ) to the ring signing oracle.
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A ring signature scheme is said to be (existentially) unforgeable under a chosensubring attacks in the 2-user setting if there is no adversary wins the above experiment with non-negligible probability.
It is emphasized that, by a hybrid argument, the above model is in fact equivalent
to a model in which A is only given the set of two public keys R := {prk0 , rpk1 },
all the ring signing queries should be queried with respect to the challenge ring R,
and the final forgery of a ring signature should be with respect to the same ring R.
For 2-user ring signatures with basic anonymity, the argument that unforgeability
against restricted adaptive attacks is a stronger model than unforgeability against
chosen-subring attacks follows from the following two claims.
Claim 1 If a 2-user ring signature scheme achieves basic anonymity and is unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks, then it is unforgeable against chosen-subring
attacks.
Proof of the claim is straightforward, since, guaranteed by the basic anonymity
property, any ring signature queries in the chosen-subring model with respect to the
signing key rsk0 can be simulated by the adversary in the restricted adaptive model
by generating a ring signature using secret key rsk1 .



Claim 2 If there exists 2-user ring signature scheme which achieves basic anonymity
and is unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks, then there exists a scheme which
achieves basic anonymity, but is not unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks.
Proof. Let RS = (KGen, Sig, Ver) be a ring signature scheme satisfying the conditions
stated in the claim. Construct the following scheme RS0 from RS as follows.
• KGen0 (1k ): Randomly pick a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and run (rsk, rpk) ← KGen(1k ).
Output rpk 0 = b||rpk and rsk 0 = rsk.
• Sig0 (rskd , m, S): On input a message m, a 2-user set S := {b0 ||rpk0 , b1 ||rpk1 },
and a secret key rskd which is the corresponding secret key of bd ||rpkd where
d ∈ {0, 1}, if b0 = b1 , it outputs σ ← Sig(rskd , m, S̄) where S̄ := {rpk0 , rpk1 };
otherwise, it outputs σ ← Sig(rskd , m̄, S̄), where m̄ is the complementary
message of m, i.e. m̄ and m are of the same bit-length but each i-th bits of
them are different.
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• Ver0 (m, σ, S): On input a message m, a ring signature σ, and a 2-user set S :=
{b0 ||rpk0 , b1 ||rpk1 }, if b0 = b1 , it outputs Ver(m, σ, S̄) where S̄ := {rpk0 , rpk1 };
otherwise, it outputs Ver(m̄, σ, S̄) where m̄ is the complementary message of
m.
Clearly, the above scheme RS0 still achieves basic anonymity. It is also not
difficult to see that it remains unforgeable against chosen-subring attacks. However,
it is not unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks, since given a challenge ring
R := {b0 ||rpk0 , b1 ||rpk1 }, the adversary can always asks a query on message m with
respect to a ring R0 := {b00 ||rpk0 , b1 ||rpk1 } where b00 = (b0 + 1) mod 2. In this case,
the adversary can easily forge a ring signature on message m̄ with respect to the
challenge ring R where message m̄ is the complementary message of m.



Based on the above analysis, the security guaranteed by the restricted adaptive model lies between the securities guaranteed by unforgeability against chosensubring attacks and by unforgeability under an adaptive attack, against a static
adversary.

5.3

Security of the Generic Construction

Huang et al.’s generic construction of OFE schemes based on conventional signatures
and ring signatures was reviewed in Chapter 4. It has been proved that the above
generic construction of OFE is secure in the enhanced chosen-key model, provided
that S is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks and RS
is a secure ring signature scheme with basic anonymity and existential unforgeability
under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting.
Here it will be shown that the construction is still secure if a ring signature
scheme that is secure in the weaker ring model, i.e., unforgeable against restricted
adaptive attacks, is adopted.
Theorem 5.2 The generic construction of optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure in the enhanced chosen-key model, if S is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks and RS is a secure ring signature with basic anonymity and
existential unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks.
Proof. Theorem 5.2 follows from the following lemmas.
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Lemma 5.3 The generic construction of optimistic fair exchange scheme is unconditionally secure against signers.
Proof. Obviously, for any message m and any valid conventional signature σ 0 on m
under the verification key pk i , the arbitrator can always produce a ring signature σr
on m||PKi using its own secret key, under the ring R := {rpk i , apk}. Therefore, no
adversary can win the game.



Lemma 5.4 The generic construction of optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure
against verifiers if RS is unforgeable against restricted adaptive attacks.
Proof. Suppose that an adversary A breaks the security against verifiers. It is shown
how to construct an algorithm B that breaks the unforgeability against restricted
adaptive attacks.
Given two public keys rpk0 and rpk1 , which are challenge public keys, B randomly
generates a key pair (sk, pk) of S by running (sk, pk) ← S.KGen(1k ), and sets
APK := rpk1 and PK := (pk, rpk0 ). It then runs A as a subroutine with input
(PK, APK).
When A makes a partial signing query m to oracle OPSig , B computes and returns
S.Sig(sk, m) to A.
When A makes a signing query m to oracle OPSig , B firstly runs σ 0 ← S.Sig(sk, m)
and gains a ring signature σr on message m||PK under the ring {rpk0 , rpk1 } from
its own ring signing oracle. B forwards (σ 0 , σr ) to A as the reply. Due to the
basic anonymity, even though the ring signature is generated using the secret key
corresponding to rpk1 , the answer to the signing query is indistinguishable from that
in the real environment.
When A makes a resolution query (m, σ 0 , PK0i ) where PK0i := (pki0 , rpki0 ) to oracle
ORes , B checks whether PVer(m, σ 0 , PK0i , APK) = >. If not, B returns ⊥ to A. Otherwise, B gains a ring signature σr on message m||PK0i under the ring {rpki0 , rpk1 }
from its own ring signing oracle. B forwards (σ 0 , σr ) to A.
Finally, A outputs its forgery (m∗ , σ ∗ ), where σ ∗ = (σ 0∗ , σr∗ ). Thus it must be
RS.Ver(m∗ ||PK, σr∗ , R) = > where R := {rpk0 , rpk1 }. Since (m∗ , ·, PK) is not submitted to the signing oracle or the resolution oracle, B has never issued a query
(σ ∗ ||PK, {·, rpk1 }) to its own ring signing oracle. Therefore σr∗ is a valid ring signature on a new message m∗ ||PK under the ring {rpk0 , rpk1 }. B can simply output
(m∗ ||PK, σr∗ ) and break the existential unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks.
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Lemma 5.5 The generic construction of optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure
against the arbitrator if S is unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks.
Proof. Since this proof only relies on the property of the conventional signature
scheme S, the proof is the same as that in Theorem 4.5 in Chapter 4. Here it will
just be omitted.

5.4



A new efficient OFE scheme

In the following, an OFE instantiation is provided to demonstrate the significance of
the generic construction when adopting a ring signature scheme that is unforgeable
against restricted adaptive attacks. Water’s signature scheme [Wat05] is used as
S and the modified Bender-Katz-Morselli ring signature (in Section 5.2.1) as RS.
Note that in Water’s signature scheme, each user’s public key includes g1 , g2 and a
set of Waters hash generators u0 , u1 , · · · , un . In the OFE instantiation, all the users
share the same Waters hash generators so that S and RS can share the same public
parameters. Besides, it is required that all users share the same g2 so that each user
can combine two key pairs for S and RS respectively into a single key pair.
Global Setup : On input 1k where k is a security parameter, the setup algorithm
generates a multiplicative cyclic group G of prime order p and a bilinear pairing e :
G×G → GT where GT is a multiplicative group of order p. Let g be a generator of G.
It then chooses random exponents a ∈ ZZp and sets A := g a . Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
be a collision-resistant hash function. The setup algorithm picks independently
and uniformly at random Waters hash generators u0 , u1 , · · · , un ← G. The public
parameters shared by all users are set as (G, p, e, H, A, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ).
After the global setup is finished, the algorithms in OFE can be executed as follows.

SetupTTP : The TTP chooses exponents y ← ZZp and sets Y = g y . APK is set as Y .
ASK is set as y.
SetupUser : User Ui randomly chooses an exponent xi ← ZZp and sets SKi = xi and
PKi = g xi .
PSig(M, SKi , APK): It computes (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H(M ), chooses r ← ZZp , and
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computes
xi

S1 = A · (u

n
Y

0

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r .

j=1

The partial signature is set as σP = (S1 , S2 ).
PVer(M , σP , PKi , APK): It verifies
e(A, PKi ) = e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , u0

n
Y

m

uj j ).

j=1

If so, returns >; otherwise it returns ⊥.
Sig(M, SKi , APK): It computes σP ← PSig(M, SKi , APK) and (m01 , · · · , m0n ) ←
H(M ||PKi ). It then chooses r0 ← ZZp and compute
S10

0

xi

= APK · (u

n
Y

m0

0

0

uj j )r , and S20 = g r .

j=1

The full signature is set as σ = (σP , S10 , S20 ).
Ver(M, σP , PKi , AP K): It verifiers whether PVer(M, σP , PKi , APK) = > and whether
e(APK, PKi ) =

e(S10 , g)

·

e(S20−1 , u0

n
Y

m0

uj j ).

j=1

If both hold, it returns >; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Res(M, σP , ASK, PKi ): It first verifies whether σP is a valid partial signature by
running PVer(M, σP , PKi , APK). If σP is invalid, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it computes
(m01 , · · · , m0n ) ← H(M ||PKi ), chooses r0 ← ZZp , computes
S10

=

PKyi

· (u

0

n
Y

m

0

0

uj j )r , and S20 = g r ,

j=1

and returns σ = (σP , S10 , S20 ).
Since the securities of both Waters’ signature scheme and that of the modified
Bender-Katz-Morselli ring signature are based on the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption, the instantiation is secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [DH76], a well-established assumption on which many cryptographic primitives are based and was reviewed in Definition 2.4.
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Comparison

There are only three efficient OFE schemes that are known to be secure in the
multi-user setting and chosen-key model without random oracles. They are the three
instantiations proposed by Huang et al. based on their generic construction. Instantiation I1 uses Waters’ signature scheme [Wat05] as S and Shacham-Waters’s
ring signature scheme [SW07] as RS. The security is based on sub-group decision
assumption [BGN05, SW07] and computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [DH76].
Instantiation I2 employs Boneh-Boyen’s weakly secure signature scheme [BB04]
plus a one-time signature scheme as S, and Chandran-Groth-Sahai ring signature
scheme [CGS07] as RS. The security follows from a stronger assumption, i.e., strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption [BB04, CGS07].
In these two instantiations, each user has two key pairs, one for the conventional
signature and the other one for ring signature. To make the instantiations more
practical and efficient, it may be more desirable to combine the two key pairs into
one. Thus in Instantiation I3 , Boyen’s ring signature [Boy07] (or, say, his mesh
signature) is employed. In Boyen’s ring signature scheme, each user owns a single
key pair, and the adversary can ask not only ring signature queries, but also atomic
(or conventional) signature queries. The security is based on Poly Strong DiffieHellman assumption introduced by Boyen [Boy07], which is a stronger variant of
the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Compared with the three instantiations suggested by Huang et al., the new
instantiation has the advantage of relying on simpler cryptography assumption. Besides, in both Instantiation I3 and the new instantiation, each user owns a single
key pair. However, the public key of a user in Instantiation I3 consists of three
group elements, while only one in the new instantiation.
Next the performance of the instantiation is compared with Huang et al.’s three
instantiations. Since pairing and exponentiation operations take more time than
multiplication operations do, the costs of multiplication computations and hash
evaluations will be simply ignored. Let “E” denote an exponentiation operation,
and “P” denote a pairing operation. By “OFE.Sig elements”, “OFE.Sig costs” and
“OFE.Ver costs”, they mean the number of group elements of a full signature, the cost
of generating a full signature, and the cost of verifying a full signature, respectively.
The table 5.1 summarizes the performances of Huang et al.’s instantiations and the
new instantiation.
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Instantiations: OFE.Sig elements OFE.Sig costs OFE.Ver costs
I1
8
7E
8P
I2
10
12E
9P
I3
8
10E
8E + 4P
New
4
4E
4P
Table 5.1: Performance Comparison
From the table, it is clear that, compared with Huang et al.’s instantiations, the
new instantiation saves almost 50% or even more of the costs in both generating a
full signature and verifying a full signature. Besides, the number of group elements
of the full signature in the new instantiation is only half of those in Huang et al.’s
instantiations. It should also be noted that Instantiation I1 requires the use of
composite order groups equipped with a bilinear map, which is known to be less
efficient compared with prime-order groups equipped with bilinear map.
As a side note, the most efficient scheme in the random oracle model under the
CDH assumption is based on the verifiably-encrypted signature [BGLS03]. For the
the generation and verification of a partial signature, the costs are 3 exponentiations
and 3 pairing. The corresponding figures for full signatures are 1 exponentiation
and 2 pairings. The partial signature size and full signature size are 2 and 1 group
elements respectively. It is fair to say the construction performs comparably to the
most efficient scheme secure in the random oracle model.

5.5

Chapter Summary

It is well-known that efficient optimistic fair exchange schemes without random oracles can be built from conventional signatures and ring signatures. To guarantee the
resulting OFE scheme’s security in the enhanced chosen-key model, it was previously
believed that the ring signature scheme should be unforgeable under an adaptive
attack, against a static adversary in the 2-user setting. In this chapter, a new weaker
model for ring signatures named “unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks”
was proposed, and it was proved that a 2-User ring signature secure in the weaker
model was sufficient to guarantee the resulting OFE scheme’s security. This observation makes it feasible to construct more efficient OFE schemes whose security
relies on a weaker assumption.
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Chapter 6
Threshold-Oriented Optimistic Fair
Exchange
In this chapter a new scenario of OFE, namely exchange of threshold signatures, is
considered.

6.1

Introduction

In Chapter 3 and 4 the OFE security model was extended to better capture possible
attacks in reality, and in Chapter 5 more efficient OFE schemes in the enhanced
chosen-key model were proposed. In this chapter, a different aspect of OFE will be
investigated.
Since the introduction of OFE, some desirable properties such as setup-free [ZB06],
stand-alone [ZB06], abuse-free [GJM99], signer ambiguity [HYWS08a], resolution
ambiguity [MK01] and accountability [HMS+ 11] has been proposed in the literature.
In [AV04] and [KL10], OFE employing multiple arbitrators are discussed to reduce the trust placed on the single arbitrator. Unfortunately, the existing techniques
are either expensive or rely on synchronized clocks, which is undesirable as achieving
synchronization in a peer-to-peer setting in which the arbitrators do not even know
each other is hard.
Traditionally in OFE the digital items to be exchanged are digital signatures.
Most of the previous works on OFE are done in the individual setting, in which
the two involving parties are individual users and they represent themselves. An
interesting scenario in OFE is that either party consists of a group of users. In such a
scenario, every single user in the group can represent its party to execute transactions
with another party. In [QWM12], the authors employ a ring signature such that all
the group of users’ public keys are involved in the ring to ensure that each signer
108
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can sign on behalf of the party. Later, optimistic fair exchange of group signatures
is considered in [HWS11b]. The difference between optimistic fair exchange of ring
signatures and that of group signatures is similar with the difference between ring
signatures and group signatures. For instance, the user in ring signature setting can
choose its key pair by himself while in the group signature setting, a group manager
is responsible to the generation of a user’s key pair. Furthermore, optimistic fair
exchange of group signatures has an additional feature that the anonymity of a
signer can be revoked by its group manager. One common characteristic that the
above two kinds of optimistic fair exchange share is that each single user in the party
can sign on behalf of the party.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no previous work on OFE discussing about
the scenario that at least a number of users together can represent a party. That
is, for a party involving a group of n users, only at least t users of them together
can sign on behalf of the party and make exchanges with other parties. The notion
of threshold-oriented optimistic fair exchange (TOFE) will be introduced, which in
essence is optimistic fair exchange of threshold signatures. This can be viewed as a
natural way to reduce the trust placed on every single user of the group.
Besides, TOFE has other practical applications. For example, consider the case
in which two parties intend to exchange a secret key of an identity-based encryption
(IBE) [BF01]. In an identity-based setting, the key generation centre (KGC) is
a high value target to adversaries as compromising the master key will break the
whole system. Thus the master key is typically split amongst a set of authorities
so that only when a threshold of authorities together can create a secret key for an
identity [KG10]. Remember that the secret key of an identity can be viewed as a
digital signature on the user’s identity from the KGC [BF01]. Thus, fair exchange
of secret key of an identity-based encryption also falls within the model of OFE.
In case when the master key is split amongst a set of authorities and two KGCs,
perhaps each for a certain geographic location, would like to exchange a secret key
of a specific identity, TOFE would be useful.
The table below summarizes the categories of exchanged digital items that have
been discussed in the literatures.
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Schemes
Digial Items Exchanged
traditional OFE
individual signatures
Qu et al. [QWM12]
ring signatures
Huang et al. [HWS11b]
group signatures
The Scheme
threshold signatures / secret keys of an IBE
Table 6.1: Digital items that are exchanged in OFE

6.1.1

Contribution.

In this chapter, optimistic fair exchange in a threshold-oriented setting is studied.
Specifically, a formal definition for TOFE is presented. A concrete construction is
proposed and it is demonstrated that the construction is secure in the random oracle
model.

6.2

Definition of TOFE

6.2.1

Syntax

The definitions and security models of OFE from various literatures are adapted
for the TOFE. For efficiency consideration, the definition of TOFE consists of noninteractive algorithms only. The following is the syntax of a construction of TOFE,
which consists of seven algorithms. In addition, the common reference string model
is adopted.
• Common Reference String Generation On input a security parameter 1k , this
algorithm outputs a common reference string paramCRS which includes the
security parameter 1k . It is assumed paramCRS is an implicit input to all
algorithms described below.
• (pkA , skA ) ← AGen() This algorithm outputs the arbitrator key pairs (pkA ,
skA ).
• (pkU , {skU,i }ni=1 ) ← UGen(n, t) This algorithm takes as input the required number of signers n, the threshold t and output the public key of the user pkU ,
together with n secret signing keys for the signers skU,i .
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• PSign = (PSign(s) , PSign(v) , PSign(g) ) This is a suite of three algorithms which
allows a subset of signers to create a partial signature.
– σ̂i ← PSign(s) (pkA , M, skU,i ) On input the public key of the arbitrator
pkA , a message M and a secret signing key of signer i, this algorithm
outputs a partial signature share for signer i.
– valid/invalid ← PSign(v) (pkA , pkU , M, σ̂i , i) On input the public key
of the arbitrator pkA and that of the user pkU , a message M , a partial
signature share σ̂i from signer i, this algorithm checks the validity of the
partial signature share created by signer i.
– σ̂ ← PSign(g) (pkA , pkU , M, {σ̂i }i∈I , I) On input the public key of the arbitrator pkA and that of the user pkU , a message M , t partial signature
shares {σ̂i } for i ∈ I such that I ⊂ [n] and |I| = t, this algorithm outputs
a partial signature.
• valid/invalid ← PVer(pkA , pkU , M, σ̂) This algorithm checks the validity of
a partial signature σ̂ on message M based on the public key of the arbitrator
pkA , the public key of the user pkU .
• Sign = (Sign(s) , Sign(v) , Sign(g) ) Similar to the partial signature generation process, the signing algorithm is also a set of three algorithms which allows a
subset of signers to create a signature.
– σi ← Sign(s) (pkA , M, skU,i ) On input public key of the arbitrator pkA ,
message M and secret signer key of signer i, this algorithm outputs a
signature share for signer i.
– valid/invalid ← Sign(v) (pkA , pkU , M, σi , i) This algorithm checks the
validity of the signature share σi created by signer i based on the public
key of the arbitrator pkA , the public key of the user pkU and message M .
– σ ← Sign(g) (pkA , pkU , M, {σi }i∈I , I) On input the public key of the arbitrator pkA and that of the user pkU , a message M , t signature shares
{σi } for i ∈ I such that I ⊂ [n] and |I| = t, this algorithm outputs a
signature.
• valid/invalid ← Ver(pkA , pkU , M, σ) This algorithm checks the validity of a
signature σ on message M based on the public key of the arbitrator pkA and
that of the user pkU .
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• σ ← Res(pkA , pkU , M, σ̂, skA ) Given a valid partial signature σ̂, a message M ,
public key of the user pkU , key pair of the arbitrator (pkA , skA ), this algorithm
allows the arbitrator to output a signature on message M . Note that ⊥ is
returned if invalid ← PVer(pkA , pkU , M, σ̂).
Correctness A construction of TOFE is correct if the following conditions hold:
1. Any partial signature created by any t honest signers using PSign will be valid
under PVer.
2. Any signature created by any t honest signers using Sign will be valid under
Ver.
3. Any signature created by the arbitrator using Res based on a valid partial
signature will be valid under Ver.
Furthermore, it is required that any signature created by the arbitrator using
Res based on a valid partial signature will be indistinguishable from the signature
created by any t honest signers using Sign.

6.2.2

A Typical Usage of the TOFE Algorithms

Note that in OFE with three message flows between the initiator Alice and the
receiver Bob, the item to be sent by Bob is not restricted to any format. It could be
a digital item such as electronic money. For simplicity it is assumed that the item
to be sent by Bob is a digital signature. Nonetheless, it could be a ring signature, a
group signature or a threshold signature. Below it is showed how Alice and Bob can
conduct an exchange based on the definition of TOFE. Note that the party Alice
in TOFE consists of a group of n signers, and an exchange is possible only when at
least t-out-of-n signers agree to participate.
The definition of TOFE does not require the set of t signers to communicate
with each other. Below is a typical usage of the definition of TOFE algorithms.
1. Partial Signature Shares Collection Bob approaches each signer independently
and the signers agree on the items to be exchanged. The signer, say signer i,
invokes PSign(s) and sends the share of the partial signature σ̂i to Bob. Bob
uses PSign(v) to verify the share.

6.2. Definition of TOFE

113

2. Partial Signature Generation Upon collecting t partial signature shares, Bob
invokes PSign(g) to generate a partial signature σ̂. He invokes PVer to ensure
its validity.
3. Obligation Fulfillment If the partial signature Bob obtained is valid, he fulfills
his obligations. In this example, Bob sends his digital signature to all the
signers involved.
4. Signature Shares Collection Each signer validates that Bob has fulfilled his
obligations. In this example, each signer checks that the digital signature sent
by Bob is valid. If yes, each signer, say signer i, invokes Sign(s) and sends the
share of the signature σi to Bob, who checks its validity with Sign(v) .
5. Signature Generation Upon collecting t signature shares, Bob invokes Sign(g)
to generate a signature σ. He invokes Ver to ensure its validity. If yes, the
exchange process is completed.
6. Resolution Suppose some signers refuse to send their signature shares, or that
the signature created in signature generation is invalid, Bob can approach the
arbitrator for assistance. Specifically, he approaches the arbitrator and proves
that he has fulfilled his obligation. After that, Bob submits the valid partial
signature σ̂ to the arbitrator. The arbitrator sends back the signature σ by
invoking Res and this completes the exchange.
7. Remarks In this example, Bob can send his digital signature to the arbitrator
as a proof of obligation fulfillment. Even if Bob is lying, the arbitrator can
still give this digital signature to the signers should they also complain and
thus the exchange could be completed regardless of what happens afterwards.

6.2.3

Security Model

Traditionally, any construction of optimistic fair exchange should be secure in three
aspects, namely, security against signers, security against verifiers and security
against the arbitrator respectively. As suggested by the respective names, they
intend to cover the scenarios when the named party is dishonest. The traditional
model is modified to suit the threshold setting. Specifically, the verifier can collude
with t − 1 malicious signers in the consideration of security against verifiers.
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Security Against Signers
This property guarantees that even when all the signers collude together, they cannot create a partial signature that passes the partial signature verification algorithm
PVer yet it cannot be resolved into a full signature by the arbitrator. This property intends to protect honest verifiers. Specifically, the following three-phase game
between a challenger C and an adversary A is used to define this property.
Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t. C creates
the common reference string paramCRS and invokes
(pkA , skA ) ← AGen(),
(pkU , {skU,i }ni=1 ) ← UGen(n, t).
C gives (paramCRS , pkA , pkU , {skU,i }ni=1 ) to A.
Query A can adaptively issue the following query to C.
• Res Query. A gives (σ̂, M ) to C, who invokes
σ ← Res(pkA , pkU , M, σ̂, skA )
and returns σ to A.
End-Game A submits (M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ ) and wins the game if
valid ← PVer(pkA , pkU , M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ )
invalid ← Ver pkA , pkU , M ∗ , Res(pkA , pkU , M, σ̂ ∗ , skA )



Security Against Verifiers
This property guarantees that even when the verifier colludes with t − 1 signers,
they cannot create a valid full signature. This property intends to protect honest
signers. The model is static in the sense that the subset of signers to be controlled
by the attacker is fixed during the initialization phase. Specifically, the following
three-phase game between a challenger C and an adversary A is used to define this
property.

6.2. Definition of TOFE

115

Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t, together with
an index set I 0 ⊂ [n] such that |I 0 | = t − 1. C creates the common reference
string paramCRS and invokes
(pkA , skA ) ← AGen(),
(pkU , {skU,i }ni=1 ) ← UGen(n, t).
C gives (paramCRS , pkA , pkU , {skU,i }i∈I 0 ) to A.
Query A can adaptively issue the following query to C.
• PSign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes σ̂i ← PSign(s) (pkA , M ,
skU,i ) and returns σ̂i to A.
• Sign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes σi ← Sign(s) (pkA , M ,
skU,i ) and returns σi to A.
• Res Query. A gives (σ̂, M ) to C, who invokes σ ← Res(pkA , pkU , M, σ̂,
skA ) and returns σ to A.
End-Game A submits (M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ ) and wins the game if
valid ← Ver(pkA , pkU , M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ )
and that (M ∗ , ·) did not appear in any Sign(s) query. Furthermore, if there
exists a PSign(s) query with input (M ∗ , ·), (·, M ∗ ) should not appear as input
in any Res query.
Security Against the Arbitrator
This property guarantees that the arbitrator cannot create a signature on behalf
of the user unless it is given a valid partial signature. In TOFE, the arbitrator is
allowed to collude with t − 1 signers. As in the case of security against verifiers, the
model is static in the sense that the subset of signers to be controlled by the attacker
is fixed during the initialization phase. Specifically, the following three-phase game
between a challenger C and an adversary A is used to define this property.
Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t, together with
an index set I 0 ⊂ [n] such that |I 0 | = t − 1. C creates the common reference
string paramCRS and invokes
(pkA , skA ) ← AGen(),

6.3. Construction

116

(pkU , {skU,i }ni=1 ) ← UGen(n, t).
C gives (paramCRS , pkA , pkU , {skU,i }i∈I 0 , skA ) to A.
Query A can adaptively issue the following query to C.
• PSign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes σ̂i ← PSign(s) (pkA , M ,
skU,i ) and returns σ̂i to A.
• Sign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes σi ← Sign(s) (pkA , M ,
skU,i ) and returns σi to A.
End-Game A submits (M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ ) and wins the game if
valid ← Ver(pkA , pkU , M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ )
and that (M ∗ , ·) did not appear in any Sign(s) query nor PSign(s) query.

6.3

Construction

The TOFE is motivated by the ordinary OFE by [BGLS03]. Indeed, when t = n = 1,
the construction degenerates to their scheme.
Common Reference String The construction works in the common reference
string model. For a security parameter 1k , let G, GT be cyclic groups of prime order
p with g as a generator of G, where p is a k-bit prime. Further, let e : G × G → GT
be a bilinear map. The common reference string is defined to be
paramCRS := (1k , G, GT , p, g, e).
AGen On input paramCRS , the arbitrator picks at random y ∈R ZZp and computes
Y = g y . The public key and secret key of the arbitrator is defined as

(pkA , skA ) := Y, y .
UGen On input paramCRS , the required number of signers n and the threshold t,
the user picks at random a polynomial of degree t − 1 in ZZp , say f . Assume the
signers are indexed by i, for i = 1 to n, with n ≥ t ≥ 1. The user further picks a
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G. Note that H is to be modelled as a random oracle.
For i = 1 to n, the secret signing key of signer i is defined as f (i).
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The user computes the public key as
pkU := (H, X, X1 , . . . , Xn ) := (H, g f (0) , g f (1) , . . . , g f (n) ).
The value f (0), which is the actual master secret, should be deleted. This ensures
only a set of t signers together could create a threshold signature.
PSign The partial signature generation process consists of three sub-algorithms.
• Generation of a Partial Signature Share On input paramCRS , pkA , a message
M and the signing key of signer i f (i), signer i randomly picks ri ∈R ZZp and
outputs the partial signature share as

σ̂i := (αi , βi ) := H(M )f (i) Y ri , g ri .
• Verification of a Partial Signature Share The partial signature share σ̂i can be
verified by evaluating the following relation:
?

e(αi , g) = e(H(M ), Xi )e(Y, βi ).
• Generation of a Partial Signature When t partial signature shares, say, σ̂i for
i ∈ I ⊂ [n] such that |I| = t on the same message, say M , have been collected,
anyone can output the partial signature on message M as:
σ̂ := (α, β) := (

Y
i∈I

where λi is defined as
λi :=

Y
j∈I\{i}

As discussed, f (0) =

P

i∈I

αiλi ,

Y

βiλi ).

i∈I

−j
.
i−j

f (i)λi .

PVer On input paramCRS , pkA , pkU , a message M and a partial signature σ̂, the
algorithm outputs valid if and only if the following equality holds:

e(α, g) = e H(M ), X e(Y, β).

6.3. Construction

118

Sign The full signature generation process consists of three sub-algorithms as well.
• Generation of a Signature Share On input paramCRS , pkA , a message M and
the signing key of signer i f (i), signer i outputs the signature share as
σi := H(M )f (i) .
• Verification of a Signature Share The signature share σi can be verified by
evaluating the following relation:
?

e(σi , g) = e(H(M ), Xi ).
• Generation of a Signature When t signature shares, say, σi for i ∈ I ⊂ [n]
such that |I| = t on the same message, say M , have been collected, anyone
can output the signature on message M as:
σ :=

Y

σiλi

i∈I

where λi is defined as
λi :=

Y
j∈I\{i}

−j
.
i−j

Ver On input paramCRS , pkA , pkU , a message M and a signature σ, the algorithm
outputs valid if and only if the following equality holds:
e(σ, g) = e(H(M ), X).
Res On input paramCRS , pkA , pkU , a message M , a partial signature σ̂ and the
secret key of the arbitrator y, the full signature can be computed as follows.
• Check that σ̂ is a valid partial signature by evaluating the relation
?

e(α, g) = e(H(M ), X)e(Y, β).
• Output σ as
σ := α/β y .
Regarding the security of the construction of TOFE, the following theorem is
presented.
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Theorem 6.1 The construction of TOFE is secure against signers, verifiers and
the arbitrator under the CDH assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof:

Security against signers. Given a valid partial signature σ̂ ∗ := (α∗ , β ∗ ) on

message M ∗ , such that
e(α∗ , g) = e(H(M ∗ ), X)e(Y, β ∗ ),
the resolved signature σ is defined as α∗ /(β ∗ )y where Y = g y .
Note that
e(α∗ , g)
e(H(M ∗ ), X)e(Y, β ∗ )
e(σ, g) =
=
= e(H(M ∗ ), X),
∗
y
∗
y
e((β ) , g)
e((β ), g )
any valid partial signature will always be resolved to a valid full signature.
Security against verifiers. Suppose the final output of A is (M ∗ , σ ∗ ). If A has
not made a PSign(s) query with input (M ∗ , ·), the analysis of this type of attack is
covered in the security against the arbitrator to be discussed later. Thus without
loss of generality, it is safely assumed that A has made a PSign(s) query with input
(M ∗ , ·). In this setting, it is shown how to construct a simulator S that is given
A = g a , B = g b and tries to solve the CDH problem by outputting g ab .
Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t, together with
an index set I 0 ⊂ [n] such that |I 0 | = t−1. S sets the common reference string
paramCRS , pkA = B y for some randomly picked y ∈R ZZp . For each i ∈ I 0 , S
picks si ∈R ZZp and computes Xi = g si . S sets X = g a . Consider a degree
t − 1 polynomial f (x) such that f (0) = a and f (i) = si for i ∈ I 0 . Note that
the set of points (0, a) ∪ {(i, si )}i∈I 0 uniquely determines this polynomial yet
the coefficients are unknown to S. However, S can still compute Xi = g f (i)
for i ∈ [n] \ J where J := 0 ∪ I 0 using the Lagrange polynomial interpolation
technique discussed in Section 2.2.1. Specifically, for i ∈ [n] \ J ,
g f (i) = g

P

j∈J

f (j)λj (i)

=

Y

g f (j)

λj (i)

.

j∈J

Note that both λj (i) and g f (j) for all j ∈ J are computable by S and thus S
can compute Xi = g f (i) for all i = 1 to n. S also specifies the random oracle
H. pkU is set to be (H, X, X1 , . . . , Xn ). S gives (paramCRS , pkA , pkU , {si }i∈I 0 )
to A.
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Query A can adaptively issue the following query to S.
• Random Oracle H Query. Suppose A makes q queries of this type. S
picks an index z ∈ [q] at random. For the h-th query, A submits a value
Mh and is expecting the value of H(Mh ). If h 6= z, S replies with g dh for
a random dh ∈R ZZp . For the z-th query, S replies with g b .
• PSign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to S. Then, S locates the random oracle
H query for M . If there exists h such that M = Mh and that h 6= z, S
picks r ∈R ZZp at random and responds with (α, β) = (Y r Xidh , g r ). If M
has not been queried, S makes such a random oracle query on input M .
If M = Mz , S responds as follows.
– Note that each Xi for i ∈ [n] \ I 0 is of the form g ui a+vi for some
constant ui 6= 0, vi known by S.
– S computes r such that ui = −yr.
– S randomly picks ti ∈R ZZp , computes βi = (g a )r g ti and αi =
(g b )vi +yti and returns (αi , βi ) to A.
• Sign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to S. If M = Mz , S aborts. Otherwise, S
can locate h such that H(M ) = g dh . Next, S computes σi = Xidh and
returns σi to A.
• Res Query. A gives (σ̂, M ) to S. S first checks the validity of σ̂ and
proceeds if it is valid. Otherwise it returns ⊥. Then, S locates the
random oracle H query for M . If M = Mz , S aborts. Otherwise, there
exists h such that H(M ) = g dh . Next, S computes σ = X dh and returns
σ to A.
End-Game A submits (M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ ). If M ∗ 6= Mz , S aborts. In the random oracle
model, M must have been submitted as an input in the random oracle Hquery. Thus, with probability 1/q, S does not abort. S outputs σ as the
solution to the CDH problem. Note that in order to win,

e(σ, g) = e H(M ∗ ), X .
It implies that σ = g ab .
Security against the arbitrator. It will be shown any adversary A that breaks the
security against the arbitrator can be converted into a simulator S that solves the
CDH problem. S is given A = g a , B = g b and its goal is to output g ab .

6.3. Construction

121

Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t, together with
an index set I 0 ⊂ [n] such that |I 0 | = t−1. S sets the common reference string
paramCRS , pkA = g y for some randomly picked y ∈R ZZp . For each i ∈ I 0 , S
picks si ∈R ZZp and computes Xi = g si . S sets X = g a . Consider a degree
t − 1 polynomial f (x) such that f (0) = a and f (i) = si for i ∈ I 0 . Note that
the set of points (0, a) ∪ {(i, si )}i∈I 0 uniquely determines this polynomial yet
the coefficients are unknown to S. However, S can still compute Xi = g f (i)
for i ∈ [n] \ J where J := 0 ∪ I 0 as
g f (i) = g

P

j∈J

f (j)λj (i)

Y

=

g f (j)

λj (i)

.

j∈J

S also specifies the random oracle H. pkU is set to be (H, X, X1 , . . . , Xn ). S
gives (paramCRS , pkA , pkU , {si }i∈I 0 , y) to A.
Query A can adaptively issue the following query to S.
• Random Oracle H Query. Suppose A makes q queries of this type. S
picks an index z ∈ [q] at random. For the h-th query, A submits a value
Mh and is expecting the value of H(Mh ). If h 6= z, S replies with g dh for
a random dh ∈R ZZp . For the z-th query, S replies with g b .
• PSign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to S. Then, S locates the random oracle
H query for M . If there exists h such that M = Mh and that h 6= z, S
picks r ∈R ZZp at random and responds with (α, β) = (Y r Xidh , g r ). If M
has not been queried, S makes such a random oracle query on input M .
If M = Mz , S aborts.
• Sign(s) Query. A gives (M, i) to S. If M = Mz , S aborts. Otherwise, S
can locate h such that H(M ) = g dh . Next, S computes σi = Xidh and
returns σi to A.
End-Game A submits (M ∗ , σ̂ ∗ ). If M ∗ 6= Mz , S aborts. In the random oracle
model, M must have been submitted as an input in the random oracle Hquery. Thus, with probability 1/q, S does not abort. S outputs σ as the
solution to the CDH problem. Note that in order to win,

e(σ, g) = e H(M ∗ ), X .
It implies that σ = g ab .
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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Chapter Summary

In this chapter the first threshold-oriented fair exchange protocol which allows a
subset of signers to exchange a digital item with a counter party was presented. Indeed, in the specific construction, the item being exchanged is a threshold signature.
Formal security model for TOFE was defined, an efficient construction was present
and it was shown that it is secure in the random oracle model under well-known
assumptions. Construction of TOFE in the standard model is left as an open problem. The construction of TOFE secure in a non-static model is left as the future
work.

Chapter 7
Perfect Ambiguous Optimistic Fair
Exchange
In this chapter a new notion named perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange
(PAOFE) is proposed to prevent the premature leakage of information about an
exchange to take place. The new notion can be viewed as an extension of ambiguous
optimistic fair exchenge (AOFE) with a new property perfect anonymity.

7.1

Introduction

Consider a scenario in which Apple engages Intel in a fair exchange protocol to sign
a contract that pays an amount of money for the early termination of the use of Intel
technology in the next generation of Macbook and iMac desktop computers. In this
situation, reveal of the will of signing this contract, prior to the final signing date
will be potentially harmful to the companies. For instance, Apple may be reluctant
to expose prematurely the changes it is introducing to its next generation products,
which may possibly affect the sales of the current generation of the products. On
the other hand, the potential termination of cooperation with Apple may lead to
a decline of Intel’s shares value. Therefore, it is necessary that the fair exchange
of signatures protocol should not leak information prematurely before both parties
agree on the exchange.
To the best of my knowledge, ambiguous optimistic fair exchange [HYWS08a]
is the closest cryptographic solution to the above problem. An AOFE protocol
comprises three parties, namely, signer Alice, verifier Bob, and a semi-trusted third
party known as the “arbitrator”. In a typically execution of an AOFE protocol,
Alice delivers a “commitment” of her signature, called ambiguous partial signature,
to Bob. Upon successful verification of the ambiguous partial signature, Bob delivers
his full signature to Alice. After verifying the full signature from Bob, Alice sends
123
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to Bob her own full signature. This completes the protocol.
Bob can approach the arbitrator for assistance in the situation in which Alice
refuses to send her full signature at the end of the exchange protocol. The ambiguous
partial signature is designed in such a way that the arbitrator can turn it into Alice’s
full signature, which is indistinguishable to a “real” signature created by Alice. In
this way, as long as the arbitrator is trusted to carry out its duty, Bob can always be
assured he can obtain a full signature from Alice, either from Alice or the arbitrator.
In addition, the arbitrator is not required to take part in typical executions of the
protocol.
AOFE differs from traditional optimistic fair exchange (OFE) schemes, for example [ASW97, Mic03, BGLS03, DR03, Wan05, ZM07, DLY07, HYWS08b, HV11],
in the sense that the ambiguous partial signature does not reveal the exact identity
of its creator. Specifically, in OFE, everyone can verify that Alice has created a
commitment of her signature in the first step. This may create an unfair situation
to Alice as Bob can simply use Alice’s commitment as a mean to his advantage. For
instance, if Alice’s signature represents her contract tender for Bob’s service, Bob
can use Alice’s commitment as a way to ask for a higher price from another party.
On the other hand, the ambiguous partial signature in AFOE has the extra property
that it can be created by either Alice or Bob. Thus, while Bob can be assured that
this is Alice’s commitment of her signature, he cannot convince anybody that this is
Alice’s commitment since from an outsider’s view Bob could have been the creator
of the ambiguous partial signature as well. Nonetheless, in AOFE, the arbitrator
knows who is the creator of the ambiguous signature.
Unfortunately, AOFE is inadequate to the aforementioned problem raised earlier.
If AOFE is employed in the above scenario, Apple will transmit the ambiguous
partial signature to Intel on the contract of the termination of the use of Intel
technology in its next generation of computers as the first step of the exchange.
This ambiguous partial signature itself leaks sufficient information to be valuable.
The reason is that in this scenario, it does not matter who is the signer of this
contract. The valuable information to an outsider is that these two companies
are discussing about a potential termination, which is the partial signature. The
ambiguous partial signature created by Apple or Intel is sufficient evidence to prove
the authenticity of the information.
One key observation about the existing exchange protocol is that the ambiguous partial signature in AOFE, as well as the regular partial signature in OFE, is
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publicly verifiable. This is not strictly a necessary functional requirement of an exchange protocol. In fact, this may have an undesirable effect as illustrated in the
case earlier. In general, if Bob is known to be trustworthy, for example, if Bob is a
government department, then malicious observer Oven who obtains an ambiguous
partial signature submitted to Bob knows the intention of Alice. Besides, the observation is made that the arbitrator in AOFE knows who the creator of an ambiguous
partial signature is, and is capable of converting it into a full signature. A high level
of trust has to be placed on the arbitrator.
Hence, a new notion, called Perfect Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange (PAOFE),
is introduced as a practical cryptographic solution to the aforementioned scenario.
Indeed, the solution builds on top of AOFE and it also fulfills all the security requirements of an AOFE. In addition, PAOFE enjoys a new property called Perfect
Ambiguity in which the equivalent of an “ambiguous partial signature” leaks no information about the actual signer, intended recipient and the signature itself, and
not even in the view of the arbitrator. Thus, no outsider can tell if an exchange is
in progress.

7.1.1

The Contributions

In this chapter the following contributions are maked.
1. The notion of Perfect Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange is proposed, which
allows a signer Alice to generate a partial signature in such a way that no
outsider, not even the arbitrator, is able to infer any useful information about
the signature. Indeed, a partial signature in PAOFE generated by the signer
Alice with Bob being the receiver is indistinguishable to a random bit string
chosen from the signature space. In other words, any partial signature is
indistinguishable from a partial signature on a random message with respect
to a random signer and a random receiver. To realize this notion, Bob’s secret
key is required in the verification of the partial signature in PAOFE. Thus,
only Bob is able to verify the partial signature, and an outsider gains nothing
about the transaction. Both the identities of the signer and receiver and the
content of an transaction are perfectly hidden.
2. A security model for PAOFE in the multi-user setting under chosen-key attack
is defined. The model captures the existing security requirements for AOFE,
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namely, signer ambiguity, resolution ambiguity, security against signers, security against verifiers and security against the arbitrator. In addition, PAOFE
covers an additional requirement: perfect ambiguity. It is required that any
user can generate a partial signature whose distribution is indistinguishable
from that of a partial signatures generated by Alice. In other words, a specific
partial signature generated by Alice with recipient Bob is indistinguishable
from a partial signature uniformly randomly chosen from the whole signature
space.
3. A generic construction of PAOFE is proposed from two well established cryptographic primitives, namely, AOFE and key-private encryption and provide the
security proof of the proposal in the proposed model. The generic construction
works in the standard model and does not involve any extra assumptions.

7.1.2

Chapter Organization

In the next section, a notion for public-key encryption that guarantees the dataprivacy and key-privacy simultaneously is proposed. In Section 7.3, a formal definition of PAOFE, together with the security model in the multi-user and chosen key
setting is proposed. Then, a generic construction of PAOFE and the security proof
of the scheme under the model in Section 7.4 is provided. Finally, the chapter is
summarised in Section 7.6.

7.2

A new Encryption Notion

One building block that will be used in this chapter is the public-key encryption
schemes. For a public-key encryption scheme E = (KGen, Enc, Dec), it is known
that IND-CCA2-security captures the privacy of data, and IK-CCA2-security which
was reviewed in Definition 2.15 captures privacy of user’s key. Though the goals of
data-privacy and key-privacy are orthogonal, it is very desirable, from a practical
point of view, that an encryption scheme satisfies both sides. To guarantee both the
message-privacy and key-privacy properties at the same time, the existing notions
IND-CCA2-security and IK-CCA2-security are combined into one. Formally, consider
the following experiment conducted between a challenger C and an the adversary A.
Setup : The challenger C runs KGen(1k ) to generate a decryption/encryption
key pair (dk, ek), gives the encryption key ek to the adversary A, and keeps dk as
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private.
Phase 1 Queries : A can adaptively make a polynomial number of decryption
queries to C . For each query, A submits a ciphertext c to A, who returns a message
m outputted by Dec(dk, c).
Challenge phase : A submits a messages m∗ . C randomly flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1}.
If b = 0 and computes c0 = Enc(ek, m∗ ). If b = 1, C uniformly at random chooses
a ciphertext from the whole ciphertext space with respect to any message and any
public key. C returns cb to A.
Phase 2 Queries : A can further adaptively make a polynomial number of decryption queries to C with the only limitation that the challenge ciphertext cb should
not be queried. For each query, A submits a ciphertext c to A, who returns a message m outputted by Dec(dk, c).
Guess : A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}. A wins the game if b0 = b.
Definition 7.1 A public-key encryption scheme is IND-IK-CCA2-secure if no PPT
adversary wins the above experiment with non-negligible probability.
By using the hybrid technique described in [Gol00], it is easy to see that any
public key encryption scheme that is both IND-CCA2 secure and IK-CCA2 secure
will be IND-IK-CCA2 secure. Since Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] is both
IND-CCA2 secure and IK-CCA2 secure [BBDP01], it is IND-IK-CCA2 secure.

7.3

Perfect Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange

In a PAOFE scheme, it is required that given a partial signature, no outsider should
be able to learn any information about it. Specifically, the message on which the
partial signature was generated, in addition to the identities of both the signer and
the receiver should be completely hidden. To achieve this, the verification algorithm
in PAOFE is required to involve the secret key of the receiver, rather than the case
that the partial signature is publicly verifiable in AOFE. Besides, the resolution
algorithm in AOFE is extended to the resolution protocol in PAOFE. Since an
algorithm can be seen as a non-interactive protocol, the model is more general and
could capture a larger class of schemes.
Definition 7.2 A perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme involves the
users (signers and verifiers) and the arbitrator, and consists of the following (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms/protocols:
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• PMGen: On input 1k where k is a security parameter, this algorithm outputs
a system parameter PM.
• SetupTTP : On input PM, the algorithm generates a secret key ASK, and a
public key APK of the arbitrator.
• SetupUser : On input PM and (optionally) APK, it outputs a secret/public key
pair (SK, PK). For a user Ui , (SKi , PKi ) is used to denote the user’s key pair.
• Sig and Ver: Sig(M , SKi , PKi , PKj , APK), outputs a (full) signature σ on
message M of user Ui with the designated verifier Uj , while Ver(M , σ, PKi ,
PKj , APK) outputs > or ⊥, indicating σ is Ui ’s valid full signature on M with
the designated verifier Uj or not.
• PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and verification algorithms respectively. PSig(M, SKi , PKi , PKj , APK), run by a signer Ui , outputs a partial
signature σP , while PVer(M, σP , SKj , PKi , PKj , APK), run by a verifier Uj ,
outputs > or ⊥.
• Res: This is a resolution protocol between the verifier Uj and the arbitrator,
involving a pair of interactive algorithms (ResV , ResT ). ResV (M , σP , SKj , PKi ,
PKj , APK), run by the verifier, outputs a full signature σ, or ⊥ indicating the
failure of resolving a partial signature.
Resolution ambiguity property states that any “resolved signature” ResV (M , PSig(M ,
SKi , PKi , PKj , APK), SKj , PKi , PKj , APK) is computationally indistinguishable
from the “actual signature” Sig(M , SKi , PKi , PKj , APK).

7.3.1

PAOFE Models

• Perfect ambiguity: Intuitively, it is required that no outsiders, even the
arbitrator, should be able to learn any information about a partial signature
such as the content of the message or the identities of the signer and receiver.
This ensures the privacy for both the signer and the receiver. To achieve this
property, it is required that in the view of an outsider, the partial signature is
indistinguishable to a signature randomly sampled from the signature space.
Since the verifier is able to forge a partial signature, here it is needed to provide
the dishonest signer a fake partial signing oracle, which outputs a fake partial
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signature forged by the verifier. Formally, it is required no PPT distinguisher
A succeeds with non-negligible probability in the following experiment:
PM ← PMGen(1k )
(APK, ASK∗ ) ← A(PM)
(SKB , PKB ) ← SetupUser (PM, APK)
B

B

B

(M, (SKA , PKA ), Υ) ← AOPSig ,OFakePSig ,OPVer (ASK∗ , APK, PKB )
b ← {0, 1}
(
PSig(M, SKA , PKA , PKB , APK) if b = 0
σP ←
σP0 ← S if b = 1
B

B

B

b0 ← AOPSig ,OFakePSig ,OPVer (σP , Υ)
success of A := [b0 = b
B
∧(M, σP , PKA ) 6∈ Query(A, OPVer
)]

where Υ is A’s state information, S is the whole partial signature space, oracle
B
OPSig
takes as input (M, PKj ) and outputs a partial signature of PKB ’s on
B
M with the receiver’s public key being PKj , oracle OFakePSig
takes as input

(M, PKi ) and returns a fake partial signature of user Ui ’s generated using
B
SKB on M with the receiver’s public key being PKB 1 , oracle OPVer
takes as

input a partial signature σP of user PKi ’s on message M with the verifier
B
being PKB , i.e., (M, σP , PKi ), and outputs > or ⊥, and Query(A, OPVer
) is
B
the set of queries A issued to oracle OPVer
. Note that in previous ambiguous
B
optimistic fair exchange models, the partial verification oracle OPVer
was not

provided, as a partial signature is publicly verifiable. To cope with the change
in PAOFE that partial signature is no longer publicly verifiable, a partial
signature verification oracle is provided to the adversary in the security model.
1

B
The key pair (SKB , PKB ) involved in this oracle OFakePSig
is the key pair generated in the
third step of this experiment.
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• Signer Ambiguity: Informally, signer ambiguity means that B may forge
partial signatures that look indistinguishable from those generated by A. Formally, it is required no PPT distinguisher A succeeds with non-negligible probability in the following experiment:
PM ← PMGen(1k )
(ASK, APK) ← SetupTTP (PM)
(M, (SK0 , PK0 ), (SK1 , PK1 ), Υ) ← AORes (APK)
b ← {0, 1}
(
PSig(M, SK0 , PK0 , PK1 , APK), b = 0
σP ←
FakePSig(M, SK1 , PK0 , PK1 , APK), b = 1
b0 ← AORes (σP , Υ)
success of A := [b0 = b
∧ (M, PK0 , PK1 ) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )
where Υ is A’s state information, oracle ORes takes an input (M, PKi , PKj )
and starts an execution of the Res protocol with the adversary running the
interactive algorithm ResR , algorithm FakePSig is a fake partial signature
signing algorithm and FakeSig(M, SKj , PKi , PKj , APK) outputs a forged partial signature σP on M of user Ui with the designated verifier Uj generated
using SKj , and Query(A, ORes ) is the set of queries A issued to the resolution
oracle ORes .
• Security Against Signers: It is required that any PPT adversary A, who
models a dishonest signer, succeeds with at most negligible probability in the
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following experiment:
PM

←

PMGen(1k )

(ASK, APK)

←

SetupTTP (PM)

(SKB , PKB )

←

SetupUser (PM, APK)

(M, σP , PKA )

←

AOPSig ,OFakePSig ,OPVer ,ORes (APK, PKB )

InputT

:=

(M, ASK, PKA , PKB )

InputV

:=

(M, σP , SKB , PKA , PKB , APK)

B

B

B

Res

[ResT (InputT ) → stateT ] ⇐⇒ [ResV (InputV ) → σ]
success of A

:=

[PVer(M, σP , SKB , PKA , PKB , APK) = >
∧ Ver(M, σ, PKA , PKB , APK) = ⊥
B
∧ (M, PKA ) 6∈ Query(A, OFakePSig
)]

where all the four oracles are described in the previous experiments, Query(A,
B
B
OFakePSig
) is the set of queries made by A to oracle OFakePSig
. Note that the

adversary is not allowed to corrupt PKB , otherwise it can easily success in the
experiment by simply using SKB to produce a fake partial signature under
public keys PKA , PKB and outputting it.
• Security Against Verifiers: It is required that any PPT adversary A, who
models a dishonest verifier, succeeds with at most negligible probability in the
following experiment:
PM ← PMGen(1k )
(ASK, APK) ← SetupTTP (PM)
(SKA , PKA ) ← SetupUser (PM, APK)
(M, σ, PKB ) ← AOPSig ,OFakePSig ,OPVer ,ORes (APK, PKA )
success of A := [Ver(M, σ, PKA , PKB , APK) = >
∧ (M, PKA , PKB ) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )]
where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiments, oracle OPSig takes
as input (M, PKj ) and outputs a partial signature of PKA ’s on M with the
receiver’s public key being PKj generated using SKA , oracle OFakePSig takes as
input (M, PKi ) and returns a fake partial signature of user Ui ’s generated using
SKA on M with the receiver’s public key being PKA , oracle OPVer takes as input
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a partial signature σP of user Ui ’s on message M with the receiver’s public
key being PKA , i.e., (M, σP , PKi ), and outputs > or ⊥, and Query(A, ORes )
is the set of queries A issued to the resolution oracle.
• Security Against the Arbitrator: It is required that any PPT adversary
A, who models a dishonest arbitrator, succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment:
PM ← PMGen(1k )
(APK, ASK∗ ) ← A(PM)
(SKA , PKA ) ← SetupUser (PM, APK)
(M, σ, PKB ) ← AOPSig ,OFakePSig ,OPVer (ASK∗ , APK, PKA )
success of A := [Ver(M, σ, PKA , PKB , APK) = >
∧ (M, PKB ) 6∈ Query(A, OPSig )]
where all the three oracles are described in the previous experiment, ASK∗
is A’s state information, which might not be the corresponding secret key of
APK, and Query(A, OPSig ) is the set of queries A issued to oracle OPSig .

7.4

Generic Construction

In this section, a generic construction of PAOFE is presented. Let Γ = (PMGen,
SetupTTP , SetupUser , Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) be an ambiguous optimistic fair exchange scheme. Let E = (KGen, Enc, Dec) be a public key encryption scheme.
A perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange can be constructed as follows:
• PMGen: This algorithm calls Γ.PMGen(1k ) → P M where k is a security
parameter, and outputs PM := P M .
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator runs Γ.SetupTTP (PM) → (ASK, AP K), and sets
(ASK, APK) := (ASK, AP K).
• SetupUser : Each user Ui runs Γ.SetupUser (PM, AP K) → (SKi , P Ki ) and E.KGen(1k )
→ (eki , dki ) respectively, and sets (SKi , PKi ) := ((SKi , dki ), (P Ki , eki )).
• PSig: To partially sign a message M with the verifier Uj , Ui runs Γ.PSig(M ||
PKi || PKj , SKi , P Ki , P Kj , AP K) → σP0 and then encrypts it under Uj ’s
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public encryption key ekj by running c = E.Enc(ekj , σP0 ). The partial signature
is set as σP := c.
• PVer: On receiving a partial signature σP on message M from the signer Ui ,
user Uj decrypts it using its own decryption key dkj , i.e., σP0 = E.Dec(dkj , σP ),
and then checks if Γ.PVer(M ||PKi ||PKj , σP0 , P Ki , P Kj , AP K) = >. If so, it
accepts; otherwise, it rejects.
• Sig: To fully sign a message M for the verifier Uj , Ui calls Γ.Sig(M || PKi ||
PKj , SKi , P Ki , P Kj , AP K) → σ and sends σ to Uj .
• Ver: On receiving a full signature σ from Ui , Uj outputs Γ.Ver(M || PKi || PKj ,
σ, P Ki , P Kj , AP K).
• Res: Given a partial signature σP on message M from the signer Ui , user
Uj decrypts it using its own decryption key dkj , i.e., σP0 = E.Dec(dkj , σP ),
and sends (M, σP0 , PKi , PKj ) to the arbitrator.The arbitrator first checks the
validity of σP0 by running Γ.PVer(M || PKi || PKj , σP0 , P Ki , P Kj , AP K). If
it’s invalid, it returns ⊥ to Uj . Otherwise, it returns Γ.Res(M || PKi || PKj , σP0 ,
ASK, P Ki , P Kj ) to Uj .

7.4.1

Security Analysis

Obviously the resolution ambiguity property in PAOFE follows from that in AOFE.
The generic construction is secure according to the model in Section 7.3.1, guaranteed by the following theorems.
Theorem 7.1 The generic construction is perfect ambiguous if E = (KGen, Enc, Dec)
is an IND-IK-CCA2 secure encryption.
Proof. To show perfect ambiguity, one converts any adversary A that wins the
experiment into an adversary A0 that breaks the IND-IK-CCA2 security of E. Recall
that A0 gets ek as input and has access to oracle ODec . Suppose the public parameter
PM is generated. A first chooses a public adjudication key APK and outputs it, and
keeps a corresponding secret state information ASK∗ private. A0 sets P M := PM,
AP K := APK, and runs Γ.SetupUser (P M, AP K) → (SKB , P KB ) and invokes A on
input PKB := (P KB , ek).
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B
Given a partial signature signing query (M, PKj = (P Kj , ekj )) to oracle OPSig
,

A0 runs Γ.PSig (M ||PKB ||PKj , SKB , P KB , P Kj , AP K) → σP0 , and then encrypts
σP0 under ekj by running c = E.Enc(ekj , σP0 ). A0 returns c to A as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M, PKi ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki ) to oracle
B
,
OFakePSig

A0 runs Γ.PSig(M ||PKi ||PKB , SKB , P KB , P Ki , AP K) → σP0 , and then

encrypts σP0 under ek by running c = E.Enc(ek, σP0 ). A0 returns c to A as the answer.
B
Given a partial signature verification query (M, σP , PKi = (P Ki , eki )) to OPVer
,

A0 makes a decryption query σP to its own oracle ODec . Denote the answer from
ODec is σP0 . A0 returns Γ.PVer (M ||PKi ||PKB , σP0 , P Ki , P KB , AP K) to A.
At some time, A submits (M ∗ , (SKA , PKA )), where SKA := (SKA , dkA ), and
SKA matches PKA . A0 runs Γ.PSig(M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , SKA , P KA , P KB , AP K) → σP0 ,
and submits σP0 to its own challenger, which returns a ciphertext c∗ . A0 forwards
B
B
σP := c∗ to A, and then continues to simulate the oracles OPSig
and OFakePSig
in the

same way as above. About the further queries (M, σp , PKi ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki )
B
, the following two cases are distinguished:
to oracle OPVer
B
1. σP 6= c∗ . In this case, A0 simulates OPVer
in the same way as above.

2. σP = c∗ .

In this case, A0 just returns ⊥ to the adversary A. First of

all, one can exclude the subcase where (M, c∗ , PKi ) = (M ∗ , c∗ , PKA ), because
B
(M ∗ , c∗ , PKA ) is prohibited from being queried to oracle OPVer
. If (M , c∗ ,

PKi ) 6= (M ∗ , c∗ , PKA ) and PVer(M , c∗ , SKB , PKi , PKB , APK) = >, the
probability of this happening is negligible.
B
B
B
are simulated properly
It can be seen that the oracles OPSig
, OFakePSig
and OPVer

by A0 . Finally, A outputs a bit d. A0 outputs a bit b0 = d, and A0 has never issued a
query to its decryption oracle ODec on input c∗ . If A succeeds in the experiment, A0
also succeeds in outputting the bit b0 . Therefore A0 ’s advantage is also non-negligible.

Theorem 7.2 The generic construction is signer ambiguous if Γ = (PMGen, SetupTTP ,
SetupUser , Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) is signer ambiguous.
Proof. To show signer ambiguity, one converts any adversary A that wins the
experiment into an adversary A0 that breaks the signer ambiguity security of Γ.
0
Recall that A0 gets AP K as input and has access to oracle ORes
. Suppose the public

parameter PM is generated. A0 invokes A on input APK := AP K.

7.4. Generic Construction

135

Given a resolution query (M, PKi , PKj ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki ) and PKj =
(P Kj , ekj ) to ORes , suppose A sends σP0 to A0 in the first run of the protocol. A0
0
makes a query (M ||PKi ||PKj , σP0 , P Ki , P Kj ) to its own oracle ORes
and returns the

answer to A.
At some time, A submits (M ∗ , (SK0 , PK0 ), (SK1 , PK1 )), where SK0 := (SK0 ,
dk0 ), PK0 := (P K0 , ek0 ), SK1 := (SK1 , dk1 ), PK1 := (P K1 , ek1 ) and SKb matches
PKb for b = 0, 1. A0 submits (M ∗ ||PK0 ||PK1 , (SK0 , P K0 ), (SK1 , P K1 )) to its own
challenger, which returns a partial signature σP∗ with respect to the secret key SKb
for some random choice b ∈ {0, 1}. A0 encrypts σP∗ under the public encryption key
ek1 , i.e., c = E.Enc(ek1 , σP∗ ), and forwards σP := c∗ to A as the answer. A0 then
continues to simulate the oracle ORes in the same way as above.
It can be seen that the oracle ORes is simulated properly by A0 . Finally, A
outputs a bit d. A0 outputs a bit b0 = d and halts. Since A is not allowed to issue a
query (M ∗ , PK0 , PK1 ) to the resolution oracle ORes , A0 has never made a query to its
0
oracle ORes
with respect to message M ∗ ||PK0 ||PK1 . If A succeeds in the experiment,

A0 also succeeds in outputting the bit b0 with the same probability. A0 ’s advantage
is also non-negligible.



Theorem 7.3 The generic construction is secure against signers if Γ = (PMGen,
SetupTTP , SetupUser , Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) is secure against signers.
Proof. To show security against signers, one converts any adversary A that wins
the experiment into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against signers of
Γ. Recall that A0 gets (AP K, P KB ) as input and has access to oracles O0 B
PSig and
0
ORes
. A0 runs E.KGen(1k ) → (ekB , dkB ) and invokes A on input APK := AP K and

PKB := (P KB , ekB ).
B
Given a partial signing query (M, PKj ) where PKj = (P Kj , ekj ) to oracle OPSig
,

A0 makes a query (M ||PKB ||PKj , P Kj ) to its own oracle O0 B
PSig . Denote the answer
0
0
from O0 B
PSig is σP . A then encrypt it under the public encryption key ekj , i.e.,

c = E.Enc(ekj , σP0 ), and returns σP := c to A as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M, PKi ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki ) to oracle
B
OFakePSig
, A0 makes a query (M ||PKi ||PKB , P Ki ) to its own oracle O0 B
PSig . Denote
0
0
the answer from O0 B
PSig is σP . A then encrypt it under the public encryption key

ekB , i.e., c = E.Enc(ekB , σP0 ), and returns σP := c to A as the answer.
B
Given a partial signature verification query (M, σP , PKi = (P Ki , eki )) to OPVer
,

A0 decrypts σP using its own decryption key dkB , i.e., σP0 = E.Dec(dkB , σP ), and
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returns Γ.PVer (M ||PKi ||PKB , σP0 , P Ki , P KB , AP K) to A.
Given a resolution query (M, PKi , PKj ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki ) and PKj =
B
(P Kj , ekj ) to ORes
, suppose A sends σP0 to A0 in the first run of the protocol. A0
0
makes a query (M ||PKi ||PKj , σP0 , P Ki , P Kj ) to its own oracle ORes
and returns the

answer to A.
B
B
It can be seen that the oracles OPSig , OFakePSig
, OPVer
and ORes are simulated

properly by A0 . Finally, A outputs a partial signature σP∗ on message M ∗ under
PKA , PKB where PKA = (P KA , ekA ). A0 decrypts σP∗ under the decryption key dkB ,
i.e., σ˜P = E.Dec(dkB , σP∗ ) and outputs (M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , σ˜P , P KA ). Notice that σ˜P
is a valid partial signature on message M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB under P KA and P KB , i.e.
Γ.PVer(M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , σ˜P , P KA , P KB , AP K) = >, but it can not be resolved to a
valid full signature by the resolution algorithm Γ.Res, i.e. Γ.Res(M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , σ˜P ,
ASK, P KA , P KB ) = ⊥. Since A is prohibited from making a query (M ∗ , PKA )
B
to oracle OFakePSig
, A0 has never issued a query (M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , P KA ) to its own
0
oracle O0 B
PSig , thus if A succeeds in the experiment, A also succeeds with the same

probability in breaking the security against signers of Γ.



Theorem 7.4 The generic construction is secure against verifiers if Γ = (PMGen,
SetupTTP , SetupUser , Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) is secure against verifiers.
Proof. To show security against verifiers, one converts any adversary A that wins
the experiment into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against verifiers of
0
Γ. Recall that A0 gets (AP K, P KA ) as input and has access to oracles OPSig
and
0
ORes
. A0 runs E.KGen(1k ) → (ekA , dkA ) and invokes A on input APK := AP K and

PKA := (P KA , ekA ).
Given a partial signing query (M, PKj ) where PKj = (P Kj , ekj ) to oracle OPSig ,
0

0
A makes a query (M ||PKA ||PKj , P Kj ) to its own oracle OPSig
. Denote the answer
0
from OPSig
is σP0 . A0 then encrypt it under the public encryption key ekj , i.e.,

c = E.Enc(ekj , σP0 ), and returns σP := c to A as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M, PKi ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki ) to oracle
0
OFakePSig , A0 makes a query (M ||PKi ||PKA , P Ki ) to its own oracle OPSig
. Denote
0
the answer from OPSig
is σP0 . A0 then encrypt it under the public encryption key

ekA , i.e., c = E.Enc(ekA , σP0 ), and returns σP := c to A as the answer.
Given a partial signature verification query (M, σP , PKi = (P Ki , eki )) to oracle
OPVer , A0 decrypts σP using its own decryption key dkA , i.e., σP0 = E.Dec(dkA , σP ),
and returns Γ.PVer (M ||PKi ||PKA , σP0 , P Ki , P KA , AP K) to A.
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Given a resolution query (M, PKi , PKj ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki ) and PKj =
(P Kj , ekj ) to ORes , suppose A sends σP0 to A0 in the first run of the protocol. A0
0
makes a query (M ||PKi ||PKj , σP0 , P Ki , P Kj ) to its own oracle ORes
and returns the

answer to A.
It can be seen that the oracles OFakePSig , OPSig , OPVer and ORes are simulated properly by A0 . Finally, A returns a full signature σ ∗ on message M ∗ under
PKA , PKB where PKB = (P KB , ekB ) such that Ver(M ∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , PKB , APK) =
>, which means Γ.Ver(M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , σ ∗ , P KA , P KB , AP K) = >. A0 outputs
(M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , σ ∗ , P KB ) and aborts. Since A is prohibited from making a query
(M ∗ , PKA , PKB ) to oracle ORes , A0 has never made a query with respect to message
M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB to its own oracle O0 Res . If A succeeds in the experiment, A0 also
succeeds in breaking the security against verifiers of Γ. Thus A0 ’s advantage is also
non-negligible.



Theorem 7.5 The generic construction is secure against the arbitrator if Γ =
(PMGen, SetupTTP , SetupUser , Sig, Ver, PSig, PVer, Res) is secure against the arbitrator.
Proof. To show security against the arbitrator, one converts any adversary A that
wins the experiment into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against the arbitrator of Γ. Suppose the public parameter PM is generated. A first chooses a
public adjudication key APK and outputs it, and keeps a corresponding secret state
information ASK∗ private. A0 sets AP K := APK, gets P KA as input, and has ac0
cess to oracles OPSig
. A0 runs E.KGen(1k ) → (ekA , dkA ) and invokes A on input

PKA := (P KA , ekA ).
Given a partial signing query (M, PKj ) where PKj = (P Kj , ekj ) to oracle OPSig ,
0

0
A makes a query (M ||PKA ||PKj , P Kj ) to its own oracle OPSig
. Suppose the answer
0
from OPSig
is σP0 . A0 then encrypt it under the public encryption key ekj , i.e.,

c = E.Enc(ekj , σP0 ), and returns σP := c to A as the answer.
Given a fake partial signing query (M, PKi ) where PKi = (P Ki , eki ) to oracle
0
OFakePSig , A0 makes a query (M ||PKi ||PKA , P Ki ) to its own oracle OPSig
. Denote
0
the answer from OPSig
is σP0 . A0 then encrypt it under the public encryption key

ekA , i.e., c = E.Enc(ekA , σP0 ), and returns σP := c to A as the answer.
Given a partial signature verification query (M, σP , PKi = (P Ki , eki )) to oracle
OPVer , A0 decrypts σP using its own decryption key dkA , i.e., σP0 = E.Dec(dkA , σP ),
and returns Γ.PVer (M ||PKi ||PKA , σP0 , P Ki , P KA , AP K) to A.
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It can be seen that the oracles OFakePSig , OPSig and OPVer are simulated properly
by A0 . Finally, A returns a full signature σ ∗ on message M ∗ under PKA , PKB where
PKB = (P KB , ekB ), such that Ver(M ∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , PKB , APK) = >, which means
Γ.Ver(M ∗ || PKA || PKB , σ ∗ , P KA , P KB , AP K) = >. A0 outputs (M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB , σ ∗ ,
P KB ) and aborts. Since A is prohibited from making a query (M ∗ , PKA , PKB ) to
oracle OPSig , A0 has not made a query with respect to message M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB to
its own oracle O0 PSig . If A succeeds in the experiment, A0 also succeeds with the
same probability in breaking the security against the arbitrator of Γ, as σ ∗ is a valid
full signature on message M ∗ ||PKA ||PKB under P KA , P KB . Thus A0 ’s advantage
is also non-negligible.

7.5



Comparison with Designated Verifier Signature

A designated verifier signature scheme is a signature scheme in which signatures can
only be verified by a single designated verifier who is chosen by the signer. This
concept was first introduced by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo [JSI96]. After
getting a designated verifier signature, the verifier can not convince others that it if
from the signer, as it can also be generated by the verifier in the view of an outsider.
PAOFE is similar with designated verifier signatures in this sense, since the verifier
can not convince outsider of the authorship of the partial signature either. However,
in PAOFE, the partial signature reveals no information about the identities of the
signer or the verifier, but the designated verifier signatures do not necessarily have
to be so. Besides, there is a third party in PAOFE, who can help identify the exact
signer of the partial signature. Such a third party does not exist for designated
verifier signature schemes.

7.6

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the notion of perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange was proposed, and a formal security model was given. A generic construction of PAOFE
was then proposed, and its security was proved under the proposed model in the
standard model.
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The generic construction involves an encryption and an AOFE scheme. Compared with that of an AOFE scheme, the computation cost of the PAOFE scheme
contains only one more encryption operation, which is quite acceptable. Construction of more efficient concrete PAOFE schemes is left as the future work.

Chapter 8
Attribute-based Optimistic Fair
Exchange: How to Restrict Brokers with
Policies
In this chapter a new notion named attribute-based optimistic fair exchange (ABOFE)
is introduced to solve the fair exchange problem in the attribute-based setting.

8.1

Introduction

The brokerage business model has been used since the pre-Internet era, where the
intermediary buys from the supplier (or producer) and owns the goods first, and
then sells it. This model plays a very important role in the online business nowadays, as it enables fast and secure transactions without relying on a single merchant’s connection. Brokers have been known to be active in business-to-business
(B2B), businesss-to-consumer (B2C) and consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or peer-topeer (P2P) markets. Although this model is known to be very useful and practical,
some issues have happened since the broker may incorporate some certain strategies
to increase his/her sales, and it may damage even the supplier.
Consider the following real life case study. A broker B buys games from the
game developer G and sells these games to its customer. Since B is considered as
a broker, the price that has been set to B is certainly lower than the retail price of
the game itself. In order to maximise its sales, B is happy to make its margin to
be very low, and this way B will gain popularity among the customers and attract
more buyers. In particular, this is certainly possible if B purchases the games from
different countries, since usually the price for each country will be different, due
to the sales tax applied. This action is certainly damaging the market and G will
not be able to sell that particular game with the retail price to the customers as
they would have preferred to acquire it from B instead. This issue can be solved by
140
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placing required policies for the brokers. First of all, each broker must be licensed in
order to sell the games. The license is limited to the country of residence. The game
will be playable, if and only if, the required CD key sold by the broker matches with
the country where the game will be played. To give an example, someone resides
in the US will purchase a CD key from the broker. First of all, he/she needs to be
sure that the broker is a licensed retailer for US. Once the CD key is issued by the
broker, this CD key is only usable if it is used in the US and not in other countries.
Another scenario involves limitation of the age restriction towards the game itself.
For instance, consider the game “God of War” that is restricted to people over 18
years old. A US online reseller selles the activation key (or CD key) for this game.
This price is lower than the price of the same game available in Canada. There are
two issues need to be solved here. First, the buyer needs to be ensured that the
reseller is a genuine reseller, and the reseller needs to be sure that the buyer is at
least 18 years old. Subsequently, the activation key sold can only be used in the US
and not elsewhere. Hence, the buyer from Canada will not be able to make use of
this particular activation key.
The Approach. In this chapter, a cryptographic primitive that aims to solve the
above scenario is to be presented. The notion of optimistic fair exchange (OFE)
is used and enhanced to enable policies for both parties, namely the seller and the
buyer (or the signer and the verifier, resp.). A trivial solution for enabling the above
scenario would be that prior to involving an OFE protocol, each participant will
simply present evidence, for instance a copy of the identity card or license, to the
other participant, hence confirming that they satisfy the requirements. Nevertheless,
this solution compromises the privacy of the users, and therefore it is not ideal.
Furthermore, providing such kind of evidence over the network securely is rather
challenging as well.

8.1.1

The Contributions

In this chapter, motivated by idea of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [SW05]
and ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [Wat11], the notion
of attribute-based optimistic fair exchange (ABOFE) is introduced, which can be
viewed as an extension of OFE, as a practical cryptographic solution to the aforementioned scenario.
In ABOFE, each user satisfying a set of attributes is assigned a credential by
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the credential center. This allows the signer Alice to generate a credential-protected
package in such a way that only verifiers that possess appropriate credentials can
convert it into a full signature, which naturally guarantees that the verifier should
satisfy some particular set of attributes.
The syntax is proposed and a security model for ABOFE is defined in the multiuser setting under chosen-key attack. The model captures the existing security
requirements for OFE, namely, security against signers, security against verifiers
and security against the arbitrator. As suggested by the respective names, they
intend to cover the scenarios when the named party is dishonest.
Finally, a generic construction of ABOFE is proposed from the two well established cryptographic primitives, OFE and CP-ABE, and the security proof of the
proposal is provided in the proposed model. The generic construction works in the
standard model and does not involve any extra assumptions. The efficiency of an
instantiation of the generic construction is also discussed.

8.1.2

Chapter Organization

In the next section, the syntax of ABOFE and its security definitions are presented.
Then the construction is presented in Section 8.3. An instantiation is descussed in
Section 8.4. Finally, this chapter is summarised in Section 8.5.

8.2

Attribute-based Optimistic Fair Exchange

The definitions and security models of OFE are adapted for the attribute-based
OFE. In ABOFE, besides the traditional secret/public key pair, each user also possesses a credential, generated by the credential center, corresponding to a set of
attributes the user satisfies, like in the notion of ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption (CP-ABE) which was reviewed in Section 2.2.8. It is required that a user
that does not possess a set of attributes should not be able to gain other users’ full
signatures. Thus a full signature will not be sent by the signer in ABOFE, which is
different from the case in OFE.
With this in mind, the algorithms of which ABOFE scheme consists are introduced.
Definition 8.1 An attribute-based optimistic fair exchange scheme involves the users,
the credential center and the arbitrator, and consists of the following (probabilistic)
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polynomial-time algorithms:
• PMGen: On input 1k and attribute universe description U where k is a security parameter, this algorithm outputs a system parameter PM and a credential
secret key CK.
• SetupTTP : On input 1k , the algorithm generates a secret key ASK, and a public
key APK of the arbitrator.
• SetupUser : On input 1k and (optionally) APK, it outputs a secret/public key
pair (SK, PK). For a user Ui , (SKi , PKi ) is used to denote the user’s key pair.
• SetupCred : On input the credential secret key CK and a set of attributes S, the
attribute key generation algorithm outputs a credential CDS corresponding to
the set of attributes S.
• TranP : The transaction promise generation algorithm TranP (m1 , m2 , SKi ,
APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) takes as input two messages m1 and m2 , respectively, user
Ui ’s secret key SKi , the arbitrator’s public key APK, the system parameter PM
and two access structure A1 and A2 over the universe of attributes, respectively.
This algorithm outputs a transaction promise ω.
• TPVer: The transaction promise verification algorithm TPVer(m1 , m2 , ω,
PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) takes as input two message m1 and m2 , respectively, a
transaction promise ω, user Ui ’s public key PKi , the arbitrator’s public key
APK, the system parameter PM, and two access structure A1 and A2 , respectively. The algorithm outputs > indicating valid or ⊥ indicating invalid.
• TranS : The transaction for signer algorithm TranS (m, SKi , APK, PM, A) takes
as input a message m, user Ui ’s secret key SKi , the arbitrator’s public key APK,
the system parameter PM, and an access structure A. The algorithm outputs
a credential-protected package π.
• TranV : The transaction for verifier algorithm TranV (m, π, PKi , APK, PM, CDS )
takes a message m, a credential-protected package π, user Ui ’s public key PKi ,
the arbitrator’s public key APK, the system parameter PM, and a credential
CDS . This algorithm outputs a full signature σ or ⊥ indicating failure.
• Ver: The full signature verification algorithm Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK) outputs >
indicating valid or ⊥ indicating invalid.
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• ResUser : The resolution for user algorithm ResUser (m1 , m2 , ω, SKj , PKi , APK,
PM, A1 , A2 ) takes as input two message m1 and m2 , respectively, a transaction
promise ω, and user Uj ’s secret key SKj , the system parameter PM, and two
access structure A1 and A2 , respectively. This algorithm outputs a resolution
request request.
• ResTTP : The resolution for arbitrator algorithm ResTTP (m, PKi , A, request, ASK)
takes as input a message m, user Ui ’s public key PKi , an access structure A, a
resolution request request and the arbitrator’s secret key ASK. It outputs two
credential-protected packages π1 and π2 , respectively.
Correctness states that, for PMGen(1k ) → (PM, CK), SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK),
SetupUser (1k ) → (SKi , PKi ), SetupUser (1k ) → (SKj , PKj ), TranP (m1 , m2 , SKi , APK,
PM, A1 , A2 ) → ω, TranS (m1 , SKi , APK, PM, A2 ) → π1 , TranS (m2 , SKj , APK, PM, A1 )
→ π2 , ResUser (m1 , m2 , ω, SKj , PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) → request, ResTTP (m1 , PKi ,
A2 , request, ASK) → (π̃1 , π̃2 ), SetupCred (CK, S) → CDS where the sets of attributes
S satisfies the access structures A1 , and SetupCred (CK, S 0 ) → CDS 0 where the sets
of attributes S 0 satisfies the access structures A2 , the following conditions hold:
• TPVer(m1 , m2 , ω, PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = >.
• Ver(m1 , TranV (m1 , π1 , PKi , APK, PM, CDS 0 ), PKi , APK) = >.
• Ver(m2 , TranV (m2 , π2 , PKj , APK, PM, CDS ), PKj , APK) = >.
• Ver(m1 , TranV (m1 , π̃1 , PKi , APK, PM, CDS 0 ), PKi , APK) = >.
• Ver(m2 , TranV (m2 , π̃2 , PKj , APK, PM, CDS ), PKj , APK) = >.
Resolution ambiguity states that, any “resolved credential-protected packages” π̃1
and π̃2 outputted by ResAbr are computationally indistinguishable from the “actual
credential-protected packages” π1 and π2 generated by TranS , respectively.

8.2.1

A Typical Usage of ABOFE

For simplicity, a typical usage of ABOFE between two users Alice and Bob will be
described. Before the exchange phase, the credential center runs PMGen to set
up the public parameters and keep the credential secret key as private. Alice and
Bob acquire their respective credentials generated by SetupCred from the credential
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center. Besides, the arbitrator sets its key pair by invoking SetupTTP . Alice and
Bob generate their own key pairs by invoking SetupUser , respectively.
Suppose Alice intends to exchange her own full signature σ1 on message m1
for Bob’s full signature σ2 on message m2 . Besides, Alice should satisfy an access
structure A1 , and Bob should satisfy an access structure A2 . The exchange phase
consists of three steps.
1. Alice invokes TranP to generate a transaction promise ω on message m1 and
m2 with respect to access structures A1 and A2 . Alice sends ω to Bob.
2. Bob invokes TPVer to ensure the validity of ω. Bob then invokes TranS
to generate a credential-protected package πB on message m2 with respect to
access structure A1 . Bob sends πB to Alice.
3. If satisfying the access structure A1 , Alice can invoke TranV to gain a full
signature σB of Bob’s. Then Alice invokes TranS to generate a credentialprotected package πA on message m1 with respect to access structures A2 .
Alice sends πA to Bob, who can invoke TranV to gain Alice’s full signature σA
if satisfying the access structure A2 .
Note that in the normal cases, the exchange will finish and both Alice and Bob
can gain the full signature of the other’s. In the case Alice refuses to send her
credential-protected package πA in the third step, or that credential-protected package is created with respect to improper access structures, Bob can approach the
arbitrator for assistance. Specifically, he approaches the arbitrator and sends a resolution request generated by invoking ResUser . To make a resolution, the arbitrator
invokes ResTTP to generate two credential-protected packages π̃1 and π̃2 . π̃1 is sent
to Bob, and π̃2 is sent to Alice. Thus both Alice and Bob can invoke TranV to gain
the other’s full signature if satisfying the expectant attributes.

8.2.2

Security Model

The traditional OFE model is modified to make it suitable in the attribute-based
setting.
• Security Against Signers: This property guarantees that a transaction promise
generated by a signer can always be resolved to a full signature of the signer’s
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if the arbitrator honestly makes a resolution and the verifier satisfies the expectant attributes. Formally, consider the following experiment, in which the
adversary A models a dishonest signer that can even have access to the credential secret key and the verifier’s secret key.
Experiment SAS:
(PM, CK) ← PMGen(1k , U )
(ASK, APK) ← SetupTTP (1k )
(SKB , PKB ) ← SetupUser (1k )
(m∗1 , m∗2 , ω ∗ , PKA , A1 , A2 , S) ← AORes (PM, CK, APK, SKB , PKB )
CDS ← SetupCred (CK, S)
request∗ ← ResUser (m∗1 , m∗2 , ω ∗ , SKB , APK, PM, A1 , A2 )
(π1∗ , π2∗ ) ← ResTTP (m∗1 , PKA , A2 , request∗ , ASK)
σ ∗ ← TranV (m∗1 , π1∗ , PKA , APK, PM, CDS )
success of A := [TPVer(m∗1 , m∗2 , ω ∗ , PKA , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = >
∧ Ver(m∗1 , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = ⊥]
where S is a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure A2 , the resolution for arbitrator oracle ORes takes as input (m, PKi , A, request), and outputs
ResTTP (m, PKi , A, request, ASK). In this experiment, the adversary can arbitrarily choose a public key PKi , and it may not know the corresponding private
key of PKi .
• Security Against Verifiers: This property captures two cases: the first case
is that no verifier, even given the credential secret key, should be able to generate a full signature of the signer’s while not possessing a credential-protected
package. The second case is that the verifier that does not possess the expectant attributes should not be able to generate a full signature even if given
a corresponding credential-protected package. Formally, it is required that
no PPT adversary A, who models a dishonest verifier, succeeds with nonnegligible probability in either of the following two experiments:
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Experiment SAV1:
(PM, CK) ← PMGen(1k , U )
(ASK, APK) ← SetupTTP (1k )
(SKA , PKA ) ← SetupUser (1k , APK)
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) ← AOTranP ,ORes (PM, CK, APK, PKA )
success of A := [Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >
∧ (m∗ , PKA , ·, ·) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )]
where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiment, oracle OTranP takes
as input (m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) and outputs TranP (m1 , m2 , SKA , APK, PM, A, A0 ),
and Query(A, ORes ) is the set of queries A issued to the resolution oracle.
Note that there is no need to provide A with access to the transaction for
signer oracle OTranS , as resolution ambiguity property guarantees that its functionality could be achieved by executing OTranP and ORes .
Experiment SAV2:
(PM, CK) ← PMGen(1k , U )
(ASK, APK) ← SetupTTP (1k )
(SKA , PKA ) ← SetupUser (1k , APK)
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) ← AOSetupCred ,OTranP ,ORes (PM, APK, PKA )
success of A := [Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >
∧ for any S ∈ Query(A, OSetupCred ),
for any (m∗ , PKA , A, ·) ∈ Query(A, ORes ),
S does not satisfy A]
where oracles OTranP , ORes and Query(A, ORes ) are described in the previous
experiment, oracle OSetupCred takes as input a set of attributes S, and outputs
a credential CDS , and Query(A, OSetupCred ) is the set of queries A issued to
the oracle OSetupCred .
• Security Against the Arbitrator: This property guarantees that even when
given the credential secret key, the arbitrator should not be able to create a
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valid full signature unless it has seen a corresponding transaction promise.
Formally, consider the following experiment, in which the two-stage adversary
A = (A1 , A2 ) models the dishonest arbitrator that may even have access the
credential key.
Experiment SAA:
(PM, CK) ← PMGen(1k , U )
(APK, ASK∗ ) ← A1 (PM, MK)
(SKA , PKA ) ← SetupUser (1k , APK)
OTranP

(m∗ , σ ∗ ) ← A2

(PM, CK, ASK∗ , APK, PKA )

success of A := [Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >
∧ (m∗ , ·, ·, ·) 6∈ Query(A, OTranP )]
where the partial signing oracle OTranP is described in the previous experiment,
ASK∗ is A’s state information, which might not be the corresponding secret
key of APK, and Query(A, OTranP ) is the set of queries A issued to oracle
OTranP .
Definition 8.2 An attribute-based optimistic fair exchange scheme is said to be
secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if there is no PPT adversary
that wins any of the experiments above with non-negligible probability.

8.3

Construction

In this section, a generic construction of ABOFE that is secure in the defined model
is given.
Let E := (Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt) be a ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption scheme and OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig, Ver, Res) be a
conventional optimistic fair exchange scheme. Below are the details of the generic
construction of an attribute-based optimistic fair exchange scheme.
• PMGen: On input 1k and attribute universe description U , this algorithm
runs E.Setup(1k , U ) → (PM, MK). The public parameter and credential secret
key are set as PM := PM and CK := MK, respectively.
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• SetupTTP : On input 1k , this algorithm runs OFE.SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, AP K).
The arbitrator’s secret and public key pair is set as ASK := ASK and APK :=
AP K.
• SetupUser : This algorithm runs OFE.SetupUser (1k , AP K) → (SKi , P Ki ). The
user’s secret and public key pair is set as SKi := SKi , PKi := P Ki .
• SetupCred : On input the credential secret key CK and a set of attributes S, this
algorithm runs E.KeyGen (MK, S) → SK. The credential is set as CDS := SK.
• TranP : Taking as input (m1 , m2 , SKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ), user Ui runs OFE.PSig
(m1 , SKi , APK) → σP , and generates a non-repudiation information θ about
the transaction1 with respect to the tuple (σP , m1 , m2 , A1 , A2 ). The transaction promise ω is set as (σP , θ).
• TPVer: Taking as input (m1 , m2 , ω, PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ), it outputs OFE.PVer
(m1 , σP , PKi , APK).
• TranS : Taking as input (m, SKi , APK, PM, A), user Ui runs OFE.Sig(m, SKi ,
APK) → s, and then encrypts s under the access structure A, i.e., E.Encrypt
(PM, s, A) → CT. The credential-protected package is set as π := CT.
• TranV : Taking as input (m, π, PKi , APK, PM, CDS ), the verifier that possesses
a set of attributes S that satisfies the access structure A will be able to convert
the credential-protected package to a full signature. The verifier outputs σ ←
E.Decrypt(PM, π, CDS ).
• Ver: Taking as input (m, σ, PKi , APK), it outputs OFE.Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK).
• ResUser : Taking as input (m1 , m2 , ω, SKj , PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ), it runs OFE.Sig
(m2 , SKj APK) → σ2 . The resolution request is set as request := (m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A1 ).
1

This is used to identify the transaction that is going on and will be necessary when the
arbitrator makes a resolution. Typically this can be achieved by signing σP ||m1 ||m2 ||A1 ||A2 using
an independent signature key pair.
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• ResTTP : Taking as input (m, PKi , A, request, ASK), the arbitrator firstly parses
request as (m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A1 ), and checks whether TPVer (m1 , m2 , ω, PKi ,
APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = > and whether Ver(m2 , σ2 , PKj , APK) = >. If either
does not hold, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, the arbitrator parses ω as (σP , θ),
computes σ1 ← OFE.Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ) and then encrypts σ1 under the
access structure A2 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ1 , A2 ) → CT1 . The arbitrator also
encrypts σ2 under the access structure A1 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A1 ) → CT2 .
The credential-protected packages are set as π1 := CT1 and π2 := CT2 .

8.3.1

Security Analysis

Regarding the security of the generic construction of ABOFE, it has the following
theorem.
Theorem 8.1 The generic construction of ABOFE is secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if the optimistic fair exchange scheme OFE is secure in
the multi-user setting and chosen-key model and the ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption scheme E is fully secure.
Theorem 8.1 is proved by the following three lemmas.
Lemma 8.2 (Security against Signers) The generic construction is secure against
signers if OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig, Ver, Res) is secure against
signers.
Proof. To show security against signers, one converts any adversary A that wins
the experiment SAS into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against signers
0
of OFE. Recall that A0 gets AP K as input and has access to oracle ORes
. A0 runs

PMGen(1k , U ) → (PM, CK) and invokes A on input PM, CK and APK := AP K.
Given a resolution for arbitrator query (m, PKi , A, request) to ORes , A0 firstly
parses request as (m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A0 ) and checks whether TPVer (m1 , m2 , ω, PKi ,
APK, PM, A0 , A) = > and whether Ver(m2 , σ2 , PKj , APK) = >. If either does not
hold, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, A0 parses ω as (σP , θ), and makes a query (m, σP ,
0
0
PKi ) to its own oracle ORes
. Denote the answer from ORes
is σ1 . A0 encrypts σ1 under

the access structure A, i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ1 , A) → CT1 . A0 also encrypts σ2 under
the access structure A0 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A0 ) → CT2 . The credential-protected
packages are set as π1 := CT1 and π2 := CT2 . A0 returns (π1 , π2 ) to A.
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It can be seen that the resolution for arbitrator oracle ORes is perfectly simulated
by A0 . Finally, A outputs a tuple (m∗1 , m∗2 , (σP∗ , θ∗ ), PKA , A1 , A2 , S) where the set of
attributes S satisfies the access structure A2 . A0 outputs (m∗1 , σP∗ , PKA ).
Denote (π1∗ , π2∗ ) as the output of ResTTP (m∗1 , PKA , A2 , Request∗ , ASK), and σ ∗ as
the output of TranV (m∗1 , π1∗ , PKA , APK, PM, CDS ) where CDS = SetupCred (CK, S).
Due to the fact that the set of attributes S satisfies the access structure A2 , σ ∗ is in
fact also the output of OFE.Res(m∗1 , σP∗ , ASK, PKA ). Since TPVer(m∗1 , m∗2 , (σP∗ , θ∗ ),
PKA , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = > but Ver(m∗1 , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = ⊥, it means OFE.PVer
(m∗1 , σP∗ , P KA , AP K) = > but OFE.Ver (m∗1 , σ ∗ , P KA , AP K) = ⊥. Thus if A
succeeds in the experiment, A0 also succeeds with the same probability in breaking
the security against signers of OFE.



Lemma 8.3 (Security against Verifiers) The generic construction is secure against
verifiers if OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig, Ver, Res) is secure against
verifiers and the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption E := (Setup, Encrypt,
KeyGen, Decrypt) is fully secure.
Proof. To show security against verifiers, one considers the experiments SAV1 and
SAV2, respectively. One firstly converts any adversary A that wins the experiment
SAV1 into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against verifiers of OFE.
0
Recall that A0 gets (AP K, P KA ) as input and has access to oracles OPSig
and
0
ORes
. A0 runs PMGen(1k , U ) → (PM, MK) and invokes A on input PM, CK, APK :=

AP K and PKA := P KA .
Given a transaction promise query (m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) to oracle OTranP , A0 makes a
0
0
query m to its own oracle OPSig
. Denote the answer from OPSig
is σP . A0 returns

(σP , θ) to A where θ is a non-repudiation information about the transaction with
respect to the tuple (σP , m1 , m2 , A1 , A2 ).
Given a resolution for arbitrator query (m, PKi , A, request) to ORes , A0 firstly
parses request as (m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A0 ) and checks whether TPVer (m1 , m2 , ω, PKi ,
APK, PM, A0 , A) = > and whether Ver(m2 , σ2 , PKj , APK) = >. If either does not
hold, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, A0 parses ω as (σP , θ), and makes a query (m, σP ,
0
0
PKi ) to its own oracle ORes
. Denote the answer from ORes
is σ1 . A0 encrypts σ1 under

the access structure A, i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ1 , A) → CT1 . A0 also encrypts σ2 under
the access structure A0 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A0 ) → CT2 . The credential-protected
packages are set as π1 := CT1 and π2 := CT2 . A0 returns (π1 , π2 ) to A.

8.3. Construction

152

It can be seen that the oracles OPSig and ORes are perfectly simulated by A0 .
Finally, A outputs a tuple (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >. This
means OFE.Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , P KA , AP K) = >. A0 outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ). Since A is prohibited from making a query (m∗ , PKA , ·, ·) to oracle ORes , A0 has never made a query
with respect to a tuple (m∗ , ·, PKA ) to its own oracle O0 Res . If A succeeds in the
experiment SAV1, A0 also succeeds in breaking the security against verifiers of OFE.
Thus A0 ’s advantage is also non-negligible.
Next, one considers the experiment SAV2. One converts any adversary A that
wins the experiment SAV2 into an algorithm B that breaks the full security of the
encryption scheme E.
Recall that B gets PM as input and can query its own challenger for private
keys corresponding to a sequence of sets of attributes. B runs SetupTTP (1k ) →
(ASK, APK) and SetupUser (1k , APK) → (SKA , PKA ), and invokes A as a subroutine
by forwarding PM := PM, APK and PKA .
When A makes a query S to oracle OSetupCred , B supplies S to its own challenger and forwards the reply to A. When A makes a transaction promise query
(m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) to oracle OTranP , B runs TranP (m1 , m2 , SKA , APK, PM, A1 , A2 )ω and
send ω to A as the reply.
Suppose A makes q valid resolution for arbitrator queries to ORes . B chooses a
random value z ∈ {1, · · · , q}. When A makes a j-th resolution query (mj , , PKj , Aj ,
requestj ) to ORes , if j 6= z, B runs ResTTP (mz , PKj , Aj , requestj , ASK) and sends
the outputs to A as the reply. When j = z and PKz 6= PKA , B aborts and returns
failure. When j = z and PKz = PKA , B parses requestz as (m2 , ωj , PKi , σ2 , A0z ) and
parses ωz as (σP z , θz ). B runs OFE.Res(mz , σP z , ASK, PKA ) → σz , randomly chooses
M1 that is of the same bit length with σz , and sends M0 := σz , M1 and the access
structure Az to its own challenger. Denote the challenge ciphertext is CT. B also
encrypts σ2 under the access structure A0z , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A0 ) → CT0 . The
credential-protected packages are set as π1 := CT and π2 := CT0 . A0 returns (π1 , π2 )
to A as the reply to the z-th resolution for arbitrator query.
Finally A either outputs failure or wins by outputting a tuple (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such
that Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >. Note that when A wins, A must have made a
resolution query (m∗ , PKA , ·, ·) to ORes . Otherwise the analysis of this type of attack
is covered in the experiment SAV1 discussed above. If m∗ = mz , PKA = PKz , and
A2 = A0z , then B outputs 0. Otherwise, B outputs a random bit.
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If the challenge ciphertext CT is the encryption of σz (i.e., b = 0), CT is a
valid attribute-related signature and the distribution of B’s view in the simulated
environment is identical with that in the real attack environment. If the challenge
ciphertext CT is the encryption of M1 (i.e., b = 1), CT has no information on the full
signature of a message mz and B’s chance of forging a valid full signature on message
mz (with respect to PKA ) is negligible. Thus if A in the real experiment SAV2
wins with non-negligible probability, then B wins with non-negligible probability in
breaking the full security of the encryption scheme E.



Lemma 8.4 (Security against the Arbitrator) The generic construction is secure against the arbitrator if OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig, Ver, Res)
is secure against the arbitrator.
Proof. To show security against the arbitrator, one converts any adversary A that
wins the experiment SAA into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against the
arbitrator of OFE. A firstly chooses a public adjudication key APK and outputs it,
keeps a corresponding secret state information ASK∗ private. A0 sets AP K := APK,
0
gets P KA as input, and has access to oracles OPSig
. A0 runs PMGen(1k , U ) →

(PM, CK) and forwards PM, CK and PKA := P KA to A.
Given a transaction promise query (m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) to oracle OTranP , A0 makes a
0
0
query m to its own oracle OPSig
. Denote the answer from OPSig
is σP . A0 returns

(σP , θ) to A where θ is a non-repudiation information about the transaction with
respect to the tuple (σP , m1 , m2 , A1 , A2 ).
It can be seen that the oracle OTranP is perfectly simulated by A0 . Finally, A
outputs a tuple (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that Ver (m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK = >. This means OFE.Ver
(m∗ , σ ∗ , P KA , AP K) = >. A0 outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ). Since A is prohibited from making
a query (m∗ , ·, ·, ·) to oracle OTranP , A0 has never made a query message m∗ to its
0
own oracle OPSig
. If A succeeds in the experiment SAV2, A0 also succeeds with the

same probability in breaking the security against the arbitrator of OFE.

8.4



Instantiation

In the following, an instantiation is provided to demonstrate the flexibility of the
generic construction. It was shown in [HYWS08b] that OFE secure in the multi-user
setting and chosen key model can be constructed from conventional signatures and
ring signatures. More specifically, in this paradigm, the partial signature in OFE
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is a conventional signature, and the full signature in OFE is the partial signature,
together with a two party ring signature generated between the signer and the
arbitrator. The authors [HYWS08b] suggest a concrete OFE scheme can be built
on Waters signature scheme [Wat05] in a group of composite order and ShachamWaters’ ring signature scheme [SW07] so that they share the same set of system
parameters. For the CP-ABE scheme, the one proposed by Lewko and Waters in
[LW12] is employed, which is known to be fully secure. Note that there is a global
setup process before execution of the scheme due to the requirement of having such
a setup process of Shacham-Waters’ ring signature.
Global Setup : On input 1k where k is a security parameter, the setup algorithm
generates a multiplicative cyclic group G of composite order n1 where n1 = pq and
a bilinear pairing e : G × G → GT where GT is a multiplicative group of order n1 .
Let Gp and Gq be the cyclic order-p and order-q subgroups of G, respectively. Let g
be a generator of G and h be a generator of Gq . It then chooses random exponents
a, b ∈ ZZn1 and sets
A := g a , B := g b , Â := ha .
Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a collision-resistant hash function. The setup algorithm
picks Waters hash generators
u0 , u1 , · · · , uk ← G.
The common reference string is set as (n1 , A, B, Â, u0 , u1 , · · · , uk , H0 ).
After the global setup is finished, the algorithms in ABOFE can be executed as
follows.
• PMGen: On input 1k where k is a security parameter, the setup algorithm
outputs a multiplicative cyclic group Ĝ of order n2 where n2 = p1 p2 p3 (3
distinct primes) and a bilinear pairing ê : Ĝ × Ĝ → ĜT where ĜT is a multiplicative group of order n2 . Let Ĝpi denote the subgroup of order pi in Ĝ.
Let gi be a generator of Ĝpi and H1 : ĜT → {0, 1}l be a collision-resistant
hash function. It then chooses random exponents α, c, γ ∈ ZZn , and for each
attribute i ∈ U , it chooses a random group element hi ∈ Ĝp1 . Let SE be
a symmetric encryption scheme whose symmetric key space is {0, 1}l . The
public parameters PM are set as
n2 , g1 , Â, g1c , g1γ , e(g1 , g1 )α , H1 , h1 , · · · , h|U | , SE.
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The master key are set as MK := (g1α , g3 ).
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator chooses a random exponent y ∈ ZZn1 , and sets
APK := g y ∈ G and sk := Ay ∈ G.
• SetupUser : Each user Ui randomly chooses exponents x1 , x3 ∈ ZZn1 and computes ḡ1 = g x1 and ḡ3 = g x3 . Besides, user Ui randomly chooses ḡ2 , ū0 , ū1 , · · · , ūk
∈ G and sets PKi := (ḡ1 , ḡ2 , ḡ3 , ū0 , ū1 , · · · , ūk ) and SK := (ḡ2x1 , Ax3 ).
• SetupCred : On input the credential secret key CK and a set of attributes S,
the algorithm chooses random exponents t, u ∈ ZZn2 , and random elements
R, R0 , R00 , {Ri }i∈S ∈ Gp3 (this can be done by raising a generator of Gp3 to
random exponents modulo n2 ). The credential is:
S, K = g1α g1ct g1γu R, K 0 = g1u R0 , K 00 = g t R00 , Ki = hti Ri for i ∈ S.
• TranP : TranP (mA , mB , SKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )), where M is an L × N
matrix and ρ a map from each row Mj of M to an attribute ρ(j), and M 0 is
an L0 × N 0 matrix and ρ0 a map from each row Mj0 of M 0 to an attribute ρ0 (j),
does as follows:
1. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mA ),
2. Choose a random exponent r ∈ ZZn1 and computes
S1 =

ḡ2x1

0

· (ū

k
Y

r
i r
ūm
i ) , and S2 = g .

i=1

3. σP is set as (S1 , S2 ).
4. Generate a non-repudiation information θ about the transaction with respect to the tuple (σP , mA , mB , (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )). The transaction promise
ω is set as (σP , θ).
• TPVer: TPVer(mA , mB , ω, PKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )) does as follows.
1. Parses ω as (σP , θ).
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2. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mA ), and verify whether
e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , ū0

k
Y

m

ūj j ) = e(ḡ1 , ḡ2 )

j=1

holds. If so, output >; if not, output ⊥.
• TranS : TranS (m, SKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ)), where M is an L × N matrix and ρ
a map from each row Mj of M to an attribute ρ(j), does as follows:
1. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (m),
2. Choose a random exponent r ∈ ZZn1 and computes
S1 =

ḡ2x1

0

· (ū

k
Y

r
i r
ūm
i ) , and S2 = g .

i=1

3. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (m||S1 ||S2 ||PKi ).
4. Choose two random exponents t0 , t1 ∈ ZZn1 and sets
C00 = (ḡ3 /B)ht0 , π0 = ((ḡ3 /B)ht0 )t0 , C10 = ht1 , π1 = ((APK/B)−1 ht1 )t1 .
5. Choose r0 ← ZZn1 , and compute first t = t1 + t2 and then
S10

x3

=A

0

· (u

k
Y

m0

0

0

uj j )r · Ât , and S20 = g r .

j=1

6. Choose a random vector v ∈ ZZN
n2 , denoted v = (s, v2 , · · · , vN ). For each
row Mj of M , it chooses a random rj ∈ ZZn2 .
7. Choose a random element D ∈ GT , computes sk = H1 (D), and uses sk
as a symmetric key of SE to encrypt the bit strings
S1 ||S2 ||S10 ||S20 ||C00 ||C10 ||π0 ||π1 and gains a ciphertext c̃.
8. The credential-protected package π is set as
c̃, C0 = De(g1 , g1 )αs , C = g1s , C 0 = (g1γ )s ,
−r

r

Cj = (g1c )Mj ·v hρ(j)j , Dj = g1j , for j = 1, · · · , L.
• TranV : TranV (m, π, PKi , APK, PM, CDS ) does as follows.
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1. Computes constants ωj ∈ ZZn2 such that

P

ρ(j)∈S

ωj Mj = (1, 0, · · · , 0). It

then computes
Y

ê(C, K)ê(C 0 , K 0 )−1 /

(ê(Cj , K 00 )ê(Dj , Kρ(j) ))ωj = ê(g1 , g1 )αs .

ρ(j)∈S

2. Recover D as C0 /ê(g1 , g2 )αs , compute sk = H1 (D) and uses sk as a
symmetric key of SE to decrypt the ciphertext c to gain a full signature
σ.
• Ver: Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK) does as follows.
1. Parse σ as (S1 , S2 , S10 , S20 , C0 , C1 , π0 , π1 ), compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (m),
and verify whether
e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , ū0

k
Y

m

ūj j ) = e(ḡ1 , ḡ2 )

j=1

holds. If so, output >; if not, output ⊥.
2. Check whether
e(C00 , C00 /(ḡ3 /B)) = e(h, π0 ) and e(C10 , C10 /(APK/B)) = e(h, π1 )
hold. If either does not hold, output ⊥.
3. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (m||S1 ||S2 ||PKi ) and C20 = C00 · C10 , and
verify whether
e(A, BC20 )

=

e(S10 , g)

·

e((S20 )−1 , u0

k
Y

m0

uj j )

j=1

holds. If so, output >; if not, output ⊥.
• ResUser : ResUser (mA , mB , ω, SKj , PKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )) does as follows.
x0

0

1. Parses PKj as (g̃1 , g̃2 , g̃3 , ũ0 , ũ1 , · · · , ũk ) and SKj := (g̃2 1 , Ax3 ).
2. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mB ),
3. Choose a random exponent r ∈ ZZn1 and computes
S1 =

x0
g̃2 1

0

· (ū

k
Y
i=1

r
i r
ũm
i ) , and S2 = g .
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4. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (m||S1 ||S2 ||PKj ).
5. Choose two random exponents t0 , t1 ∈ ZZn1 and sets
C00 = (g̃3 /B)ht0 , π0 = ((g̃3 /B)ht0 )t0 , C10 = ht1 , π1 = ((APK/B)−1 ht1 )t1 .
6. Choose r0 ← ZZn1 , and compute first t = t1 + t2 and then
S10

x3

=A

k
Y

0

· (u

m0

0

0

uj j )r · Ât , and S20 = g r .

j=1

7. Set σB := (S1 , S2 , S10 , S20 , C0 , C1 , π0 , π1 ).
8. Set request := (ω, mB , σB , PKj , (M, ρ)).
• ResTTP : ResTTP (mA , PKi , (M 0 , ρ0 ), request, ASK) does as follows.
1. Parse request as (ω, mB , σB , PKj , (M, ρ)) and ω as σP and θ. If the nonrepudiation information θ is not with respect to the tuple (σP , mA , mB ,
(M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )), outputs ⊥.
2. Parse σP as (S1 , S2 ), compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mA ), and verify whether
e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , ū0

k
Y

m

ūj j ) = e(ḡ1 , ḡ2 )

j=1

holds. If not, output ⊥.
3. Check whether Ver(mB , σB , PKj , APK) = >. If not, output ⊥.
4. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (mA ||S1 ||S2 ||PKi ).
5. Choose two random exponents t0 , t1 ∈ ZZn1 and sets
C00 = ht0 , π0 = ((ḡ3 /B)−1 ht0 )t0 , C10 = (APK/B)ht1 , π1 = ((APK/B)ht1 )t1 .
6. Choose r0 ← ZZn1 , and compute first t = t1 + t2 and then
S10 = Ay · (u0

k
Y

m0

0

0

uj j )r · Ât , and S20 = g r .

j=1
0

7. Choose a random vector v ∈ ZZN
n2 , denoted v = (s, v2 , · · · , vN 0 ). For each
row Mj of M , it chooses a random rj ∈ ZZn2 .
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8. Choose a random element D ∈ GT , computes sk = H1 (D), and uses sk
as a symmetric key of SE to encrypt the bit strings
S1 ||S2 ||S10 ||S20 ||C00 ||C10 ||π0 ||π1 and gains a ciphertext c̃A .
9. The credential-protected package πA is set as
c̃A , C0 = De(g1 , g1 )αs , C = g1s , C 0 = (g1γ )s ,
−r

0

r

j
, Dj = g1j , for j = 1, · · · , L0 .
Cj = (g1c )Mj ·v hρ0 (j)

0
0
0 0
10. Choose a random vector v 0 ∈ ZZN
n2 , denoted v = (s , v2 , · · · , vN ). For each

row Mj0 of M 0 , it chooses a random rj0 ∈ ZZn2 .
11. Choose a random element D0 ∈ GT , computes sk 0 = H1 (D0 ), and uses sk 0
as a symmetric key of SE to encrypt the σB and gains a ciphertext c̃B .
12. The credential-protected package πB is set as
0

0

0

c̃B , C0 = De(g1 , g1 )αs , C = g1s , C 0 = (g1γ )s ,
0

−r0

r0

Cj = (g1c )Mj ·v hρ(j)j , Dj = g1j , for j = 1, · · · , L.
13. The output is (πA , πB ).

8.4.1

Efficency Analysis

Since pairing and exponentiation operations take more time than multiplication operations do, the costs of multiplication computations will be simply ignored here. Let
SE, SD, P and E denote a symmetric encryption operation, a symmetric decryption
operation and a pairing operation, and an exponentiation operation, respectively.
Let M be an L × N matrix, ρ a map from each row Mj of M to an attribute ρ(j),
and S a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure (M, ρ). Denote s as the
number of elements of the set {1 ≤ j ≤ L|ρ(j) ∈ S}.
The costs of the instantiation of ABOFE is presented in Table 8.1, in which
TranS is evaluated with respect to the access structure (M, ρ), and TranV is evaluated with respect to the set of attributes S.

8.5

Chapter Summary

The notion of attribute-based optimistic fair exchange was proposed, and a formal
security model was given. A generic construction of PAOFE was then proposed,

8.5. Chapter Summary

Algorithms: TranP
Cost:
2E

TPVer
3P
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TranS
1SE, (12 + 3L)E

TranV
1SD, (2s + 2)P, (s)E

Ver
10P

Table 8.1: Costs of algorithms in the instantiation of ABOFE.
and its security is proved under the proposed model in the standard model. Since
ABOFE can be used to solve the fair exchange problem when the attributes of the
participants need to be taken into account, ABOFE can be viewed as an extension of
OFE in the attribute-based setting. A more elegant solution based on fair exchange
of attribute-based signatures is left as the future work.
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Chapter 9
Fairness in Concurrent Signatures
Revisited
In this chapter the fairness of concurrent signatures is revisited, and it is shown that
the initial signer enjoys more advantages than it was acknowledged.

9.1

Introduction

Fairness in the exchange of digital signatures is normally achieved with the help of
a trusted third party (TTP), which is often off-line. It is well-known that the role
of the TTP cannot be replaced by a normal certification authority.
In Eurocrypt 2004 [CKP04], Chen, Kudla and Paterson presented a new cryptographic primitive called “concurrent signature” to allow two parties to produce two
ambiguous signatures, such that both signatures do not bind to their true signers.
Upon the release of the signatures, any third party cannot identify the true signer
who generated the signature. However, upon the release of an extra piece of information called the keystone, both signatures will bind concurrently. Further, Chen,
Kudla and Paterson presented a concrete concurrent signature scheme based on a
variant of Schnorr based ring signature scheme [AOS02].
In a concurrent signature protocol run, there are two parties involved, namely
Alice and Bob (or A and B, respectively). Since one party is required to create a
keystone and sends the initial signature to the other party, this party is called the
initial signer. A party who responds to the initial signature by creating another
signature is called a matching signer. Without losing generality, throughout this
chapter, it is assumed that Alice (or A, resp.) is the initial signer and Bob (or B,
resp.) is the matching signer.
Due to the merit of not requiring a TTP, concurrent signatures have been promising in many electronic commerce applications, especially in the scenarios where a
163
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TTP may not be available. A widely-used example is that concurrent signatures
provide a novel solution to the old problem of fair tendering of contracts.
It is acknowledged that concurrent signatures fall short to fully solve the problem
of fair exchange of digital signatures, since Alice is in control of the time at which
the keystone is released and thus, control when the ambiguous signatures become
binding to their respective signers. Alice can even decide not to complete a concurrent signature protocol run if Alice decided not to release the keystone ultimately.
Nonetheless, the concept of fairness in a concurrent signature is defined as follows:
“once Alice releases the keystone, both ambiguous signatures from Alice and Bob
binds concurrently”. Specifically, it is required that Alice cannot output a maliciously crafted keystone so that the ambiguous signature from Bob together with
this keystone passes the verification algorithm, yet verification of the ambiguous
signature created by Alice (perhaps also maliciously) together with this keystone
would output failure. In this thesis this definition of fairness is called a “white-box”
guarantee, as the malicious Alice is required to convert the ambiguous signature corresponding to Bob to a “well-formed” publicly verifiable signature under Bob to be
considered successful. This is possibly sufficient for legal contract signing purpose,
since the contract is valid if and only if a “well-formed” signature is present. This
definition is adopted in Chen et al.’s paper and the subsequent works.

9.1.1

Fairness in Practice

In this chapter, the observation is made that the formal definition of fairness does
not necessarily capture the fairness in practice completely. For example, there is
no guarantee that Alice could not convince a third party Carol that Bob has signed
a message, MB , that is, committed to MB , without revealing the keystone. It is
identified that a malicious initial signer may enjoy three levels of advantages in
concurrent signature.
(a) Level 0 advantage is inherent in concurrent signature. The initial signer can
always choose to abort or complete a concurrent signature protocol run.
(b) Level 1 advantage allows the initial signer to demonstrate the fact that she
is capable of making both signatures valid if she wanted to, without actually
making both signatures publicly verifiable.
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(c) Level 2 advantage allows the initial signer to convince a third party that the
matching signer has committed to a certain message, for example, MB , without
revealing anything else.
These advantage levels have concrete implications regarding the use of concurrent signatures in practical scenarios. As discussed by Chen et al. in their seminal
paper [CKP04], it is very often the case that the matching signer would not mind
sacrificing level 0 advantage. However, regarding level 1 and 2 advantages, concurrent signatures may not be suitable in some other scenarios such as tendering
systems (c.f. [CKP04] as it will be shown with details in the later part of this
chapter). Hence, in those scenarios, the OFE [ASW97, ASW98, ASW00, DLY07] or
Ambiguous OFE [HYWS08a, HWS11a, HWS12] systems are indeed more suitable
compared to concurrent signatures.

9.1.2

The Contributions

Firstly, it is shown that any constructions of concurrent signature following Chen,
Kudla and Peterson is always subject to abuse by the initial signer, with advantage
level 1 and 2, in addition to the commonly acknowledged advantage level 0. Generic
methods are presented that allow a malicious initial signer to convince any third
party that he/she has the ability to make both signatures verifiable (level 1), or
that the matching signer has committed to his message (level 2). Secondly, one
variant of concurrent signatures, namely asymmetric concurrent signature [Ngu05],
is examined and it is demonstrated how a malicious initial signer can exhibit his/her
level 1 advantage in an effective manner. The attack is practical and its implication
may discourage the adoption of concurrent signatures in some application scenarios,
and particularly, when it is undesirable to allow a malicious initial signer to convince anyone of the binding of the matching signer’s signature without making the
signature publicly verifiable.

9.1.3

Related Work

Following the seminal work by Chen et al., many subsequent concurrent signature
schemes have been proposed (such as [SMZ04, WBZ06, Ngu05, TSSN05]). Nguyen
[Ngu05] proposed an interesting variant that embraces the asymmetric property
of concurrent signatures (c.f. the symmetric property of all the previously known
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concurrent signature schemes). Furthermore, Nguyen noted that the construction
techniques of an asymmetric concurrent signature scheme can be used for constructing a multi-party concurrent signature scheme, which is the solution to the open
problem stated in Chen et al.’s seminal work [CKP04]. Subsequently, Tonien, Susilo
and Safavi-Naini [TSSN05] proposed a multi-party concurrent signature scheme that
uses a different model from the construction achieved from [Ngu05].
In an orthogonal direction, Susilo, Mu and Zhang [SMZ04] investigated the privacy issue in concurrent signatures. They observed that prior the release of a keystone, and just from the two ambiguous signatures, any third party can already
conclude that the two ambiguous signatures must be created by these two possible
signers. At the same time, if the possible signers are believed to be honest, the
outsider can already tell who the actual signer is corresponding to each ambiguous
signature. They then introduced a stronger requirement called perfect ambiguity,
which requires the ambiguous signatures to remain “ambiguous” even if the two potential signers are known to be honest. Unfortunately, their scheme is shown to be
insecure by Wang, Bao and Zhou [WBZ06], and subsequently, Wang et al. proposed
a modified scheme that is proven secure under this stronger notion.
Yuen, Wong, Susilo and Huang [YWSH11] constructed a concurrent signature
variant that supports negotiation between the initial signer and the matching signer
on who will control the final binding of the ambiguous signatures. They showed
that their model is compatible with the original definition by Chen et al. [CKP04].
Very recently, Tan, Huang and Wong [THW12] presented the first concurrent
signature scheme that is based on the standard assumption. Their ambiguity model
is very similar to the one proposed by Yuen et al. [YWSH11].

9.1.4

Chapter Organization

In the next section, the classification of advantage levels to the initial signer is
presented in detail, their implications are discussed and generic techniques which
allows the initial signer to enjoy these advantages are presented. In Section 9.3, it is
shown how an initial signer can enjoy level 1 advantage in the asymmetric concurrent
signature scheme due to Nguyen [Ngu05]. Finally, the chapter is summarised in
Section 9.5.
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Abusing Fairness in Concurrent Signatures

In this section, the various advantage levels enjoyed by the initial signer, their implications and how they could be acquired are discussed. At the high level, it is
often the case that exhibiting such advantage requires the use of zero-knowledge
proof [GMR85].

9.2.1

Advantage Level 0

Level 0 advantage is inherent in concurrent signatures, as the initial signer, Alice,
is in possession of the keystone, which is under the full control of Alice on when
and whether the keystone will be released to the public. Thus, the primitive is not
suitable if the matching signer will be at a disadvantage if withholding the keystone
or delaying the release of the keystone would cause harm to the matching signer.
The Implications.
Consider the tendering systems as discussed in the seminal paper of Chen et al.
[CKP04]. They described a scenario where A has a bridge-building contract that
she would like to put out to tender. Suppose there are two companies B and C
that wish to put in proposals to win this contract. In this scenario, B acts as the
initial signer, as this is to prohibit A to show this contract to C to get a better
proposal from C. Noted that in this particular scenario, B has the full control of
the keystone, since the keystone is selected by B. Therefore, if at the end of the
tender, if A would like to select B as the winner of the tender, B may still have the
liberty for not completing the contract by not releasing the keystone, and hence, it
is unfair to A.

9.2.2

Advantage Level 1

The Abuse.
Assume Alice is a malicious initial signer, whose purpose is to convince a third party
Carol that the matching signer Bob and herself are about to exchange signatures
on messages MA and MB . Assume Alice and Bob have completed step 3 of the
concurrent signature protocol (as described in Section 2.5.1). That is, Alice is in
possession of a keystone k and the ambiguous signature from Bob σB := (sB , hB , f )
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on message MB . At the same time, Bob is in possession of Alice’s ambiguous
signature σA := (sA , hA , f ) on message MA . In the generic attack, Alice reveals σA ,
σB , MA , MB to Carol and then conducts a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of
the value k with Carol such that
f = KGEN(k).
Carol is convinced that Alice and Bob are exchanging signatures on messages MA
and MB and that Alice has the ability to complete the transaction.
The Implications.
Consider an open auction [WBZ06, YWSH11] in which Alice’s ambiguous signature
is a contract to sell a certain goods while Bob’s ambiguous signature is a contract
of a bid. Level-1 advantage allows Alice to convince Carol that she has the ability
to seal the contract with Bob and the bid is specified in MB . This allows Alice to
safely urge Carol for a higher bid, and Bob is at a disadvantage.
Note that this implication is also applicable to the tendering systems as discussed
previously. However, in this scenario, let us consider the case where A, who would
like to put the bridge-building tender, is the initial signer. Hence, the company B
and C will act as the matching signers. In this setting, A will take the advantage
level 1 to convince C about B’s tender, so that C will increase the value of her
tender, and hence, disadvantaging B.

9.2.3

Advantage Level 2

The Abuse.
Assume Alice is a malicious initial signer, whose purpose is to convince a third party
Carol that the matching signer Bob has committed to message MB . Assume Alice
and Bob have completed step 3 of the concurrent signature protocol (as described
in Section 2.5.1). That is, Alice is in possession of a keystone k and the ambiguous
signature from Bob σB := (sB , hB , f ) on message MB . At the same time, Bob
is in possession of Alice’s ambiguous signature σA := (sA , hA , f ) on message MA .
The observation on the incompleteness of the original fairness definition in [CKP04]
arises from the fact that to convince Carol about Bob’s commitment to MB does not
necessarily involve outputting some maliciously crafted keystone k̂. Specifically, in
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the generic attack, Alice conducts a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the tuple
(k, σB ) with Carol such that the following statements are true:
1. f = KGEN(k), and
2. AVERIFY(σB , XA , XB , MB ) = 1.
This would be sufficient to convince a third party about Bob’s intention to sign
a message MB , without revealing anything about Alice’s intention, thus undermining the fairness guarantees of the concurrent signature schemes, and put Bob into
disadvantage.
The Implications.
Note that in the zero-knowledge proof, Alice does not reveal the keystone k, the
keystone fix f , nor Bob’s ambiguous signature. Thus, even if Carol is presented
with the secret key of Bob, the ambiguous signatures σA and σB from Bob, she
could not conclude that Alice has committed to MA . In other words, the only thing
that Carol can be assured of is that Alice is in possession of a signature from Bob
on message MB . Bob is left at an unfair position.
Note that both level 1 and 2 advantages are outside the security definition presented in Section 2.5.2. It is not claimed that existing concurrent signature schemes
are broken for two reasons. Firstly, they are not within the security model. Secondly, even though they are theoretically possible, it is not always feasible. Thus,
people should bear in mind any concurrent signature following this syntax could be
abused by the initial signer, and hence, the adoption of concurrent signatures in
application scenario should be examined to make sure that either the level 1 and
2 advantages of the initial signer are acceptable or that the advantages cannot be
claimed efficiently.

9.3

Abusing Fairness in Asymmetric Concurrent
Signatures

In this section, a practical abuse in advantage level 1 of the asymmetric concurrent
signature due to Nguyen [Ngu05] is demonstrated. In this abuse, the initial signer
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can convince any verifier that he/she has the ability to make both ambiguous signatures verifiable. It should be stressed again that the attack is outside their original
model and therefore it is not claimed that Nguyen’s original scheme is broken.

9.3.1

Review of Nguyen’s asymmetric concurrent signatures

For completeness, Nguyen’s scheme will be firstly reviewed.
Setup. Let G = hgi be a group of prime order p. The key pair of Alice and Bob
are respectively (XA = g xA , xA ) ∈ G × ZZp , (XB = g xB , xB ) ∈ G × ZZp . Let
H : G × {0, 1}∗ → ZZp be a hash function that would be modeled as random
oracle.
Generation of Alice’s ambiguous signature. On input a message MA ∈ {0, 1}∗
and Bob’s public key XB , Alice randomly generates r ∈R ZZp and computes
c = H(g r , MA ), s = g r+cxA . Alice sets her ambiguous signature as (c, s) and
sends it to Bob. The keystone is defined as k = r + cxA such that s = g k .
Generation of Bob’s ambiguous signature. On input a message MB ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
an ambiguous signature (c, s) on message MA from Alice, Bob first checks if
c = H(sXA−c , MA ). Bob continues if the check is successful. He computes
r0 −c0
.
xB

0

s0 = sxB , c0 = H(s0 g r , MB ) and k 0 =
0

0

He sets his ambiguous signature as

0

(c , s , k ) and sends it to Alice.
Binding of both signatures. Upon receiving (c0 , s0 , k 0 ) from Bob, Alice first checks
if
0

0

c0 = H(g c XBk s0 , MB )
and s0 = XBk . If the check is successful and if Alice decides to have both
signatures binded, she releases the value k. Both signatures are now publicly
verifiable by checking the following verification equations.
Verification of Alice’s signature:
?

?

c = H(XA−c s, MA ) ∧ s = g k
Verification of Bob’s signature:
?

0

0

?

c0 = H(g c XBk s0 , MB ) ∧ s0 = XBk
Remark. Nguyen’s construction is asymmetric in the sense that Alice’s signature
and Bob’s signature are of different form with different verification equations.
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A Concrete Level-1 Abuse on Nguyen’s Scheme

Given the pair of ambiguous signatures (c, s), (c0 , s0 , k 0 ) on message MA and MB
respectively, Alice, who is in possession of the keystone k satisfying the relationship
s = g k and s0 = XBk can convince a third party Carol that she has the ability to bind
both ambiguous signatures by proving she knows the value k in zero-knowledge. The
full proof protocol is shown below.
1. Alice sends both (c, s), (c0 , s0 , k 0 ) MA , MB to Carol.
0

0

2. Carol checks c = H(XA−c s, MA ) and c0 = H(g c XBk s0 , MB ). If yes, she randomly
generates two values t1 , t2 ∈R ZZp and sends T0 = g t1 ht2 to Alice.
3. Alice randomly generates a value t ∈R ZZp , computes T1 = g t , T2 = XBt and
sends T1 , T2 to Carol.
4. Carol sends t1 , t2 to Alice
5. Alice checks if T0 = g t1 ht2 . If yes, she computes z = t − t1 k and sends z to
Carol.
6. Carol checks if T1 = st1 g z and T2 = s0 t1 XBz and accepts the proof if both
equations hold.

9.4

Comparison of Concurrent Signatures and OFE

In this section the properties of concurrent signatures and those of OFE are compared with respect to the identified levels of fairness. Remember that in OFE the
verifier can always choose to abort or complete a fair exchange after having received
the signer’s partial signature. Thus for both concurrent signatures and OFE a user
can enjoy advantage level 0. However, the work in this chapter demonstrates a clear
gap between the notion of concurrent signature and optimistic fair exchange (OFE)
in which no party enjoys advantage level 1. Furthermore, in the variant Ambiguous
OFE, no party enjoys either advantage level 1 or advantage level 2.

9.5. Chapter Summary
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Chapter Summary

The advantage gained by the initial signer in a concurrent signature scheme were
pointed out, and classified into three levels. In fact, any concurrent signature satisfying Chen, Kudla and Paterson’s syntax can be abused in different ways. This
is a very important observation in particular where concurrent signatures are used
in different scenarios. Cautions must be exercised when concurrent signatures are
to be adopted in real applications to ensure either the matching signer can accept
the inherent unfairness of concurrent signatures or it is hard for the initial signer to
claim the advantage. In particular, it is demonstrated that concurrent signatures
were not suitable for tendering systems (in contrast to the seminal paper of Chen
et al. [CKP04]).
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Chapter 10
Conclusion and Future Work

10.1

Summary of the Thesis

Fair exchange of digital signatures has been considered as a fundamental problem
in cryptography. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows.

10.1.1

OFE with Stronger Security

In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, it was identified that the the existing security models
for OFE were not practical enough. To make it complete and more practical, the
enhanced chosen-key model was proposed, which allows a dishonest signer to have
access to the arbitrator’s secret key and explicitly provides the dishonest verifier
and the dishonest arbitrator with the signing oracle. It was demonstrated that the
enhanced chosen-key model were strictly stronger than the highest level of existing
OFE security model. Two popular approaches in the construction of OFE protocols
were revisited, namely, schemes based on verifiably encrypted signature and those
based on conventional signature plus ring signature and it was shown that they
could still yield schemes which remain secure in the enhanced model.

10.1.2

OFE with Better Efficiency

It is known that efficient OFE schemes can be constructed based on conventional
signatures and ring signatures. To guarantee the security of the resulting OFE
schemes, the security requirement for the ring signatures was previously believed
to be unforgeable under an adaptive attack, against a static adversary in the 2user setting. In Chapter 5, a strictly weaker model for 2-user ring signatures called
unforgeability against restricted adaptive attacks was proposed and it was proved
that 2-user ring signatures secure in this weaker model would suffice to guarantee the
174
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security of the resulting OFE scheme. Based on this observation, a new instantiation
of OFE scheme was proposed that achieved the best efficiency in the standard model
in terms of signature size, generation as well as verification. Besides, the OFE
instantiation relies on a weak assumption, and has comparable efficiency with the
most efficient OFE scheme secure in the random oracle model.

10.1.3

OFE with New Features

To extend the applications of OFE, several situations that had not been researched
before were studied. In Chapter 6, optimistic fair exchange of threshold signatures
was considered. In Chapter 7, perfect ambiguous optimistic fair exchange (PAOFE)
was introduced, which can be viewed as an extension of AOFE with a new property
perfect ambiguity. In Chapter 8, OFE in the attribute-based setting was considered.

10.1.4

Concurrent Signatures Revisited

Concurrent signature is a new cryptographic primitive to solve the fair exchange
of digital signatures problem without the help of a third party. In Chapter 9, it
was identified that theoretically the initial signer in a concurrent signature scheme
can gain more advantages except the basic one that was known. It was emphasized
that cautions must be exercised when concurrent signatures are to be adopted in
real applications and concurrent signatures may not be suitable in some applications
such as tendering systems.

10.2

Future Work

It would be an interesting work to apply the ideas in the enhanced chosen-key model
for OFE to AOFE, and propose the corresponding security model for AOFE, as well
as new efficient constructions of AOFE schemes secure in the new enhanced model.
Besides, construction of threshold optimistic fair exchange in the standard model
and secure in a model that is not static is left as the future work. It would also be
a meaningful work to find more elegant solutions based instead on fair exchange of
attribute-based signatures to solve the fair exchange problem in the attribute-based
setting.
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